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-The prosperity of a nation does not descend from
the sky. Nor does it emerge from its own accord from
the earth. It depends upon the conduct of the
people that constitute the nation. We must recognize
that the country does not mean just the lifeless soil
around us. The country consists of a conglomeration
of people and it is what they make of it. To rectify the
world and put it on proper path, we have to first rec-
tify ourselves and our conduct.... At the present
time, when we see all over the country confusion,
fear and anxiety, each one in every home must con-
tribute his share of cool, calm love to suppress the
anger and fury. No governmental authority can sup-
press it as effectively and as quickly as you can by love
and brotherliness.
SATHYA SAl BABA
.,
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-Preface
THERE has been no comprehensive study by geographers of the eth-
nic conflict in Sri Lanka which has been partially caused by the inabil-
ity of a community to preserve and develop a well-defined geographi-
-cal region considered to be its traditional homeland. My aim has been
to analyze__~.f!12~g other factors the geographical dctermmants.-2fthe
conflict."especially_tbg?_~geaUI1gwit.li.theaIIOC:itiOnofwateron a spa-
tial ba~~.iQ!agriculturaIdeyeJ<:>P!!lentand land seufe'"~ent.
I have undertaken this ambitio~~ taSk"serlOils[y and the book is the
culmination of a decade of intensive study and exclusive research on
this topic. I have undertaken numerous trips to Sri Lanka from 1977
to 1983.
The book deals primarily with contemporary issues, but I had to
discuss developments prior to independence in order to make readily
understandable the origins of the ethnic conflict.
Although the author is a Tamil and shares the concerns of his com- -
munity, he nevertheless has attempted to look at all sides of the issue
and make as disinterested a judgment as possible. So far as is
humanly possible, I have tried to approach the topic from the view-
point of a professional scholar. The reader has to judge for himself/
herself how well the author has succeeded in achieving that goal.
I am deeply indebted to my colleague]ohn D. Buenker, an author-
ity on ethnic history of the United States, who read all of the manu-
script, offered valuable criticism, and gave encouraging support. In
this regard, I greatly appreciate the contributions made by the
readers, whose critical reviews forced me to tighten the manuscript
and strengthen its substance. My sincere thanks also go to B. J.
Nielsen of the University of Wisconsin-Parkside library for her skill
and patience in obtaining most of the reference materials used in this
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book via the inter-library loan system. Donald Litner and Catherine
Owen of the Media Services of the university and my brother
Ainkaran assisted me with the compilation, drafting, and photo-
graphing of illustrations. Two of my former students, Patrick Lu-
chack, a Fulbright Scholar who completed one year of graduate study
in Sri Lanka in 1986, and Lydia Morrow, who is employed in the cata-
loging section of the university library, assisted me in the library
research and computer analysis of data.
One of the pleasures of writing this book has been the opportunity
to work with the members of the University of Hawaii Press. I am par-
ticularly indebted to Damaris A. Kirchhofer for her careful editing
and numerous improvements in the manuscript.
Finally, more than these words can convey, lowe a great deal to my
family-Devi, Shakila, and Anita-who had to suffer through my
moods and anxieties.
-Introduction
SRI LANKA, a small tropical island situated fewer than twenty-six
miles off the southern tip of India, has been the home of two major
ethnic groups, the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority, for cen-
turies. Previously known as Ceylon, the island is 61,610 square kilo-
meters in extent and is made up of predominantly coastal lowlands
and a central highland of less than 2,000 meters in elevation. The
lowlands, with a flat to undulating surface, comprise four-fifths of
the island and.are drained by rivers, many of which are dammed to
irrigate crops. The island is divided into a Wet Zone and a Dry Zone,
based on the regional distribution of annual precipitation. The Wet
Zone corresponds to the southwestern coastal plain and western por-
tion of the central highlands where large quantities of moisture are
delivered by the southwest monsoon. The Dry Zone, which covers the
rest of the island, receives between 1,000 to 1,800 millimeters of
annual rainfall from the often unreliable northeast monsoon and
cyclonic storms during the months ofNovember and December.
Although the Sinhalese and Tamil communities of Sri Lanka trace
their ethnic heritage and culture to India, the physical separation. of
the island from the subcontinent fostered the developmenr of a Sri
Lankan society with its own historical and cultural tradition.s. Within
Sri Lanka, however, each of these communities developed its own
sense of group identity, differentiated from the other on the basis of
ethnic origin, ancestral territory, language, religion, and cultural
attributes. Sinhalese, the majority of whom are Buddhists, consider
themselves to be descendants of the fair-skinned Aryan people of!
North India, pointing out that the Sinhala language is related to th
refined and widely used Indo-European group of languages rathe
than to the I:')ravidian language of the Tamils, the darker-skinned
largely Hindu people of South India.
2. INTRODUCTION
Colonized by Europeans in the sixteenth century, Sri Lanka became
an independent state in 1948. In the past decade, however, ethnic
conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils has undermined
national unity and all but destroyed the political integration of Sri
Lanka. The Sinhalese/Tamil relationship in Sri Lanka has its roots in a
long history that includes both traditional rivalry and peaceful coexis-
tence between the two groups. The Tamils have long been perceived
as a privileged community in Sri Lanka, a perception that remains
strong although it no longer holds true. Many Sinhalese continue to
insist that it is their rights, rather than those of the Tamils, that need
to be protected, even though the long-standing grievances of the
Sinhalese people concerning language rights, the status of Bud-
dhism, employment and educational opportunities, and political
control of the state by the Sinhala majority have been resolved. In the
meantime, the policy of discrimination against the Tamil community
fostered by Sinhala-dominated governments has reduced the minor-
ity to an oppressed group.
Sinhalese extremists have used the historical relationship between
the two groupit6=expl6jfthepolitical siniationinvari()us ways. The
Sinhalese-Bllddhist clergy-- has--convlnced gener~tions of-Sinhalese
that they were the original people of the island and that the Sinhalese
race was chosen by Gautama Buddha to establish a Sinhalese-Bud-
dhist society in Sri Lanka. Sinhalese historical traditions blame the
Tamils for the disintegration and collapse of the ancient Sinhalese
Buddhist civilization in north central Sri Lanka and for the forced
migration of Sinhalese from the Dry Zone to the Wet Zone in the
thirteenth century. Legends also remind the Sinhalese that there was
a constant danger of their society being destroyed or polluted by the
much larger Dravidian Hindu civilization of the subcontinent and
that heroic efforts were taken by rulers in the past to stem the tide of
Tamil invasion. This notion that South Indian Tamils in the past
.strived actively to subjugate the Sinhalese and even-destroyed their
flourishing :dvilizatiori- haS_h:a~_~- tremendous-impact on Sinhalese
conscioust!~. To a largeextent it accounts for the negative way some
\ Sinhalese havereaci:~dt~ Tamil demands for regional autonomy for
.,\. the northern and eastern areas ofthe country, which theTamils con-
-sider to betheiuraditiooal homeland.
Contrary to Sinhalese claims that they were the original inhabitants
of the island, Sri Lanka has had a long and continuous history of set-
tlement by Tamils. Their numerical strength was large enough in the
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thirteenth century to establish an independent kingdom in northern
Sri Lanka. Historical records indicate that the Malabar Coast on the
western side of the subcontinent was the source ofmajor Tamil migra-
tion to the island until about the thirteenth century, when it shifted
to the present-day Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Although Sri Lankan
Tamils speak the same language and follow a set of cultural traditions
similar to those of the Tamils of South India, the impact of the early
Malabar migration, their long period of residence in Sri Lanka, and
their interaction with the Sinhalese people helped them to become
distinct from the Tamils of Tamil Nadu. Sri Lankan Tamils developed
a unique community identity when they established the ]affna king-
dom, independent of the Sinhalese Kandyan kingdom of the hill
country and Kotte kingdom of the southwest, and of Tamil kingdoms
in South India. When the Portuguese and the Dutch occupied Sri
Lanka in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, respectively, they
left intact the administrative structure of the three kingdoms and rec-
ognized northern Sri Lanka as the traditional homeland of the
Tamils. A vast stretch of mosquito-infested Dry Zone kept the Sinha-
lese and Tamils apart until the eighteenth century, when the whole
country was brought under one administration by the British.
The establishment of a unitary form of government and the devel-
opment of an extensive system of roads and railroads linking all parts
of the island enabled members of the Sinhalese and Tamil communi-
ties to come into contact with each other. The British government
abolished the three separate systems of administration that had
existed for the Sinhalese Maritime provinces, the Tamil Maritime
provinces, and the Kandyan provinces during the Dutch period. The·
country was divided on a territorial basis into five provinces, namely,
the Northern, Eastern, Southern, Western, and Central provinces,
and each province was placed under the authority of a British govern-
ment agent who was appointed by the governor of Ceylon. The Tamil
Maritime provinces, which have been traditionally inhabited almost
entirely by Tamil-speaking people, became the Northern and Eastern
provinces of Sri Lanka. The number of provinces was later increased
to nine by the addition of the Northern-Western, North-Central,
Uva, and Sabaragamuwa provinces, and each province was sub-
divided into administrative districts and administered by Assistant
Government Agents (see Figure 1). Administrative functions were
subsequently decentralized at the district level, rather than at the
provincial level, and each of the twenty-two administrative districts
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was placed under the charge of a government agent. The Tamil-
speaking people maintained a clear majority in all the districts of the
Northern and Eastern provinces, but the ethnic composition of some
of these districts, especially Amparai, Trincomalee, and Vavuniya
began to change dramatically after the 1930s as large numbers of
Sinhalese were settled in these districts under government-sponsored
colonization schemes.
The linguistic and religious differences between the two communi-
ties proved strong enough that Sinhalese and Tamils continue to be
self-conscious about their identification with their respective com-
munities. Although four different ethno-religious-linguistic com-
munities reside in Sri Lanka, more than 92 percent of the inhabitants
identify themselves with one of two distinct groups, Sinhalese and
Tamils (see Tables 1 and 2). In 1981, the estimated population of the
island was 14.85 million, of which the Sinhalese and Tamil communi-
ties account for 74 percent and 18.2 percent, respectively. Two-thirds
of the inhabitants, predominantly Sinhalese, live in the Wet Zone,
while 72.6 percent of the Sri Lankan Tamils, 9.4 percent of the Indian
Tamils, and 35 percent of the Muslims, all of whom speak Tamil, live
in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where agricultural develQp.~
ment is hampered by a lack ofwater.
Agriculture is the mainstay of the' economy of the island. Rice is
the staple food of the inhabitants, and paddy lands occupy approxi-
mately 13 percent of the island's total land area, with almost two-
thirds of the area under irrigation. In addition, tea, rubber, coconut,
sugar cane, and minor food crops occupied approximately 17.5 per-
cent of the total land area of the island in 1981. The cultivation of
export crops-including paddy, subsidiary food crops, as well as for-
estry and fishing-contributed approximately 28 percent of the Gross
National Product in 1983 (see Table 3).
Given the meager resources of the water-deficient environment of
northern Sri Lanka, the Tamils were compelled to seek alternative
means of livelihood. By acquiring knowledge of the English language
they were able to secure a disproportionate share of public employ-
ment in the British-run administration, even in Sinhalese-dominated
areas, as well as in the legal, medical, and engineering professions
during colonial times. Tamils who were employed in the colonial
administration had an average income higher than the rest of the
population, including the majority of Tamils living in the Northern
and Eastern provinces. Nevertheless, the Sinhalese community
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6Table I. Ethnic Communities in 1981
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Ethnic
Communities
Northern Reptesented
and in Northern
Eastern and Eastern
Ethnic Communities Sri Lanka Provinces' Provinces
Number % Number % %
Total 14,850,000 100.0 2,087,943 100.0
Sinhalese 10,989,000 74.0 276,578 13.2 2.51
Sri Lankan Tamils 1,871,000 12.6 1,358,188 65.0 72.59
Indian Tamils 817,000 5.5 76,754 3.7 9.39
Muslims (Moors) 1,054,000 7.1 368,277 17.7 34.94
Othersb 119,000 0.8 8,146 0.4 6.80
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census ofPopulation andHousing, Sn' Lanka,
1981: Preliminary Release No.1.
'These two provinces were approximately 26 percent of the total area of the island in 1978.
blncludes Burghers (Eurasians) and Malays.
Table 2. Population by Religion in Sri Lanka, 1981
Religion
All Religions
Buddhists
Hindus
Muslims (Moors)
Christians
Others
Numbers
14,850,000
10,291,000
2,302,000
1,128,000
1,114,000
15,000
Percentage
Distribution
100.0
69.3
15.5
7.6
7.5
0.1
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Census ofPopula-
tion and Housing, Sri Lanka, 1981: Preliminary Release No.1.
viewed all Tamils, irrespective of whether they resided in Tamil- or
Silnhalese-dominated areas, as having an income higher than that of
the Sinhalese population. Therefore, Sinhalese politicians demanded
a larger share of the economic resources of the country for their com-
munity in order that the consequences of inequalities between the
two communities might be redressed.
The Sinhalese also became resentful of the Tamils of Indian origin
whom the British settled in the predominantly Sinhalese areas of the
hill country in the 1830s to work on the tea plantations. The Indians
were considered by the Sinhalese to be foreigners who had no abiding
interest in the island and who were prepared to work for low wages on
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Table 3. Sector Composition of Gross National Product and Employment, 1983.
(GNP at 1982 Constant Factor Cost Prices)
Composition
GNP (millions Percent Employment Percent
Sector of Rupees) of GNP (thousands) of Iotal
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 26,294 28.0 2,172.7 45.8
Mining and Quarrying 2,413 2.6 63.7 1.3
Manufacturing' 13,710 14.6 568.2 12.0
Construction 8,039 8.5 229. I 4.8
Electricity, Gas, and Sanitary
Services 1,161 1.2 18.0 0.4
Transportation, Storage, and
Communications 8,920 9.5 197.4 4.2
Wholesale and Retail 16,910 18.0 490.8 10.4
Services 8,672 9.2 648.1 13.7
Othersb 10,864 11.5 349.6 7.4
Gross National Product 94,047 103.1
Net Factor Income from Abroad -2,936 -3.1
Total 94,047 100.0 4,737.7 100.0
Source: Department ofCensus and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book o/the Democratic Socialist
Republic o/Sri Lanka, and Central Bank ofCeylon, Review o/the Economy.
'Includes tree crop processing.
bInciudes banking, insurance, real estate, ownership ofdwellings, public administration, and
defense.
the plantations that were established on lands cultivated-or with the
potential to be cultivated-by the Kandyan peasantry. As Tamils of
Sri Lankan origin and Tamils of Indian origin moved into Sinhalese
areas to seek employment, it was not difficult for politicians to revive
the ancient fear of a Tamil threat to the survival of the Sinhala race,
its language, and culture. Thus the early decades of the twentieth
century saw the resurgence of Sinhalese nationalism to which Bud-
dhist activists gave a religious bent by warning that the people should
strive to prevent the Tamils and Muslims from dominating the econ-
omy of the island. Nevertheless, there was no open confrontation
between Sinhalese and Tamil politicians until the 1920s.
Ethnic rivalry became an issue in the-1920s when the British gov-
ernment began giving serious consideration to greater Ceylonese par-
ticipation in the political process. Sinhalese politicians insisted that
communal representation, which had hitherto been the vehicle
through which Ceylonese participated in the colonial government, be
replaced by some form of territorial representation that would be
reflective of the size of the Sinhalese community relative to that of
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\ the Tamils. Tamil demands to retain communal representation were
I
\ Jejected.
During the early years of British rule in Sri Lanka, the governor,
who was appointed by the Crown, exercised all executive and legisla-
tive power with the aid of an advisory council. The governor's auto-
cratic powers were reduced with the establishment of the first Legisla-
tive Council in 1833, which included both official and unofficial
members. Three of the six unofficial members of the Legislative
Council were nominated by the governor from the English-educated
Ceylonese elite. The nomination was on a communal basis, since one
Tamil, one Burgher (Eurasian), and one low-country Sinhalese were
selected to represent their respective groups in the Council. The exec-
utive powers were vested in the governor and the Executive Council,
and the Legislative Council continued to be mainly an advisory body.
In 1912, an "educated Ceylonese," who could speak, read, and write
in English, was elected by educated Ceylonese to the Legislative
Council, but all the other Ceylonese on the Council were nominated
by the governor on a communal basis. With the official majority in
the Legislative Council, the unofficial members had very little power
to enact laws. In 1924, more than half the members of the Legislative
Council were elected and for the first time the unofficial members
formed a majority in the Council. Even those nominated on a com-
munal basis were elected by communal electorates. The governor,
however, continued to exercise his powers through the Executive
Council without having to consult with the members of the Legisla-
tive Council.
The Donoughmore Constitution of 1931 introduced drastic
changes in the system of representation and in the exercise of real
power by the people of Sri Lanka. All adults over the age of twenty-
one were granted franchise and the members in the newly constituted
State Council were territorially elected. The State Council was also
vested with both legislative and executive powers. The minorities,
especially the Tamils, objected to the abolition of communal elector-
ates on ground that territorial representation would create a Sinha-
lese-dominated State Council that would ultimately discriminate
against them. When a new legislature was convened, after the elec-
tions of 1936, Tamil representatives for the first time were excluded
from the cabinet and a pan-Sinhalese ministry was formed. Tamil
politicians became apprehensive that their community would be dis-
criminated against by a Sinhalese-dominated government and de-
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manded that the Soulbury Commission, charged with drawing up a
constitution for an independent Sri Lanka, safeguard minority inter-
ests. G. G. Ponnambalam, a Tamil representative to the State Coun-
cil of the ]affna constituency in the Tamil north, demanded that half
the seats in the parliament of independent Sri Lanka should be
assigned to minorities. Thus, the formation of the pan-Sinhalese
ministry and a pro-Sinhalese council, the Sinhala Maha Sabha, fol-
lowed by the "50-50" demand of G. G. Ponnambalam, paved the
way for the emergence of contemporary ethnic conflict.
The constitution of independent Sri Lanka provided for the estab-
lishment of a British-style parliamentary system of government in
1948. The parliament consisted of the Queen, and the House of Rep-
resentatives, and the Senate. The Queen was represented by the gov-
ernor-general, who was appointed by the Queen on the advice of the
prime minister. The governor-general had very little power to govern
the country. The link to the Crown was maintained because it did not
infringe on Sri Lanka's independent status and provided an opportu-
nity for the country to become a member of the worldwide common-
wealth of nations. In 1972, Sri Lanka became a free, sovereign, and
independent republic within the Commonwealth.
The Senate had thirty members, of whom fifteen were elected by
the Bouse of Representatives, in accordance with the system of pro-
portional representation by means of single transferable vote, and fif-
teen were appointed by the governor-general on the advice of the
prime minister. Senators served for a period of six years, one-third
retiring every two years. The president and the deputy president of
the Senate were elected by its members. The Senate was abolished in
1972 by a constituent assembly of the people of Sri Lanka, convened
to adopt and enact a new constitution.
The House of Representatives had 101 members, 95 popularly
elected and 6 appointed by the governor-general to insure that
minorities were represented. The duration of the House of Represen-
tatives is five years unless parliament is dissolved earlier. All citizens
of Sri Lanka over the age of eighteen were entitled to elect the mem-
bers to the House of Representatives from 89 electoral districts. Five
electorates had more than one seat. The electorates were delimited
according to one seat for every 1,000 square miles and one seat for
every 75,000 inhabitants. The area provision was incorporated to
ensure that minorities in the less-populated Eastern Province were
adequately represented. As the population increased, the total num-
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ber of electoral districts was increased to 145 in the 1960s. There was a
corresponding increase in the members of the House of Representa-
tives from 101 to 157. Of the 157 members, 151 were elected and 6
were appointed. The 1972 constitution called for a unicameral repub-
lican structure and established the National State Assembly to replace
the two houses. The National Assembly of the elected representatives
of the people was vested with the legislative, executive, and judiciary
power of the Republic. The duration of the National Assembly was
set at six years, unless it is dissolved earlier. The National Assembly,
which was elected in 1977, has not been dissolved even though it
completed its six-year term in 1983. One hundred and sixty-eight
members were elected to the National Assembly at the general elec-
tion held in 1977.
From 1948 until 1977 , the prime minister and his cabinet, chosen
from the party which had the majority in the House of Representa-
tives, constituted the executive branch of the government. The prime
minister as the head of the cabinet, was in charge of the Ministry of
Defense and External Affairs, while the other ministers were in
charge of departments assigned to them by the prime minister. While
the prime minister, the leader of the largest party to be represented in
the House of Representatives, was appointed by the governor-gen-
eral, other ministers were appointed by the governor-general on the
advice of the prime minister. The position of governor-general was
abolished by the constituent assembly in 1972, bur the prime minis-
ter was given the authority to nominate the president, who became
the head of the state, head of the executive, and commander-in-chief
of the armed forces. He was, however, responsible to the National
Assembly in the exercise of the powers that were delegated to him
under the constitution. In actual practice, the president had very lit-
tle powers and the cabinet of ministers with the prime minister as its
head were in complete charge of the government of the Republic of
Sri Lanka until 1977.
A major change was introduced in the British-style parliamentary
form of government in 1978, when the constitution of the Demo-
cratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka made provisions for the presi-
dent to be directly elected by the people for a fixed term of six years.
The president serves as head of the state, the government, as well as a
member and head of the Cabinet of Ministers. The prime minister
does not exercise the same degree of executive power he or she exer-
cised under the British-style parliamentary system. Nevertheless, as
INTRODUCTION II
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the leader of the majority party in the National Assembly, the prime
minister has sufficient influence over the elected representatives in
parliament. Since the prime minister and the president are from the
same party, no major conflicts have appeared over issues between the
National Assembly and the president. In the future, however, if the
prime minister and the president were to be elected from different
political parties, the National Assembly could pass or reject laws con-
trary to the president's wishes. The life of the present parliament,
which was elected in 1977, has been extended until 1989 by means of
a referendum conducted in 1982.
WhelL~ri_ ~:ll1lca_bl::carnejndependentinJ24_8.L?jnhalese politi-
cians used their majority in the newly electedparliament_tojmprove
theircomrtill@YJ_~~9nomicand p()liticatpositions. Th.e Tamils of
Indian-origIn became the first target of discrimination when the par-
liamentenaeteareglsIatlon exCluding-themTiom Ceylon citizenship
in19{?! Some Sinhalese leaders realized-that -a better life for their
community could not be achieved by merely acquiring political
power-the sensitive issue of ethnic identity had to be exploited to
accomplish this. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was one of the eminent
politicians who championed the cause of the Sinhalese masses by
demanding the overhauling of the administrative, educational, and
political structures, legacies of the colonial system that had bestowed
"undue" privileges on Tamils. No sooner had he become the prime
minister in 1956 than the Sinhalese-dominated parliament passed
legislation making Sinhala the official language of the country in
place of English. Tamil politicians adopted various strategies to show
their disapproval of this legislation. C. Suntharalingam, a prominent
Tamil politician who served in the post-independence cabinet,
threatened that the Tamils would solicit the support of Tamils in
South India in order to establish an independent state. The call for
the establishment of a separate Tamil state was considered very serious
by Sinhalese politicians, especially because the Dravida Munnetra
Kazhagam Movement in India was clamoring for the establishment
of an independent Dravida state in South India. Some Sinhalese poli-
ticians warned of the possibility of the creation of a pan-Dravidian
Tamil state that would ultimately undermine the future of the
Sinhala race, its culture, and Buddhism. It is obvious that political
leaders in both communities used the issue of ethnicity to outbid
their political opponents.
The Tamil electorate, however, continued to support the Federal
Il. INTRODUCTION
Party whose objective was not to establish a separate state but to form
a semi-autonomous Tamil linguistic state within a federal union of Sri
Lanka, although some radicals in the party clamored for an indepen-
dent state. Nevertheless, the Buddhist clergy, some opposition par-
ties, and a few powerful Sinhalese extremists began to view all Tamil
demands as seeking to establish a separate state. These groups have
generally succeeded in blocking the passage of any legislative mea-
sures designed to grant political, language, territorial, and economic
concessions to the Tamils since 1956. Tamil opposition to discrimina-
tory laws and regulations under the direction of the Federal Party
took the form of nonviolent disobedience campaigns designed to per-
suade the government to grant concessions. In many instances, how-
ever, thugs or the police broke up these peaceful demonstrations.
Some of the demonstrations led to anti-Tamil riots, such as those in
1956 and 1958, which swept the island. The leader of the Federal
party, S.]. V. Chelvanayakam, attempted to work with various Sin-
hala governments to resolve the ethnic problem. The Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 and the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam
pact of 1965 were negotiated in good faith but were not imple-
mented because of strong opposition from a section of the Buddhist
clergy and a few extremists. In. ~9thcasesthe ..Tamils were willing to
accept constitutional provisions for the decentralizatioll'of limited
governmentalfunCiions toTimill;r()vlnces-~nd to;f,-andon their orig-
inal derriari~ds-forrrlakingIa~ilan official language and for establish-
inga_ThmiUinguistic state within Sri tanka.'
Not only was the Federal Party unsuccessful in secuting Tamil
rights from successive governments, it W:l!nUSO unable to dissuade the
government from discriminating against the Tamils with regard to
recruitment for government jobs and admissions to universities and
frot.!! settling.-.Sinhalese-peasants, in Tamil areas. Despite appeals from
the Federal Party, laws were passed an.d·regulations issued to facilitate
the gradual exclusion of Tamils from public service, to restrict the
number of Tamil students gaining admission to universities on the
basis of merit, to accelerate the planned colonization of Tamil areas,
and to encourage the development of Sinhalese districts relative to
Tamil districts. The government also pursued an aggressive policy of
settling Sinhalese families in Tamil districts by inaugurating major
irrigation projects and repairing existing ones, while the economy of
the predominantly Tamil areas was allowed to deteriorate.
~ In the early 1970s, a major change occurred in the strategy
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employed by Tamils to fight for their rights because of two factors.
First, the 1972 constitution of Sri Lanka did not recognize Tamil as
the language of a national minority, while Sinhala was reaffirmed as
the onl~allangu~e of Sri Lanka. Also, there were no provisions
granting devoliitioiiOt powers to Tamil provinces, but Buddhism was
given special status as the religion of the state. Second, Tamil youths,
frustrated with the inability of their leaders to secure the legitimate
rights of the Tamils, demanded that all Tamil parties unite to become
an effective force against Sinhalese domination. As a result, all the
major Tamil parties were dissolved and the Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF) was formed under the leadership of Chelvanayakam in
1972. Many Tamil youths, however, disapproving of the peaceful
methods adopted by their elders, demanded more vigorous action.
Deeply concerned about their future and thai: of their community,
some of them decided to follow the dictates of their own leaders to \
carry arms in order to establish an independent state in which they
could hope to enjoy the privileges denied to them by Sinhala govern-
ments. Indeed, as the degree of discrimination against Tamils intensi-
fied, Tamil demands for the establishment of a semi-autonomous
state fhanged-m-197<Jto a caIIT6nh-ecteationoting1.aependent and
sovereign state to l?~_named_E~lam. Tamil milit~i;ts formed under-
g~nd-movements, the most prominent of which was the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and employed violent methods to express
their disapproval ofgovernment policies against their people.
Tamil representatives continued to use their influence in parlia-
ment to persuade the government to grant political, economic, and
language concessions to the Tamils, but with little success. However,
the ultimate objective of all TULF members was to establish the state
of Eelam, and that elicited an expression of moral support from the
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam of Tamil Nadu. This Indian connection
revived Sinhalese fears of South Indian domination of Sri Lanka and,
in 1977, when the TULF won the elections in the Tamil-dominated
districts on a mandate to establish Eelam, reports linking Tamil mili-
tants to the killing of a. Sinhalese policeman started a major riot in
which many Tamils were killed and made homeless. The riot alienat-
ed Tamil miiitants, and they showed their disapproval by attacking
security forces. Soon the ethnic violence, which had hitherto been
limited to the burning and looting of Tamil homes and properties in
Sinhalese areas, took on a multifaceted character. Tamil militants also
attacked government establishments and government informants in
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Tamil-dominated areas. The security forces retaliated by attacking
innocent civilians. The government, in turn, introduced emergency
regulations, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, and other repressive
measures to halt terrorism, but youths continue to harass security
forces.
Since 1977, many civilians have been killed and made homeless by
Sinhalese mobs, government security forces, and by the militant wing
of the Tamil separatist movement. The intensity and the severity of
anti-Tamil riots, as determined by the loss of lives and damage to
property, have been increasing with each incident. The 1983 riot is
considered the worst, since it was allegedly instigated and organized
by employees of a government ministry. After 1983, Tamil militants
expanded their attacks to include Sinhalese civilians in the Northern
and Eastern provinces. Many Tamils were killed and rendered home-
less as government forces attempted to flush out militants indis-
criminately from these provinces. This circle of violence has taken
such a heavy toll of innocent lives and inflicted such suffering and
humiliation on the Tamil community that time must pass before the
memories of the bloodshed and bitterness can be forgotten. Even if a
political settlement to the ethnic problem were to be negotiated in a
spirit of mutual accommodation, the prospects for national reconcili-
ation seem remote. The governing United Nati()nalParty appears to
want a s()lutiontoth~ethnicproblem, but itsreluctance"togrant sub-
stanualpowers to Tamil provincesand its carrot and stickj'Eproach in
de'iliiYf·wiilietbnic.<:onflict have delayed any peacefuLf~.2!irtion to
the conflict.
The purpose of this book is to document accurately and fairly the
historical perspective of Sinhalese/Tamil relationships in Sri Lanka. It
will be shown that the roots of the ethnic conflict can be traced to
early historical times. The long-standing grievances of the Sinhalese
people concerning their language rights, the status of Buddhism,
employment and education opportunities, and political control of
the state by the Sinhala majority have been resolved. Likewise, it will
be demonstrated that the Tamils are no longer a privileged commu-
nity, although many Sinhalese continue to insist that their rights,
rather than those of Tamils, should be protected. The aggressive pol-
icy of discrimination in areas such as languaRe, freedom ~s­
sion, universit-y-educarion:eIDpioyment "1ll7he public anctprivate
sectorsy,co~mil-tlistti£.fs;-and--the--agticulturaland
---_.......... .- .-'- .. " .. - .. '"--'''''''--'-''' ----..--.-'"
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0All~s~[~L~nLQUaDlildistricts has made the Tamils an
oppressed mmonty m Sri Lanka. T~-Throils..ar~underrepresented in
the army, navy, air force, and police, and the government"lias sta-
tioned its·· Sinhai~~domiiiated sec,"!!ity.Jor~~~jn.~Tamil. distriCts to
harass~IpopulafiOn~Slnhaleseextremists ar~unwilling to
recognize that Tamils have been alienated through discrimination
and that their attitude toward the Tamils has greatly affected the abil-
ity of the Sinhalese and Tamils of the moderate persuasion to negoti-
ate a political settlement of the ethnic problem. Indeed, the Sinhala-
Tamil ethnic conflict could have been resolved in the past had the
moderate Sinhalese and Tamils persuaded the small minority of
extremists in both communities to accept proposals that guaranteed
some of the legitimate rights of the Tamils involving the use of the
Tamil language, regional autonomy for Tamil areas, colonization of
Tamil areas, and the development of Tamil areas where there are
severe problems ofunemployment and food scarcity.
Another purpose is to show that the ethnic composition of some of
the Tamil districts has been drastically altered by state-sponsored col-
onization schemes and that Tamils are increasingly apprehensive that
Sinhalese settlers will ultimately deprive them of their political power
and even deny employment opportunities to those who are educated
in the Tamil medium. It will be apparent that Tamil demands for
regional autonomy are based on the desire to preserve and develop
Tamil districts for the benefit of the Tamil community, especially
when Sinhalese-dominated areas are no longer safe for Tamil resi-
dents and where employment opportunities are largely restricted to
those educated in the Sinhala medium.
Chapters 1 and 2 provide a historical perspective on the ethnic
problem. Ethnic differences between the two major communities are
analyzed and the sequence of political events that followed the grant-
ing of independence to Sri Lanka and the introduction of Sinhala as
the only official language are discussed with special emphasis on
Sinhala nationalism, ethnic movements, and the formation of the
Tamil Federal Party. Negotiated pacts between Sinhalese and Tamil
leaders to settle the ethnic problem are critically analyzed to show
how Sinhalese leaders were swayed by sections of the Buddhist clergy
and a few extremists of their own community to abrogate some of
these agreements. The history of Tamil opposition to Sinhala govern-
ments is traced from: (1) the origin of the Federal Party to the rise of
the Tamil United Liberation Front; (2) the change in demands from a
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semi-autonomous state to a separate, sovereign Tamil state called
Edam; and (3) the change from nonviolent to violent tactics by Tamil
youths to resist Sinhala domination. Several government regulations
and acts, including the Prevention of Terrorism Act, are discussed in
conjunction with the rise of the Tamil Liberation Tiger movement,
the confrontation between the security forces and the Tamil militants,
and the killing of civilians in Tamil districts. The causes and conse-
quences of the 1983 communal riots and the inability of the govern-
ment to solve the ethnic problem by implementing the District
Development Councils legislation of 1980 are also analyzed. The fail-
ure of the 1984 All-Party Conference because of the inability of the
government to implement the proposals that were negotiated be-
tween Indian and Sri Lahkan officials and the events that led to the
collapse of the Thimphu peace talks are also discussed. Finally, events
leading to the formation of a united front among the leading Tamil
militant groups, the willingness of Tamil militants to negotiate with
the government on the question of regional autonomy as a suitable
alternative to Edam, and the determination of the government to
find a military solution to the ethnic conflict are analyzed.
Chapter 3 examines the concept of a Tamil homeland and evaluates
the environmental factors that contributed to the persistence of Tamil
settlements in northern Sri Lanka while environmental disasters such
as floods and droughts forced Sinhalese populations to move from
the Dry Zone to the Wet Zone in the thirteenth century. This discus-
sion substantially dispels the notion that Tamil invasions were entirely
responsible for the decline of the Sinhalese civilization in the Dry
Zone, the destruction of irrigation works, and the flight of Sinhalese
to the Wet Zone. A brief history of government-sponsored coloniza-
tion schemes in the Dry Zone is included.
The chapter also examines the climatic potential for cultivating
crops on a regional basis, both in the Wet and Dry Zones. The lack of
suitable agricultural and industrial resources in the Tamil regions, it is
argued, compelled the local inhabitants to seek employment else-
where, including Malaysia. It was not the lack of land but the paucity
of water resources that limited agricultural development in Tamil dis-
tricts, especially in the Northern Province. It.is also indicated that
while governments are gentli_n<::ly coflc~!I!ed abo~ral agrar-
ian problems associated with landlessness and lack of water-in Sinha-
lese districts, verylittle capital has been invested toV{ar_g,augmenting
the supply of water in rivers and tanks of the Thmil-dominated
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Northern Province..Regionaldistribution of water resources is ana-
lyzed by presenting quantitative information on water discharged by
rivers through Tamil and Sinhalese districts.
This analysis is necessary to stress the fact that while Tamil areas
lack adequate water supply to raise one crop a year, many Sinhalese
districts have a sufficient supply of water to raise two crops of rice,
one with the help of supplementary irrigation during the wet season
and the other with the aid of irrigation during the dry season. More-
over, government investments on projects to auglIlentthe supply of
water to farms have increased crop yields in Sinhalese districts. This
chapter also analyzes the-femporal and areal changes in rice produc-
tion in order to evaluate the degree of self-sufficiency in rice of
selected Sinhalese and Tamil districts in the Dry Zone. The results of
this analysis will show thatTamil districts areless.self-sufficieriiiiiSice
than-Sinhalese districts and that -t:hls--di~parity in rice production
between Sinhalese and Tamil districts is due mainly to government
~~~~il~u. -
Chapter 4 del~es into the sensitive issue of how governments have
discriminated against Tamils with regard to their making a living in
Sri Lanka. It is intended to show that the government has not only
neglected the-economic de:yelopmencoCTamildistricts-but has also
issued ordersand regulat(onsthatJimiuhe nUf!1t>er of Tamils seeking
employment tn-the ~l>lic an<iJ>rivates_ectorsof-the economy and
secu.ring admissI()fi-to universities.Th~notion that the Tamil popula-
tion is generally more literate and educated than the Sinhalese popu-
lation because of better educational facilities is dispelled by present-
ing appropriate data. It will be also shown that at no time has the
number ofTamils in the public service exceeded that of the Sinhalese.
It is true that in the past the Tamil community was overrepresented in
the public service and professions relative to the proportional size of
its population, but with the passage of the Sinhala-only legislation
and the introduction. of other regulations the number of Tamils in
different government departments has dropped drastically. The num-
ber of Tamils employed in public-sector corporations has remained
static, or even declined, because most of the state-sponsored indus-
tries established since the 1950s have been concentrated in Sinhalese
areas. The serious problem~ associated with landlessness, high unem-
ployment, and high population densities in Tamil districts as well as
the lack of government support for agricultural and industrial devel-
opment are also discussed. Finally, the chapter analyzes the numerical
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changes in the ethnic composition of Tamil districts as a result of gov-
ernment-sponsored colonization schemes.
Chapter 5 analyzes various options to devolve specific legislative,
executive, and administrative powers to regional governments in
order to solve the ethnic problem. It discusses the reasons why
attempts made by Sinhalese and Tamil leaders to negotiate agree-
ments to decentralize administrative functions to provinces and dis-
tricts in the past were unsuccessful. The structure, composition, and
functions of the District Development Councils and their failure to
solve the ethnic problem are explored. The District Development
Councils were established by the government more than five years
after it implemented an Integrated Rural (District) Development
Program (IRDP) under which several Sinhalese districts received
funds from the government and from foreign sources for rural devel-
opment. Both the District Development Councils and the Integrated
Rural (District) Development Program, which were designed to
encourage balanced regional development, are discussed.
The Epilogue traces the chronology of events that have taken place
between December 1985 and June 1987, in order to evaluate the
prospects for national reconciliation in Sri Lanka. The desirability of
reorganizing the prevailing governmental structure to discourage
future conflict between the communities and between ethnic-based
regional political parties is analyzed. Indeed, the main aim of any
political settlement of the long-standing conflict should be to foster
national unity and integration.
-CHAPTER I
Sinhalese-Tamil Ethnic Differences
and the Beginnings ofConflict
THE Sinhalese majority and the Tamil minority of contemporary Sri
Lanka assert their respective identities on the basis of language, reli-
gion, ancestral territory, and cultural attributes, although the "Tamil
identity does not have a specific religious or Hindu dimension."! It is
not known whether the members of the ethnic communities were
conscious of their separate identities when they came into contact
with each other during the early days of settlement of the island.
Semilegendary narratives, historical accounts, and religious teachings
in the Pali Chronicles, the Dipavamsa, and the Mahavamsa, com-
posed by bhikkhus (Buddhist clergy) between the fourth and the
sixth centuries A.D., suggest that the Sinhalese were the first civilized
people to settle on the island before the Veddhas and the Dravidians
appeared on the scene. 2
Veddhas are the descendants of the aboriginal tribes of ancient Sri
Lanka. They are dwindling in numbers as many of them have been
absorbed by the Sinhalese. The remaining Veddhas continue to rely
on hunting for their food and live under extreme primitive condi-
tions in the jungles of Bintenne in Eastern Sri Lanka.
Origin ofSinhalese and Tamil Settlements
According to the most popular legend in the Mahavamsa, the first
contingent of Aryan settlers, led by Vijaya, landed on the island the
very day Gautama Buddha attained nibbana (died) in India about
500 B.C. The bhlkkhus who compiled the Mahavamsa attached reli-
gious significance to Vijaya's arrival on the island as an indication
that the Sinhalese people, as the descendants of Vijaya, are destined
by divine will to protect and foster Buddhism in Sri Lanka. 3 Promi-
nent Sinhalese historians emphasize that the myth of this religious-
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ethnic destiny was contrived by the Buddhist clergy in order to propa-
gate the theme that the Sinhalese are the protectors of Buddhism.4
Gananath Obeyesekere states that the "myths are also an expression
of the self-perceived historical role of the Sinhalese as a nation" and
that this Sinhalese-Buddhist identity was used effectively in ancient
times to fight the Tamil-speaking "Saivite unbelievers" from South
India. 5
Despite the myths and legends contained in the Mahavamsa, there
is consensus among Sinhalese historians that there is an element of
truth in the Aryanization of Sri Lanka. Accordingly, the origin of the
Sinhalese people is traced to the year 543 B.C. when a group of seven
hundred men led by Vijaya, a crown prince who was banished by his
father from the city of Sinhapura in Bengal, northeast India, landed
on the western shores of Sri Lanka. Vijaya acquired control of the
island by marrying Kuveni, the queen of the nonhuman Yaksha peo-
ple, but after a few years he banished her with his son and daughter
into the forest. This story of the banishment of his family was deliber-
ately contrived to imply that Vijaya and his men did not propagate
the Sinhalese race with nonhuman Yaksha women. Instead, Vijaya
married the daughter of the Pandyan king of Madura, South India,
and his men married Pandyan women of high caste. Historians
C. W. Nicholas and S. Paranavitana contend that Pandyan people
were not Dravidian Tamils, but Aryan Pandus of epic fame who occu-
pied central and South India during this period. 6 Other studies indi-
cate that the three kingdoms of Pandya, Chola, and Chera of the
Tamil-speaking Dravidians existed in South India prior to the fourth
century B.C. and that "Aryan contacts with South India before the
fourth century B.C." were few or nonexistent. 7 Even if the Pandyans
were Dravidians, however, this link was severed with Vijaya's death
when his brother's son, Pandu Vasudeva of Bengal, who succeeded
him as the king of Sri Lanka, is supposed to have landed on the east-
ern shores of the island with another contingent of Aryan followers.
The Aryan settlers, as indicated by the legend of the banishment of
Vijaya's Yaksha wife and children to the forest, maintained their sep-
arate identity and propagated the Sinhalese race. The Mahavamsa
also indicates that the Veddhas were not the aboriginal people of Sri
Lanka but were propagated by Vijaya's Yaksha son and daughter in
the isolated parts of the island. Apparently, the Veddha connection to
Vijaya is emphasized to insure that the Sinhalese are considered the
original inhabitants of the island and that no ethnic links are estab-
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lished between the aboriginal tribes of Sri Lanka and those of South
India of the pre-Dravidian period. N. D. Wijesekera, however, indi-
cates that the physical characteristics of the Veddhas can be traced to
the successive fusion of Mediterranean, Australoid, and Negrito racial
groups in South India. 8 Moreover, the physical characteristics of the
Balangoda man, who roamed the island in prehistoric times, closely
resemble those of the pre-Dravidian tribes in South India. Appar-
ently, the present-day Veddhas are not the direct descendants of
Balangoda man but are "the mixed descendants of Balangoda man,
Sinhalese, and the Tamils."9 The Veddhas, in turn, contributed, at
least in part, "to the making of the Sinhalese population."lo
Some scholars have postulated that the Yakshas and Nagas, who
are referred to in the Mahavamsa as nonhumans, are the aboriginal
tribes of India and Sri Lanka. These scholars refer to historical tradi-
tions and the semilegendary accounts in Indian epics like the
Mahabharata and Ramayana, which were written in the sixth century
B.C., as well as to Ptolemy's description of the aboriginal people of
Sri Lanka to suggest that the Yakshas and Nagas were Tamil-speaking
people who worshipped the cobra (Naga) and demon (Yaksha),
respectively, in the protohistorical period dating back to 1000 B.C. n
Even the Mahavamsa, like the Ramayana, mentions prosperous king-
doms, townships, and rural settlements that existed on the island
when the Sinhalese arrived. 12 G. P. Malalesekere's authoritative in-
terpretation of the account of the Yaksha kingdom in the Mahavamsa
corroborates well with the accounts of the Ramayana, in which Sri
Lanka is mentioned as having "possessed a certain degree of civiliza-
tion" and it is noted that the "Yakshas had their own cities, social
institutions, a fairly developed language, and indubitable signs of
accumulated wealth." 13
Although there is a strong possibility that the Yakshas and Nagas
were the original Tamil-speaking inhabitants of Sri Lanka, the
Mahavamsa does not make any references to the origin and develop-
ment of Tamil settlements in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, some historians
are of the opinion that the Tamils began settling on the island as
peaceful immigrants and invaders from very early times. 14. Although
the dates of the establishment of the Sinhalese and Tamil settlements
are shrouded in obscurity, some historians believe that the island has
been inhabited by both communities for more than two thousand
years. 15 While there is also general consensus among historians that
Sinhalese settlements preceded Tamil settlements on the island by a
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few centuries, some scholars claim that the "Tamil-speaking Dravidi-
ans ... were very likely on the island at the time of the Sinhalese
arrival."16 This claim is based on the hypothesis that the origin of the
Dravidian group of languages can be traced to the formerly wide-
spread Megalithic culture that existed in peninsular India and Sri
Lanka prior to 700 B.C. n To substantiate this, South Indian historians
claim that the Yakshas and Nagas were the ancestors of Tamil-speak-
ing Dravidians who belonged to an earlier colony of settlers that
migrated from South India to Sri Lanka. ls They presume that this
colony of settlers established the Yaksha kingdom described in the
Mahavamsa. Linguistic, archaeological, cultural, and racial evidence
also suggest that some Dravidian-speaking people were present in the
northwestern part ofIndia and other Dravidian-speaking people were
scattered throughout India, "including sections of the South," when
the Aryans moved into India. 19 If this were true, some of the Dravidi-
an groups could have crossed the narrow stretch of water into Sri
Lanka by way of a land bridge that is supposed to have connected the
two countries in the distant past. In spite of this evidence, we can
only speculate that the ancestors of the present-day Tamils were
already in Sri Lanka when the Sinhalese began colonizing the island.
Historical evidence indicates that South Indian Tamils became
directly involved in Sri Lankan affairs by the third century B.C.,
although they may not have formed a substantial portion of the per-
manent population until the seventh century.20 Certainly, a mul-
tiethnic society seems to have existed on the island from ancient
times, and there were racial and religious harmony, culrural contacts,
and physical mixing between the two groups. There is also evidence
to show that Tamil rulers became patrons of Buddhism and Hindu
deities were worshipped by Buddhists. 21 This racial harmony was,
however, shattered by the fifth century A.D., when the rulers of three
powerful South Indian Tamil kingdoms succeeded in undermining
the influence of Buddhism on Hindu society in South India and
threatened the political stability of the island's Sinhalese kingdom. 22
Unlike in India, Buddhism was preserved and fostered in Sri Lanka
by the state and the Buddhist order of monks termed the Sangha.
The Sangha, the Myth ofSinhalese Origin, and Dravidian Invasions
Buddhist traditions indicate that Buddha and later Asoka, the North
Indian king who was instrumental in the spread of Buddhism outside
India, found the island to be an ideal place to establish a Buddhist
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society. Therefore, large numbers of bhikkhus, including Mahinda, a
close relative of Asoka, were dispatched to Sri Lanka to convert the
king and his subjects during the reign of Devanampiya Tissa (307-
267 B.C.). Sinhalese people were drawn to the new faith because leg-
ends and myths in the Pali Chronicles suggested that Buddha himself
had asked Sakka, the king of gods and the protector of Buddha's doc-
trine, to furnish protection to Vijaya, the founder of the Sinhalese
race, in order to establish the Sinhalese-Buddhist nation of Sri Lanka.
The religious significance attached to the Vijaya legend and the
myths of Buddha's visit to Sri Lanka on three separate occasions have
always been an important factor in Sinhalese national consciousness.
Therefore, when Sinhala rulers and the Buddhist clergy became
apprehensive of the growing threat from Hindu rulers in South India,
they mustered support from the Sinhala people to defend the king-
dom by appealing to their religious and racial sentiments. Indeed,
one of the most successful strategies adopted by the Buddhist clergy
to stir nationalistic sentiment was to expound the theme that the
Sinhalese are destined by divine will to defend the Sasana (Bud-
dhism) against the Tamils, who are opposed to Buddhism. Semile-
gendary and historical accounts in the Pali Chronicles emphasize that
Sinhalese people should protect both the spiritual and ethnic integ-
rity ofSri Lanka.
The Buddhist clergy was genuinely concerned about the plight of
Buddhism in the event that Sri Lanka came under the permanent rule
of Dravidian Hindu kingdoms. Political domination by Dravidians
would have meant an end to the power they traditionally wielded
over Sinhalese rulers. Sinhalese rulers were eager to maintain close
relationship with the Sangha and to support Buddhism in order to
receive the overwhelming support of the people, and the prosperity
of the Sangha and its ability to foster Buddhism varied with the polit-
ical stability of the Sinhalese state. Moreover, Sinhalese villagers
relied on the clergy to instruct the children, to conduct religious cere-
monies, and to guide the people in the conduct of their lives accord-
ing to Buddha's teachings. 23 Thus the Buddhist clergy had a pro-
found impact on the people as well as the rulers, and Buddhism, as
the state religion, had become a powerful instrument in shaping the
outlook of the people by the sixth century. The ruler and his subjects
were intimately connected through Buddhism, and this connection
between religion, culture, language, and national identity has con-
tinued to exert a powerful influence on the Sinhalese. 24
The Buddhist clergy has also influenced Sinhalese national con-
CHAPTER I
sciousness by deliberately exaggerating historical events dealing with
Sinhalese-Tamil conflict. The Buddhist clergy incorporated legends
and myths in historical accounts to inculcate the notion that the very
existence of Sri Lanka as a sovereign state is under constant threat of
"racial and cultural assimilation from Dravidian South India."25 To
the Sinhalese, myths were real; they expressed their historical role as
defenders of the country and the Sasana and, on occasion, became
"rallying points for Sinhalese nationalism."26 One example of an
appeal to the Sinhala people's nationalist sentiment was the glorifica-
tion in the Mahavamsa of Prince Durugemunu as the greatest Sinha-
lese hero of all times for his second-century defeat of Elara, the Chola
general from South India who ruled Anuradhapura for forty-four
years, and for thereby rescuing Buddhism. It is surprising to note,
however, that Elara is portrayed in the Pa/i Chronicles as a benevolent
king who extended patronage to Buddhism. There were also other
Tamil rulers who assumed the traditional role of protecting and fos-
tering the state religion while "Sinhalese kings sometimes pillaged
temples and robbed monasteries of their wealth."27 The Pali Chroni-
cles even suggest that Elara had the support of a large number of
Sinhalese, including a few generals, in his encounter with Duruge-
munu. Evidently, ethnicity was not an important factor at the time of
the Dutugemunu-Elara conflict. 28 Yet, racial and religious motives
are attributed to the Dutugemunu-Elara conflict, and some Sinhalese
scholars even regard the defeat ofElara by Durugemunu as the begin-
ning of Sinhala nationalism. 29 Over the years the myth that Duruge-
munu saved the Sinhalese race and the Sasana "developed into one
of the most powerful instruments of Sinhalese nationalism in modern
times." 30
Contrary to the accounts in the Mahavamsa that project a racial
motivation onto the Durugemunu-Elara conflict, some modern his-
torians believe that racial conflict did not occur until the fifth and
sixth centuries A.D. when Sri Lanka came under constant attack from
powerful South Indian Dravidian states that were militantly Hindu-
the Pandyans, Pallavas, and Cholas. 31 By this time the Tamil settlers
in Sri Lanka are supposed to have become conscious of their ethnic
identity and to have extended their support to the South Indian
invaders. Thus, although Dutugemunu may have been viewed as the
savior of the Sinhalese race, his victory over Elara did not put an end
to Tamil-Sinhalese conflict nor did it deter Sinhalese rulers from hav-
ing contact with South Indian rulers. Indeed, Sinhalese rulers sought
--
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the assistance ofIndian rulers to settle dynastic disputes, got involved
in conflicts between the Cholas and Pandyans, and concluded matri-
monial alliances with South Indian families. Despite the South
Indian invasions, Anuradhapura remained the capital of Sri Lanka
from the time of Dutugemunu's triumph over Elara until the
eleventh century, except for a brief period in the fifth century A.D.
when the capital was moved to Sigiriya.
The Collapse of the Sinhalese Kingdom and the Establishment
of theJaffna Kingdom
Anuradhapura was sacked in 1017 by the Cholas to punish the Sinha-
lese ruler for assisting the Pandyans against them in South India. Sri
Lanka remained a province of the Chola empire for seventy-five years,
during which time the capital was moved from Anuradhapura to
Polonnaruwa. Vijayabahu defeated the Cholas in 1070. The reign of
the Cholas came to an end with the accession of Parakramabahu I
(1153-1186), but Tamil invasions continued to plague the Sinhalese
kingdom in the twelfth century. When the Sinhalese kingdom col-
lapsed in the thirteenth century, the Sinhalese began drifting south-
west to the Wet Zone. This drift was occasioned by a combination of
factors, including invasions from India, internal dissension, natural
disasters, decline in the fertility of the soil, silting of tanks and canals,
lack of administrative control to organize labor to maintain irrigation
facilities, and a malaria epidemic of major consequences (see chapter
3).32 The Sinhalese chronicle Rajavaliya, which was written in the
seventeenth century, places the blame for the ultimate disintegration
of the Polonnaruwa kingdom on Magha of KaIinga, who invaded the
island in 1215. 33 References in the Rajavaliya to the plundering of
Buddhist shrines by Tamils, the forced conversion of Buddhists to
Hinduism, and the burning of the Rajarata, the "king's country," by
an invading army from South India have had great impact on Sinha-
lese national consciousness.
Despite periodic invasions from South India, including the Chola
campaigns of the eleventh century, the Sinhalese kingdom, with its
tank civilization, its rich Buddhist treasures, and its monumental
architecture, persisted until the thirteenth century. Indeed, it main-
tained its independence for centuries except for brief periods. Never-
theless, the collapse of the golden age of Sinhalese civilization, Vija-
yabahu's victory over the Cholas, and other minor incursions by Tamil
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armies into Sri Lanka are highlighted in the Pali and Sinhalese chron-
icles to portray the Tamils as aggressors who have continuously
attempted to destroy Buddhism and subjugate the Sinhalese. This
theme has been used effectively by some sections of the Buddhist
clergy and by Sinhalese extremist nationalists to argue against lan-
guage and political concessions for Tamils in present-day Sri Lanka.
With the collapse of the Sinhalese kingdom in the Dry Zone, the
island was subdivided into three distinct kingdoms. The northern
part of the island, from the Vanni, the area between ]affna and
Anuradhapura, to the]affna Peninsula came to be occupied by Tamil
settlers and ruled by the king ofJaffna. The coastal area of the south-
west came under the Kingdom of Kotte, and the central hill country
became the Kandyan kingdom. There is no consensus as to the date
of the establishment of the]affna kingdom, but some Tamil scholars
believe it was founded soon after the invasion of the island by Magha
of Kalinga. Even Sinhalese historians C. W. Nicholas and S. Parana-
vitana have suggested that the Tamils secured control of the Northern
Province in the thirteenth century. Whether the Tamils established
the Kingdom of]affna in the thirteenth century or earlier cannot be
confirmed because of the absence of archaeological data. Neverthe-
less, prominent Sinhalese and Tamil historians agree that the king-
dom was certainly in existence by 1325. Gananath Obeyesekere
believes that the Tamils of the present-day Batticaloa and Trincoma-
lee districts owed allegiance to the king of Kandy rather than to the
king of]affna, while others believe that by 1325 the Tamil rulers were
strong enough to hold suzerainty over a large area in northern Sri
Lanka as far as the coast ofPuttalam. 34
In the sixteenth century, the Portuguese were successful in estab-
lishing suzerainty over the lowlands of Sri Lanka, which formed part
of the Kingdoms of]affna and Kotte, but they failed to consolidate
their hold on the Kandyan kingdom, even though they sacked it
more than once. The kingdom's mountains, forests, and rivers
furnished the Kandyans with adequate protection from their ene-
mies. Kandyan rulers conspired with the Dutch to expel the Portu-
guese from the island in the seventeenth century. The Kandyan king-
dom maintained its independence from the Dutch, but its kings were
unable to restrict Dutch rule over a limited area along the coast.
Although no formal war was declared between the Dutch and the
kings of Kandy, the Dutch expedition of 1762 into the Kandyan
kingdom was completely routed.
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The Kandyan kingdom, however, became weakened by the eigh-
teenth century when the Dutch virtually monopolized trade by forc-
ing Kandyans to sell their products below the market value, as well as
preventing them from trading with the people of the lowlands. The
kingdom was also weakened by dynastic disputes and, in 1747, when
the male line to the Kandyan throne died out, it passed to a descen-
dant of the female line belonging to a Dravidian dynasty of Madura
in South India. The Sinhalese nobility and the Dravidian court were
unable to maintain peaceful relations; Sinhalese chieftains even in-
trigued with the British to overthrow the kingdom. The king eventu-
ally lost the support of his people. When the British invaded Kan-
dyan territory in 1815, Sri Vikrama Rajasinha did not even have the
support of many of his soldiers to defend the kingdom.
The history of Sri Lankan Tamils becomes more complete and con-
tinuous from the thirteenth century A.D. with the large-scale settle-
ment of Tamils in northern Sri Lanka following the Chola invasions.
Once the Jaffna kingdom was established, Sri Lankan Tamils devel-
oped a social organization, customs, traditions, and speech of their
own that are distinct from those of South Indian Tamils. Laws and
customs pertaining to inheritance and property rights evolved from a
combination of laws and customs that were prevalent in the present-
day states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu from which they had emigrated
to the island in ancient times.
Some historians view the call for the establishment of a separate
state by the Sri Lankan Tamils as a recent historical phenomenon,
contending that the kings ofJaffna were never content to be merely
rulers of a part of the island. 35 There is little doubt, however, that the
establishment of the Tamil kingdom gave the Sri Lankan Tamils an
opportunity to develop a sense of collective identity based on Tamil
language, Tamil culture, and Tamil territory, which are the prerequi-
sites of nationality. 36 Indeed, to the Tamils, the northern and eastern
parts of Sri Lanka are their "single most treasured possessions," a tra-
ditional homeland "which thus served to underline their attribute of
nationality and distinctiveness from, and, non-assimilability by, the
Sinhalese."37 They have also shown no desire to amalgamate politi-
cally or culturally with the Tamils of South India. They "have main-
tained their own separate and distinct linguistic and cultural con-
tinuum in the island for so many centuries that in reality the Tamil
literary and cultural heritage of South India operates only as a source
ofhistorical inspiration, particularly in the present text."38
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British Administration, Indian Tamils, and the Buddhist
Revitalization Movement
The Tamil kingdom lost its independence to Western colonial powers,
first to the Portuguese in 1619, then to the Dutch and the British. In
1833 the British established a centralized form of government, devel-
oped roads and railroads connecting the Tamil and Sinhalese areas,
and created opportunities for English-educated Tamils to seek em-
ployment in the South, all of which brought the two communities
into direct contact with each other in the nineteenth century. From
the 1830s, a large number of South Indian Tamil laborers were also
settled on the British-owned coffee and, later, tea and rubber planta-
tions located primarily in the highlands in the central part of the
country. The British government employed foreign workers in their
plantations because the Sinhalese peasants were reluctant to trade the
casual schedule of rice cultivation for the low-paid and strictly regu-
lated work on the plantations.
Although Indian Tamils and Sri Lankan Tamils are of the same
racial stock, speak the same language, and are Hindus, they are
separated from each other by centuries of history as well as geography.
The Sri Lankan Tamils live predominantly in the Northern and East-
ern provinces while the Indian Tamils are largely concentrated in the
Central, Sabragamuwa, and Uva provinces. The differences between
them were strong enough to restrain the two groups from forming a
united front against the Sinhalese in the past. Indeed, it seems clear,
as one observer noted, that if "race were all that mattered, the Cey-
lon and Indian Tamils would make a common cause against the
Sinhalese."39 The Sinhalese attitude toward the Indian Tamils, who
numbered approximately 1.2 million in the 1940s, has been one of
hostility, but unjustifiably so, since the large acreage of land devoted
to plantations was alienated not to the Indian Tamils but to British
plantation owners. Nevertheless, the plantations deprived the Kan-
dyans of the land they urgently needed to support their increasing
population and forced them to live among foreign-born people of
different ethnicity who had no abiding interest in the island. The
Indian Tamil community is still characterized "as an unassimilated
and unassimilable element in the Ceylonese nation."40
While Sinhalese peasants of the rural villages came into direct con-
tact with the poorly paid Indian Tamils, there was little opportunity
for interaction between the former and the majority of Sri Lankan
....
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peasants of the Northern and Eastern provinces. Sri Lankan Tamils
did not purchase land to cultivate crops or to settle in large numbers
in the rural areas of the South. Therefore, the majority of the Sri
Lankan Tamils and Sinhalese have been geographically separated
from each other since the eleventh century. It was thus natural for the
Sinhalese of the rural areas to project their negative attitudes about
the Indian Tamils onto the Sri Lankan Tamils, since they spoke the
same language. Even the leaders of the Buddhist Revivalist Move-
ment of the nineteenth century made little effort to distinguish the
Tamils of Indian origin from the Tamils of Sri Lankan origin and
lumped them into the category of Indians. Leaders of the Buddhist
and Sinhalese Revivalist movements never made any conscious effort
to describe Sri Lankan Tamils as people with longevity of residence
who are an integral part of the Sri Lankan community. Indeed, these
leaders spent many years reinforcing the negative attitudes of the
rural Sinhalese about the Sri Lankan Tamils. Nevertheless, some
Sinhalese and Tamils, especially of the middle-class elite, developed
positive attitudes toward each other as they made contact at places of
employment, educational institutions, and public places in the mid-
nineteenth century. However, as the nation moved into the twentieth
century their interests collided, especially with regard to communal
versus territorial representation in the Legislative Council, established
in 1833.
A handful of Sri Lankans who belonged to the rising middle class
of the English-educated elite were nominated to the Legislative
Council to represent their respective communities. At this stage of
political evolution in Sri Lanka, national issues were placed in the
forefront and sectarianism was discouraged. In fact, national con-
sciousness was limited to a section of the westernized elite, but every-
one extended full-fledged cooperation to the British authorities in
governing the country. The first threat to colonial rule came in the
mid-nineteenth century when the Buddhist Revivalist Movement
campaigned for the restoration of Buddhism to the former high sta-
tus it held during the golden age of Sinhalese civilization. The move-
ment concentrated its attack on foreign rule and Western influence,
since Buddhism was neglected and Christianity was fostered during
the colonial period. Communal issues were not the primary focus of
the Buddhist Revivalist Movement at this time. By the late nine-
teenth and early part of the twentieth centuries, however, there were
indications of the emergence of Sinhalese revivalist sentiments
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among those who were in the forefront of the Buddhist Revivalist
Movement.41 By the turn of the century, most Sinhalese revivalists
regarded Moors (Muslims) and Indian traders as "non-nationals,"
whom they claimed dominated the country's trade and money lend-
ing. Sri Lankan Tamils were also included in the category of "non-
nationals," since the term non-national was in many instances
equated with "non-Sinhalese" by them.
Sri Lankan Tamils did not feel threatened by the Buddhist and
Sinhalese revivalist movements although it was clear that "there were
men who saw possibilities of exploiting (Buddhist) religious senti-
ment for political purposes."42 In fact, the Sri Lankan Tamils "were in
the forefront of the movement to create a Ceylon national-conscious-
ness and to use this consciousness to wrest concessions from a reluc-
tant [colonial] administration."43 Tamil members of the Legislative
Council, such as Sir Ponnampalam Ramanathan, were more con-
cerned about the social and political welfare of Sinhalese than were
their Sinhalese counterparts in the Council and were able to obtain
much-needed concessions on issues pertaining to the Wesak holiday,
the Buddhist Temporalities Bill, and taxes from the British govern-
ment. 44
Representation in the Legislative Council was based on the princi-
ple of communal representation, wherein the governor nominated
members of the Sri Lankan elite to represent the Burgher (Eurasian),
Sinhalese (Kandyan and Low Country), Tamil, Indian, Moor (Mus-
lim), and Malay communities. The constitutional reform of 1910
maintained the principle of communal representation, but it permit-
ted the English-educated, westernized elites, for the first time, to
elect a Sri Lankan to the Legislative Council. A Sri Lankan Tamil, Sir
Ponnampalam Ramanathan, was elected, in preference to a Sinhalese
of the Karava caste, to the Council in 1912. It has been suggested
that Ramanathan's election was largely the result of the support he
received from leaders of the Sinhalese Goyigama elite, who, as the
leaders of established order, were against the rising power of the
Sinhalese Karava elite.
As members of the fisherman caste, the Karavas hold a lower posi-
tion in the Sinhalese caste hierarchy than the Goyigamas, who belong
to the cultivator caste. Despite their lower position, however, the
Karavas emerged as a wealthy caste because they had better access to
English education and more opportunities to become involved with
plantation agriculture and modern commercial enterprise.45
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Communal Versus Territorial Representation and the Beginnings
ofEthnic Conflict
Even as late as 1912, there was no visible evidence of conflict between
the Sinhalese and Tamil elites in the Council, although Ramanathan
may not have been elected were it not for the caste rivalry among the
Sinhalese. It was fortunate that Ramanathan was elected because he,
in the wake of the Sinhalese and Muslim riots of 1915, played an
effective role in condemning the way the government mishandled the
riots as well as in convincing the government that Buddhist leaders
had not incited them. There is no doubt that Sir Ponnampalam
Ramanathan's success in persuading the government to lift martial
law and to release Sinhalese leaders played a significant role in
strengthening the political unity between the Sinhalese and Tamils
and contributing to the establishment of the Ceylon National Con-
gress (CNC) in 1919. Although communal bitterness had been
aroused as early as 1910 when Ramanathan was elected to the Educat-
ed Ceylonese seat in the Legislative Council, his role in championing
the Sinhalese cause during the 1915 disturbances helped to ease ten-
sions. However, communal fears were revived as plans for constitu-
tional reforms involving the allocation of seats in the Council were
discussed.
Since 1833, unofficial membership in the Legislative Council had
been allocated among the various ethnic communities so that no sin-
gle community, irrespective of whether it was the majority commu-
nity, could impose its will on the other communities. Even before the;
CNC was organized, Sinhalese politicians had objected to this
method ofcommunal representation and demanded that the number
of Sinhalese representatives in the Council should be greater than
that of the other communities. Ramanathan's brother, Sir Ponnam-
palam Arunachalem, was the leader of the constitutional reform
movement and one of the founding members of the CNC. Constitu-
tional reform was introduced in 1920 in response to agitation from
the CNC, which sought provisions to enlarge the number of unoffi-
cial members nominated on a territorial basis to the Legislative Coun-
cil. Hitherto, the number ofSinhalese and Tamils unofficial members
of the Council had been nearly equal, but after 1921 there were more
Sinhalese than Tamils because of the greater emphasis placed on terri-
torial representation. The thirty-seven members of the reformed
Council were to include twenty-three unofficial members, who for
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the first time were to hold a majority, but only twelve members were
to be elected.
Although there were more Sinhalese unofficial members in the
Legislative Council of 1921, they did not hold a clear majority in the
Council since an education and property qualification for franchise
limited the number of members who could be elected both on a terri-
torial and communal basis. The Sinhalese members of the CNC
wanted control of the Council by limiting its membership to only
those elected on a territorial basis and objected to this arrangement,
to the surprise of the minorities. They demanded that the franchise
should be widened so that more Sinhalese could be elected. At this
stage, the minorities, led by the Tamils, "were anxious for self-gov-
ernment, but did not wish to exchange British domination for Sinha-
lese domination."46 Tamil members of the CNC, especially Sir Pon-
nampalam Ramanathan, had supported the CNC's original demand
for territorial representation because the education and property
qualification, in addition to communal representation, would insure
adequate representation of Tamils in the Council. Nevertheless, the
Tamils were willing to make concessions to insute that the Sinhalese
had a majority in the Council, provided the Sinhalese leaders in the
CNC actively supported the proposal for the reservation of a special
seat for the Tamils residing in the Western Province. To their disap-
pointment, support for this plan was not forthcoming from the CNC
Sinhalese leadership.
Most of the Tamil elite were not prepared to accept the weakened
position of Tamils in the Legislative Council under the system of terri-
torial representation, and Sir Ponnampalam Arunachalem resigned
from the CNC. The Tamil leadership became increasingly aware that
many Sinhalese political activists, including constitutional reformists
and Buddhist revivalists, "possessed a streak of Sinhalese national
consciousness" and were inclined to sacrifice Tamil interestsY This
became clear when the Sinhalese Buddhist activist Anagarika Dhar-
mapala began a campaign for the revival of Sinhala national con-
sciousness at the turn of the century. In the Buddhist Revivalist Move-
ment of this period, "the older forms of identity were given a new
lease on life, resulting in communalism, casteism, a distortion of his-
tory, a revival of myths of origin and hero-myths, along with visions
of a past 'golden age.' "48 Dharmapala's teachings, which stressed
that Sri Lanka belonged exclusively to the Sinhalese Buddhist with no
place for exploiters such as the Tamils, had a profound impact on the
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schoolteachers, Buddhist clergy, native physicians, and various cate-
gories of government officials at the local and national level who
"were educated in Sinhalese schools, but were cut off from the
sources of political and economic power."49 When Sri Lanka became
independent in 1948, these Sinhalese-educated rural people and the
Buddhist clergy, which became a powerful force in S. W. R. D. Ban-
daranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom party, demanded preferential treat-
ment for their community. Even those in the CNC, who had been
committed to fostering Ceylonese national consciousness as against
Sinhalese national consciousness, were swayed by the Sinhalese Reviv-
alist Movement. Many members of the CNC and the Council came to
realize that economic benefits would accrue to the Sinhalese if the
Indians were repatriated to India and Sri Lankan Tamils were no
longer permitted to use English for recruitment to the public service.
Clearly, Dharmapala's pronouncements that "non-Sinhalese had no
place in Sri Lanka" contributed to the emergence of "Sinhalese
nationalist-sectarianism ... from within the bastion of Ceylon na-
tionalism." 50
The CNC, which became a Sinhalese-dominated organization
when the Tamils resigned from it, established the Sinhala Mahajana
Sabha (Great Council of the Sinhalese), with its local rural sabhas, to
mobilize popular support for the liberation of the country from for-
eign rule. From the very start its proceedings were in Sinhala, and
"this emphasis on Sinhalese had the inevitable effect of strengthen-
ing ethnicity as a cohesive force within the Sabhas, and from this it
was but a short step to emphasizing ethnicity as a point of distinction
or separation from rival groupS."51 The Sinhala Mahajana Sabha was
also anti-Christian in its outlook and "in this sense ... , very much
in the tradition of the religious nationalism of men like Anagarika
Dharmapala, and precursors of the Sinhala Maha Sabha of the 1930s
and 1940s, and the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) of the mid-
and late 1950s."52
Anagarika Dharmapala's Buddhist Revivalist Movement, the es-
tablishment of the Sinhala Mahajana Sabha in 1919, and the CNC's
demand to do away with communal electorates aroused the suspi-
cions of Tamil leaders and compelled them to adopt new strategies in
order to safeguard Tamil interests. They became aware that they
could no longer rely on Sinhalese caste rivalry to secure their objec-
tives. In their view, the Goyigama elite was determined to minimize
the power of the Tamils by demanding the abolition of communal
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representation. 53 Tamil political leaders realized, for the first time
since 1833, that they represented a minority community and that
they should demand adequate constitutional safeguards from the
colonial rulers to defend Tamil rights in the face of the rising tide of
Sinhalese nationalism. They failed, however, to convince the mem-
bers of the Donoughmore Commission to continue with the system
of communal representation for safeguarding minority interests. The
Donoughmore Commission was appointed in 1927 to study the con-
stitution of 1924 and make recommendation on ways to facilitate the
participation of a large percentage of the population in the election
of Ceylonese to the Legislative Council, as well as to devise a constitu-
tion that would give substantial power to the Ceylonese representa-
tives in the Council to govern the country. To their dismay, when ter-
ritorial representation was combined with universal suffrage, the
relative ratio of Sinhalese to Tamil representation was 5: 1; a dramatic
increase from the former ratio of 2: 1 in the previous Legislative
Council. 54
The Donoughmore Constitution of 1931, granted the franchise to
all adults over twenty-one, so as to broaden the basis of political
power. Indeed, Sri Lanka became the first country in Asia to have
universal suffrage. The constitution abolished communal electorates
and members of the newly formed State Council were elected
through a territorial system. Under this system the country was
divided into electorates based on area and population and this
ensured the Sinhalese a substantial majority in the State Council. The
State Council was vested with both legislative and executive powers,
since its fifty elected and eight nominated members were divided
into seven Executive Committees. The chairmen of the committees
and three British officers of state formed the Board of Ministers. The
internal administration of the country came under the direction of
the Ceylonese ministers, while the powers reserved to the governor
were handled by the British officers of state. For the first time in the
history of constitutional development in Sri Lanka, Ceylonese were
provided with the real opportunity to gain experience in the prob-
lems of government.
Tamil leaders were not pleased with the provisions of the Don-
oughmore Constitution but refrained from contesting the 1931 elec-
tions because the Tamil Youth Congress, which was inspired by the
Indian freedom movement, as exemplified by the Indian National
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Congress, called for a boycott of the elections. The Tamil Youth Con-
gress had passed a resolution in 1929 demanding complete indepen-
dence for Sri Lanka. The Youth Congress welcomed the provisions in
the Donoughmore Constitution that abolished communal represen-
tation, seeing it as a way for the establishment of an independent,
united Sri Lanka by ending communal-oriented politics. Those
Sinhalese who clamored for complete independence for the country
praised the stand taken by the Tamil Youth Congress, although
prominent Sinhalese leaders did not support it and there were threats
made against the people of]affna. These threats merely helped to
reinforce Tamil suspicions that the majority community was deter-
mined to suppress minority rights. In spite of these suspicions, the
Tamil leaders remained willing to work together with the Sinhalese to
establish an independent united Sri Lanka.
The "Pan-Sinhalese" Ministry, Sinhala Maha Sabha, and
Ponnambalam's "50-50"
Following the general elections of 1936, Sinhalese leaders were able
to secure for themselves the chairmanships of the seven Executive
Committees in the State Council that formed the Board of Ministers.
Tamil members of the State Council became suspicious of this "pan-
Sinhalese ministry" and accused the ministers, who were in charge of
the administration of government departments, of neglecting the
needs of Tamil constituencies. Tamils also accused the Board of Minis-
ters of preferring to negotiate privately with the British government
on matters dealing with constitutional reforms. Although the estab:
lishment of a Sinhalese ministry was communally motivated, Sinha-
lese leaders convinced the British governor, Sir Andrew Caldecott,
otherwise. They emphasized that the formation of the pan-Sinhalese
Board of Ministers was essential "solely for the purpose of securing
unanimity to press the imperial power to make concessions toward
self-government." 55 Moreover, there were no indications that the
inclusion of Tamils in the ministry would have created a serious prob-
lem or hindered the country's progress toward self-government.
Indeed, Tamil leaders did not even consider that "the Tamil interest
was threatened to such a point to be impelled to collaborate with the
British and to thwart the country's progress toward self-rule." 56 Nev-
ertheless, Tamil leaders were completely excluded from sharing in the
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political power in 1936. The Tamil Congress leader G. G. Ponnam-
balam, who was elected to the State Council from]affna, was deliber-
ately excluded from the Board of Ministers.
Obviously, many Sinhalese constitutional reformists who dominat-
ed the Ceylon National Congress and the State Council had been
influenced by the upsurge of Sinhalese nationalism at the turn of the
century. Although the Sinhalese leaders of the State Council did not
agree with all the objectives of the Sinhala Revivalist Movement,
"economic nationalism had a place in their program."57 This explains
why they objected to the granting of basic rights to Indian Tamils.
Like the Sinhalese Revivalists, the Ceylon nationalists in the Council
regarded the Indian Tamils as "non-nationals," even though some of
them had long resided or were even born in Sri Lanka. The CNC
advocated restricting the immigration of Indian Tamils from 1930.
Although the CNC could not have prevented colonial rulers from
granting voting rights to most of the Indian immigrants under the
Donoughmore Constitution, Sinhalese Council members under the
direction of the CNC were determined to deny some of the basic
rights of the Indian Tamils. As a first step toward discriminating
against them, the State Council deprived them of the benefits of the
Land Development Ordinance of 1935 and the Village Development
Ordinance of 1937. 58 From 1939, Indian Tamils were gradually pro-
hibited from seeking daily paid employment in government depart-
ments. The members of the CNC and the State Council defended
these discriminatory measures as being politically and economically
rather than racially motivated. They indicated that the presence of a
large number of Indian Tamils on the island, particularly in certain
electorates, deprived the indigenous population of its political rights
and employment opportunities. It was obvious that the future for the
Indian Tamils in Sri Lanka was bleak when then minister of agricul-
ture D. S. Senanayake proclaimed in 1940 that "unless we stem the
tide of this growing domination of Indians in Ceylon in the economic
and social life, our extinction as a Ceylonese nation is inevitable." 59
With the Indians being gradually stripped of their rights in the
country, Sri Lankan Tamil leaders became increasingly skeptical about
their own community's future. They protested the treatment of
Indian Tamils to the Board of Ministers and accused the ministers of
discriminating against the native Tamil community in the areas of
agriculture, education, disbursement of public funds, and public ser-
vice appointments. 6o Evidently, some of the new members of the
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Goyigama elite, the "Goyigama arrivistes," were not satisfied merely
with the process of Ceylonization but were anxious to proceed with
the more drastic process of Sinhalese nationalism. 61 In 1937 one of
the prominent Goyigama arrivistes, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike,
founded a communal organization known as the Sinhala Maha Sabha
(The Great Council of the Sinhalese) with the support of others in the
CNC to actively agitate for the revival of Sinhala traditions, Sinhala
culture, Sinhala language, and Buddhism. The formation of the
Sinhala Maha Sabha in turn compelled G. G. Ponnambalam to form
the All-Ceylon Tamil Congress in 1944 to champion the cause of the
Tamils against Sinhala-Buddhist domination.
As Sri Lanka moved toward independence, Sinhalese and Tamil
leaders continued to disagree with each other regarding Tamil repre-
sentation in the parliament, which came into existence in 1947. The
Tamil Congress complained to the Commission on Constitutional
Reform, headed by Lord Soulbury, which was drafting the new con-
stitution, that the Board of Ministers of the State Council had delib-
erately discriminated against the Tamils in the past and that provi-
sions should be made in the constitution to protect the legitimate
rights of the Tamil community in a free Sri Lanka. The fears of
Sinhala domination were so intense that G. G. Ponnambalam even
advocated that one-half of the seats in the new legislature be reserved
for minorities, so that the "Sinhalese majority would not hold more
than 50 percent of the seats in the legislature and this balance would
be reflective in the executive and would be a series of checking clauses
against discriminating legislation."62 He believed that given the dis-
criminatory measures adopted by the Board of Ministers of the State
Council under the watchful eye of the colonial rulers, the Tamils had
to secure substantial assurances in the constitution to prevent discrim-
ination by the majority, even if their demands were extreme. This
"50-50" scheme was rejected by the Soulbury Commission as being
contrary to democratic principles, especially since the Sinhalese
accounted for nearly 70 percent of the population. The Commission
assured the Tamils that, with the inclusion of constitutional safe-
guards against discrimination, the creation of multimember consti-
tuencies (electorates from which more than one member can be
elected to parliament) for Tamil areas that provided for additional
minority representation in the legislature, and the formation of elec-
torates based on the area as well as the population of provinces, the
rights of Tamils would be protected. It was these assurances from the
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Commission that persuaded the Sri Lankan Tamil councillors to
approve the draft of the new constitution. However, even if the
modified proposal of the Board of Ministers conceding 43 percent of
the seats in the new legislature to the minorities had been accepted,
the Sinhalese-dominated parliament of independent Sri Lanka would
have been able to abolish this provision and replace it with territorial
representation.
It is often claimed that G. G. Ponnambalam's "50-50" scheme
"greatly agitated Sinhalese Buddhist resentment," and it is "cited by
many Sinhalese as the beginnings of contemporary communal prob-
lems in Sri Lanka."63 However, G. G. Ponnambalam was not respon-
sible for initiating contemporary ethnic conflict; he was willing to
cooperate with the Sinhalese leaders after 1947 and even supported
measures later adopted to deny citizenship and voting rights to the
Indian Tamils. It is more appropriate to trace the beginning of con-
temporary ethnic conflict to S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, who as the
leader of the communally structured Sinhala Maha Sabha appealed to
anti-Tamil sentiments in all sections of Sinhalese society. The lan-
guage issue, which mobilized the same forces that were in the fore-
front of the Buddhist and Sinhala revivalist movements at the turn of
the century, led to the cleavage between the Sinhalese and Tamils and
contributed to a series of anti-Tamil riots that started in 1956. There
is no doubt that both Bandaranaike and Ponnambalam taught other
ambitious politicians how easy it was to secure political power by
appealing to people's anti-Tamil! anti-Sinhalese emotions. Indeed,
some sections of the Buddhist clergy, as well as leaders of opposition
parties in parliament, have on many occasions appealed to the
Sinhala people's anti-Tamil emotions to force Sinhalese leaders to
abandon their plans to grant language and political concessions to the
Tamils.
Denial of Citizenship and Voting Rights to Indian Tamils
The 1948 constitution of independent Ceylon did provide guarantees
against discrimination for ethnic minorities in the Ceylon Orders in
Council, 1946 and 1947, Article 29, Section 2 (b) and (c).64 These
provisions and the assurances given by Prime Minister D. S. Senana-
yake that Tamil rights would be protected convinced G. G. Ponnam-
balam and a majority of his Tamil Congress to cross the floor and join
the governing United National Party (UNP) in 1948. Only Tamil
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leader S.]. V. Chelvanayakam and a few of his followers, who later
organized the Tamil Federal Party (FP), remained in the Opposition.
Under the new constitution, five elected members of the Tamil com-
munity joined the United National Party to form the first national
government. To ensure communal or ethnic balance, a Tamil was
appointed by the governor-general to a nominated seat in the Senate,
and relations between the two ethnic communities seemed to be cor-
dial at the outset.65 The interests of almost all communities were
taken into consideration in the formation of the government with a
major exception: those of the Indian community, consisting of plan-
tation workers, were ignored. Contrary to the assurances made by the
prime minister that no harm would come to the minorities, the gov-
ernment passed legislation under the Citizenship Act No. 18 of 1948
making Indian Tamils effectively stateless. The following year, the
Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship) Act No.3 of 1949 was
enacted by Parliament to define the conditions under which Indian
Tamils could claim citizenship by registration. These two acts and the
Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act No. 48 of 1949, which
were designed to deny citizenship and voting rights to Tamils of
Indian origin, had the approval of some of the Tamil members ofpar-
liament, including G. G. Ponnambalam, who may have felt a
greater sense of shared historical experience and future aspirations for
Sri Lanka with the Sinhalese than with Indian Tamils. Some of these
Tamil parliamentarians who continued to cooperate with the Sinha-
lese government were even re-elected to parliament in the 1952 gen-
eral elections.
From the early days of Sri Lanka's independence it was apparent
that Sinhalese-dominated governments were determined to deny the
legitimate rights of Tamils of both Indian and Sri Lankan origin. The
legislation denying citizenship and voting rights to most Indian
Tamils was passed by a Sinhalese-dominated parliament to satisfy the
Kandyan Sinhalese, who were resentful of the Indian Tamils living
and working in the predominantly Sinhalese areas where agricultural
land and employment opportunities for the indigenous population
were limited. Kandyan Sinhalese resented the presence in their elec-
torates of Indian voters who they considered foreigners and who
allegedly had no long-term interests in Sri Lanka. Moreover, the Kan-
dyans and many Sinhalese politicians belonging to right-wing parties
became concerned that the Sri Lankan Tamils and Indian Tamils
might unite in order to dominate the Sinhalese. Their suspicions
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were particularly aroused when members of the Tamil Congress as
well as the Tamil representatives in the Opposition, led by S. J. V.
Chelvanayakam, vehemently opposed the passage of this legislation.
In fact, it was these acts that led S. J. V. Chelvanayakam to leave the
Tamil Congress and form the Tamil Federal Party in December 1949.
The Federal Party not only opposed the legislation to disenfranchise
Tamils of Indian origin but objected to the state-aided colonization of
Tamil areas by Sinhalese peasants sponsored by the government of the
United National Party.
The situation was further aggravated by the influx of illicit Indian
immigrants from south Indian coast and the emergence of a militant
local Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) organization in the plan-
tation areas. 66 Indian Tamils had also alienated the ruling United
National Party by organizing themselves into trade unions and sup-
porting left-wing-oriented parties in their efforts to secure better
wages and working conditions. They often voted for Marxist candi-
dates in the general elections, to the dismay of candidates from the
UNP, and even expressed militancy during the period 1930-1940.
Indeed, the UNP was eager to eliminate "a bloc of Marxist represen-
tatives" from the parliament in order to win additional seats for itself
from the Kandyan areas, where the indigenous population was will-
ing to support overwhelmingly right-wing parties more concerned
about the plight of the Kandyan peasantry than about the Indian
Tamils. 67
The denial of voting rights to Tamils of Indian origin adversely
affected the capacity of the Sri Lankan Tamils to defend their legiti-
mate rights as citizens. When 90,000 Indian Tamils lost their voting
rights, the parliamentary strength of the Sinhalese was increased from
67 percent in 1947 to 73 percent in 1952. It was further increased to
78 percent in 1959 through delimitation of electorates. At present,
Sinhalese representation in the legislative bodies is as high as 80 per-
cent, and this has given the Sinhalese leaders "the ability to alter the
constitution, and to hold the minorities at their mercy in respect to
fundamental rights."68 Indeed, the legislative acts of 1948 and 1949
denying voting and citizenship rights to Indian Tamils were the first
of the many legislative acts passed by the Sinhalese-dominated parlia-
ment designed to chip away first at the privileges and then at the
basic rights of the Tamils. Being outnumbered, Tamil representatives
were unable to prevent the passage of discriminatory legislation
aimed at the Tamil community.
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Problems of National Integration
SRI LANKAN Tamils were still hopeful, despite the position taken by
the United National Party (UNP) on the Indian Tamil issue, that
their rights would be guaranteed under the Soulbury Constitution.
Their fears of being discriminated against were further allayed by
Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake's position that the concept of a sec-
ular state would be upheld and that "he sought the reconciliation of
the legitimate interests of the majority and minorities within the con-
text of an all island polity." I Unfortunately, the Sri Lankan national-
ism propagated by D. S. Senanayake did not enjoy popular support
and was opposed by the Sinhalese-Buddhist majority, and especially
by the Sinhalese intelligentsia, perturbed by the continuing emphasis
placed on English as the official language of administration. Even
before independence, some Sinhalese politicians, including]. R.
]ayewardene, had demanded preferential treatment for their com~u­
nity in the exercise of political power and in the sharing of economic
resources on the grounds that the Tamils, by virtue of their profi-
ciency in the English language, held a disproportionately higher per-
centage of employment in the public service. 2
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, a prominent member of the Goyi-
gama-dominated UNP, read the pulse of the Sinhalese electorate
accurately and adopted strategies appropriate to capitalize on this
political situation. He had already organized the Sinhala Maha Sabha
in response to Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism and aspired to transform
it into a political force. His first move in the quest for political power
was to cross over to the Opposition and form the communally
oriented Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). As a leader of the SLFP, he
was able to use the theme of Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism to secure,
in due course, support from a large number of Sinhalese from both
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the Goyigama and non-Goyigama castes. 3 Bandaranaike was confi-
dent that his future lay in the support he would receive from the
Sinhala-educated physicians, teachers, and bhikkhus who had es-
poused Sinhalese-Buddhist nationalism since the days of Anagarika
Dharmapala. In order to appeal to this sentiment, he had rejected
British rule and, above all, had demanded that both Sinhala and
Tamil be elevated to the status of official languages of the country.
Nevertheless, Bandaranaike was unable to make an impact on the
rural electorate and lost the election of 1952 held after the death of
D. S. Senanayake. He had not as yet taken up the "Sinhala only"
theme. The UNP's landslide electoral victory, under the leadership of
Dudley Senanayake, "took place in an atmosphere of emotionalism
following the death ofD. S. Senanayake, and in fact the massive vic-
tory won by his son was in many ways a ringing endorsement given by
the electorate to the father's lifework."4 However, Dudley Senana-
yake was forced to resign as prime minister in October 1953 when sev-
eral demonstrators who had taken part in a Marxist-sponsored strike
against the increase in the price of rationed rice were killed when the
police opened fire.
Although increasingly apprehensive of the emergence of Sinhalese
nationalism, the Tamil community was still willing to extend its sup-
port to the UNP in its efforts to create a united Sri Lanka in which
Sinhalese and Tamils could live in harmony. It was with this in mind
that they elected G. G. Ponnambalam to represent them in the par-
liament and in the United National Party government, which was
committed to Sri Lankan nationalism. Unfortunately, Sir John Kote-
lawala, who succeeded Dudley Senanayake, excluded Ponnambalam
from his reshuffled cabinet. While it is true that Ponnambalam was
considered by some Tamils to be a traitor to their cause because of his
willingness to join the Sinhalese-dominated government and vote for
the legislation that denied citizenship and voting rights to Indian
Tamils, he was still highly regarded. Thus, many Tamils who had
hitherto given full support to the UNP were disturbed by Kotelawa-
la's decision not to reappoint Ponnambalam to the cabinet, especially
at a time when the Sinhalese intelligentsia and the Buddhist clergy
were demanding that the Sinhala language, Sinhala culture, and
Buddhism of the majority people be given special recognition.
Evidently, as Sinhalese politicians and bhikkhus began to view
their language, religion, and traditions exclusively as Sri Lankan,
more Tamils were inclined to vote for the Federal Party, which stood
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for the preservation of the Tamil language, Tamil culture, and the tra-
ditional Tamil homeland. 5 In fact, many Tamils were beginning to
question the ability of the UNP to defend their rights in the face of
rising Sinhalese nationalism. Moreover, some Sinhalese nationalists
were already demanding that Sinhala should be made the sole official
language of Sri Lanka. In order to allay their fears and to secure their
support for the UNP, Kotelawala assured the Sri Lankan Tamils, dur-
ing a visit toJaffna in late 1954, that appropriate legislation would be
adopted to make both Sinhala and Tamil the official languages of the.
country. Many Sinhalese were outraged by this and regarded the
prime minister's initiative as inappropriate, since the government
had never striven to satisfy the aspirations of the Sinhalese people.
Bandaranaike capitalized on this situation by declaring that the SLFP
would make Sinhala the sole official language of the nation and at
the same time provide for the "reasonable use" of the Tamil lan-
guage if his party was elected to power. This was the same Bandara-
naike who had pressured the Sinhalese-dominated CNC in 1944 to
agree to Sinhala and Tamil as the official languages of the country in
place ofEnglish.
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike and other members of the SLFP recog-
nized the power of language as an aspect of group identity and used
that fact effectively to achieve their political ambitions. Bandaranaike
began to champion the cause of the bhikkhu, the native physician,
the rural schoolteacher, and the large numbers of low-paid minor
employees who had hitherto lacked opportunities to acquire the
English education necessary to secure lucrative employment. 6
The language-employment problem was closely intertwined with
Sinhala nationalism because the Sinhalese sought "their identity in
the Sinhalese language, in Buddhism, and the traditions of the
Mahavamsa-an identity sharpened and popularized by the Bud-
dhist revival" that began in the nineteenth century. 7 Sinhalese
extremist nationalists warned of the danger that would befall the
Buddhist religion and Sinhalese tradition if Sinhala were allowed to
fall into decay under the powerful influences of English and Tamil.
The "Sinhala only" theme was used effectively to garner the backing
of the Sinhala-educated rural people who aspired to share in the
political and economic power of the country but were excluded
because of the emphasis placed on English education. Indeed, politi-
cians convinced the Sinhalese electorate that the Tamils had usurped
more than their fair share of the jobs and the only way to trim the
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advantage they held was to make Sinhala the official language. The
SLFP was also supported by the Buddhist clergy and other parties that
were committed to the" Sinhala only" cause. The Eksath Bhikkhu
Peramuna, consisting of concerned bhikkhus, accorded overwhelm-
ing support to the SLFP because it promised to restore the monk's tra-
ditional role of unlimited influence in the government and educa-
tion. 8 In November 1955, four distinct groups consisting of the SLFP,
VLSSP (Viplavakari [Revolutionary] Lanka Sama Samaja Party), the
Basha Peramuna (Language Front), and independents formed the
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) to oppose the UNP and vowed to
make Sinhala the sole official language. Indeed, the MEP was basi-
cally a SLFP-Marxist coalition. The UNP, perturbed by the support
the MEP was receiving for this stand, changed its original position in
February 1955, declaring that Sinhala should be the official language
of the country. With this declaration, the UNP lost the little support
it previously had from the Tamil people.
The "Sinhala Only" Legislation, Sinhalese Nationalism, and
Tamil Nationalism
It was not surprising that the MEP, led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike,
won a landslide victory in the election of 1956. Likewise, the Federal
Party, led by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, was given a clear mandate
from the Tamil people to seek, through peaceful and parliamentary
methods, the establishment of a Tamil linguistic state within a federal
union of Sri Lanka. The electoral victory of the MEP in Sinhalese-
dominated electorates and the FP in Tamil-dominated electorates
marks the beginning of the period when Sinhalese and Tamil nation-
alism replaced the concepts "of multi-racial polity, a Sri Lankan
nationalism, and a secular state."9 From then on, politicians in both
communities were increasingly tempted to manipulate the ethnic
issue, even at the risk of endangering political stability, national
unity, and integration in Sri Lanka, as long as it contributed to the
political advantage of their party or faction.
The 1956 general elections and the formation of the government
by the MEP became an important turning point in the relationship
between the two ethnic communities in Sri Lanka. Henceforth,
Tamils who were elected from the FP to represent the interests of the
Tamils in parliament were completely excluded from holding minis-
terial or other positions of power in the government. This made it
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impossible for them to influence the decisions of the cabinet or for
the Sinhala government to interact on a regular basis with the elected
representatives of the majority of the Tamils. On the other hand, suc-
cessive Sinhala governments were obliged to listen to the wishes and
aspirations of the rural Sinhalese, the influential bhikkhus of the
Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna, and the Sinhalese nationalists who had
elected them to power. Henceforth, Sinhala governments were forced
to pay heed to the demands of powerful groups that were opposed to
the granting of concessions to the Tamils. One observer, commenting
on the outcome of the MEP victory in 1956, aptly stated that "the
rural masses and the Sinhalese Buddhists intelligentsia now came to
grips with the realities of political power. Bandaranaike, who had
reflected as well as articulated their needs and aspirations, found it
difficult to hold the more militant sections in check."10 In particular,
the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna, which campaigned for the MEP and
received a pledge from Bandaranaike that its ten demands would be
met, including the implementation of the controversial Buddhist
Commission Report and the institution of Sinhala as the official lan-
guage of Sri Lanka, became a very potent political force. Since the
MEP had used the anti-Tamil sentiment to defeat the United
National Party in the Sinhalese electorates, it was unable to grant any
concessions to Tamils because opposition parties, especially the UNP,
accused the MEP of yielding to Tamil demands. It became apparent
that Sinhala governments were unable to accede to the demands of
the Tamils because such a move would be exploited by opposition
parties to gain power. Therefore, since 1956 ambitious polit~cians
have not hesitated to inflame popular passions by appealing to com-
munal sentiments, "making virtually impossible a reconciliation of
conflicting Sinhalese and Tamil claims through reasoned accommoda-
tion and compromise and creating an atmosphere of disorder and
hostility that was readily exploited by fanatics, adventurers, and
goondas." II
The "Sinhala only" legislation, enacted into law by the MEP gov-
ernment as the Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956, marked the
end of the political control exercised by the westernized, English-
speaking elite, including the Tamils, in all spheres of life in Sri Lanka
and symbolized the end offoreign domination ofSri Lanka.
The "Sinhala only" Act made the Sinhala language the only offi-
ciallanguage of Sri Lanka in 1956. However, provisions were made in
the Act to permit the use of the English language in government
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departments until December 31, 1960, provided that the ministers in
charge of such departments were convinced that it was impracticable
to commence the use of Sinhala for any official purposes. The Act
also specified that ministries should be prepared to commence the
use of the Sinhala language before the expiry date, and if this change
could be affected by administrative order, regulations might be made
to effect such a change. No provisions were made in the Act for the
use of the Tamil language for official purposes in the Tamil districts.
"Sinhala only" legislation provided, for the first time, an opportu-
nity for 74 percent of the population who did not have proficiency in
the English language to conduct official transactions in their native
language. At the same time, however, Tamils, many of whom were
proficient in the English language and not Sinhala, were prohibited
from using the English language. Its use was prohibited partly
because it was a foreign language and partly because it gave undue
advantage to Tamils in education and employment. Tamils objected
to the attitude that they had intentionally and deviously robbed the
Sinhalese of their jobs and therefore should be punished. Tamils
insisted that they had no alternative, given the paucity of environ-
mental resources for successful agriculture in their traditional areas,
but to secure lucrative nonfarming jobs by mastering the English lan-
guage.
Under colonial rule, more than 90 percent of the island's popula-
tion was not literate in English and had to seek aid from persons pro-
ficient in English to decipher information pertaining to income taxes
or inheritance. Once Sinhala was declared the official language, the
majority of the Sinhalese people were spared the problem of having
to rely on translators to complete forms dealing with legal and per-
sonal matters. On the other hand, the Tamils had to continue, as they
had during the colonial period, to rely on translators to transact busi-
ness with the government and to complete legal documents as well to
learn an alien language in order to secure public service appoint-
ments. While colonialism had ended for the Sinhalese, it continued
for the Tamils. The Tamils were also deeply concerned that the official
language policy would destroy their language and distinctive culture,
which they have zealously cultivated from the time of their arrival
from South India in ancient times. 12 The Tamil masses and their
political leaders did not question the aspirations of the Sinhalese peo-
ple who desired to "retrieve their cultural heritage, which they felt
was endangered by the incursions of the West, and to assert their
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position and prerogatives as the majority of the island's popula-
tion." 13 Tamils, however, were unwilling to be governed in the Sinha-
lese language in the very areas they considered to be their traditional
homeland.
The Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956, despite the promises
made by Bandaranaike in the MEP manifesto, did not contain any
special provisions that granted concessions to the national minority,
the Tamils, with regard to the use of the Tami1language for educa-
tion, for administration in the Tamil areas, and for correspondence
with government departments. Tamil leaders realized for the first
time that the Sinhalese leaders were prepared to deny Tamils any of
their legitimate demands if it were politically advantageous to do so.
First, the UNP let the Tamils down by changing its language policy
from one of amending the constitution to guarantee parity of status
for both languages in 1953 to one that advocated Sinhala only in
1955. Then in 1956, the MEP gave in to demands to delete from the
Official Language bill the provisions for the "reasonable use of
Tamil" because of pressure from Sinhala nationalists, the Eksath
Bhikkhu Peramuna, and from prominent Sinhalese leaders like Met-
tananda, the influential leader of the Karava Buddhist lobby of the
MEP, as well as the UNp'14 The Buddhist clergy and a large number of
Sinhalese Buddhists were not willing to accede to Tamil demands
because they believed that the Sinhala national myth of reconquering
the island, whether from the Tamils or Europeans, had been accom-
plished, after 2,500 years of frustration, by the passage of the
"Sinhala only" legislation and that the elevated status of Sinhala and
Buddhism should be maintained.I5 .
The passage of the Sinhala only legislation had additional signifi-
cance because it coincided with the 2,500th year of Buddhism, the
year that Buddhist traditions predicted would mark the beginning of
an unprecedented spiritual awakening that would spread Buddhism
throughout the world. Therefore, the Sinhalese masses strongly
believed that this new era in the history of the Sinhalese race had
been inaugurated with the blessings of Buddha, and that it was their
duty, as the"chosen race" with a "divine mission," to establish, pre-
serve, and develop a Sinhala society based on the "sacred values" of
the ancient past. 16 The Sinhalese masses were also persistently warned
by the Buddhist clergy that Tamils should not be granted rights and
privileges of the kind they sought in a Sinhala-Buddhist state because
the Dravidian-Tamils have the reputation of destroying Sinhalese
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kingdoms, wrecking the Sinhala-Buddhist culture, usurping the
political rights of the Sinhalese, and depriving the Sinhalese of
opportunities to secure employment and prestigious positions in the
public sector. 17
To the Sri Lankan Tamils, the manner in which the language issue
was formulated and expounded by Sinhalese politicians, both within
and outside parliament, threatened their very existence as a recogniz-
able national minority. They wanted their language to be safe-
guarded, their distinct culture to be preserved, the right to conduct
the administration of their traditional homeland in the Tamil lan-
guage to be assured, and the right to develop their traditional home-
land according to their needs to be guaranteed. To show their disap-
proval of the passage of the discriminatory "Sinhala only" law, the
Federal Party staged a peaceful demonstration in the vicinity of par-
liament, but the demonstrators were beaten up by Sinhalese mobs.
This violence was accompanied by an anti-Tamil riot, resulting in the
killing of more than one hundred Tamils at the government-spon-
sored Gal Oya colonization scheme in Amparai District. The anti-
Tamil riots did not deter the federalists from continuing their demon-
strations. In August 1956, they called a convention in Trincomalee,
located in Eastern Province, to demand, among many concessions,
the creation of a federal form of government that would give them
regional autonomy, enact legislation giving parity of status to both
Sinhala and Tamil as official languages of Sri Lanka, grant citizenship
rights to Indian Tamils, and end the planned Sinhalese colonization
ofTamil areas.
Thus from the very beginning the federalists insisted that coopera-
tion from the Tamils to develop a strong national economy would not
be forthcoming unless the latter's rights were guaranteed. Such a sit-
uation, they argued, could not be secured unless Tamils were granted
a federal system of government which would allow them to use their
language for administrative purposes, preserve their culture, provide
employment opportunities for Tamils, and develop the Tamil areas
according to the economic needs of the inhabitants, without interfer-
ence from the Sinhala government. 18 They wanted economic rather
than political independence for their people at this stage of their
struggle for Tamil rights. Moreover, the claim by Sinhalese extreme
nationalists that Tamils would seek foreign assistance to subjugate the
Sinhalese, once regional autonomy was granted under a federal set-
up, had no validity because defense, foreign affairs, and other essen-
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tial services related to national security would be under the control of
the central government. The Federal Party threatened to stage a mass
civil disobedience campaign if the government failed to implement
the resolutions passed at the Trincomalee convention within one year.
Prime Minister Bandaranaike was convinced that the Tamils were
determined to defend their legitimate rights and, in order to avert a
major ethnic conflict, he agreed to negotiate a political settlement to
the conflict inJuly 1957.
The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact
The only agreement negotiated in good faith by the leaders of the Sri
Lanka Freedom Party, which, as the majority party in the MEP coali-
tion government, represented the majority of the Sinhalese people in
the parliament, and the leaders of the Federal Party, who represented
the majority of the Tamil people in the parliament, was the Bandara-
naike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 (see Appendix 1).19 Had this
agreement been implemented at this early stage of communal con-
frontation, much of the contemporary violence and bloodshed could
have been avoided. The pact recognized Tamil as the language of a
national minority and made provisions for its use as the language of
administration in the predominantly Tamil areas of the Northern and
Eastern provinces, without altering the position of Sinhala as the only
official language of Sri Lanka. It would have minimized the threat of
Sinhalese colonization of Tamil areas and permitted Tamils to
develop their traditional homeland as they deemed necessary. More-
over, it would have provided for the devolution of administrative
powers to regional councils in the Tamil areas.
Bandaranaike, realizing that the opposition from the Buddhist
clergy and Sinhalese extremist forces, as well as the UNP, was grow-
ing, delayed the implementation of the agreement and issued an
order requiring all motor vehicles to display the Sinhalese character
"Sri" on license plates throughout the island in order to assure the
Sinhalese extremists that the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact
would not nullify the Sinhala Only Act. On the other hand, the FP
became dubious about the prime minister's declared intention and
launched "a protest campaign against the sending of nationalized
public transport buses with Sinhalese-lettered number plates to Cey-
lon Tamil areas."20 In addition, the FP persuaded principals ofJaffna
schools to rescind their proposal to conduct Sinhala classes for the
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benefit of Tamil students. As expected, one action intensified the
other. Sinhalese mobs retaliated against the obliteration of Sinhalese
license plates in ]affna by defacing Tamil homes and businesses, as
well as by harassing Tamil people. The reprisals by Sinhalese mobs
and the peaceful, nonviolent demonstration by two hundred bhik-
khus of the Eksath Bhikkhu Paramuna in front of the prime minis-
ter's residence, compelled Bandaranaike to abrogate the pact in April
1958. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact was one of the many
promises to the Tamils that Sinhalese politicians failed to honor dur-
ing more than a quarter of a century.
The Federal Party, disappointed by Bandaranaike's refusal to
implement the pact, called a convention in May 1958 to plan a mass
disobedience campaign in Vavuniya District. This gathering was
opposed by some Sinhalese extremist nationalists, and what began as
the stoning of buses and trains that were transporting Tamil delegates
via Polonnaruwa ended in the massacre of Tamils in many areas, espe-
cially in Colombo. The atrocities committed by Sinhalese mobs
against Sri Lankan Tamils, who were using peaceful means to express
their disappointment with the Sinhala government, ranged from
rape to outright killing. Some of the killings and the burning of
Tamil property were instigated by casual workers and squatters who
lived in government-sponsored colonization schemes located in the
vicinity of Tamil districts. 21 A few Tamil residents in the Eastern and
Northern provinces retaliated, but the violence was predominantly
orchestrated by Sinhalese extremists. No area of the island was secure
for the Tamils except their traditional homeland, which became a safe
haven for the 12,000 refugees who were evacuated from Colombo.
The 1958 anti-Tamil riots marked the beginning of a series of ethnic
confrontations involving violence and bloodshed that would continue
in the years to come. With each successive riot, Sri Lankan Tamils
became more convinced that their very survival was contingent on the
ability to secure their traditional homeland for themselves.
The government used its emergency powers to quell the communal
riots of 1958 and to detain prominent members of the Federal Party
as well as to enact the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28
of 1958, which incorporated provisions for the use of Tamil as the
medium of instruction in schools and universities. Tamil students
were even permitted to take entrance examination to public service in
Tamil, although entrants were required to pass a Sinhala proficiency
examination within a specified time. These provisions seemed to be
'nrz
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important concessions to the Tamils, if government regulations had
authorized that Tamil parents could educate their children in the
Sinhala language. 22 The act also allowed for the transaction of busi-
ness with the government in the Tamil language and for the use of
the Tamil language for "prescribed administrative purposes" in the
Northern and Eastern provinces "without prejudice to the use of
Sinhala Only." 23
To the members of the Federal Party who were under house deten-
tion when the Tamil Language Act was passed and to others in the
Tamil community, the "special provisions" reduced Tamil-speaking
people to second-class citizens because their language was not recog-
nized as a "national language" along with Sinhala. The FP empha-
sized that the "special provisions" did not satisfy the minimum pro-
visions of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact with regard to the
devolution of political power to regional councils and procedures for
selecting colonists for state-sponsored colonization schemes. The
independent member of parliament from Vavuniya, C. Sunthara-
lingam, criticized the Tamil Language Act and even questioned the
ability of the Federal Party to wrest substantial concessions for the
Tamils. He also proclaimed that the future of the Tamils rested in the
establishment of a separate state rather than on federalism. 24 He was
the first Tamil politician to use the name "Eelam" to refer to the
independent Tamil state of Sri Lanka, which the Tamil United Libera-
tion Front and militant Tamils proclaimed in the 1970s. As it hap-
pened the Tamil Language Act of 1958 was not implemented because
of Bandaranaike's assassination by a Buddhist bhikkhu in 1959.
The Federal Party did not give up hopes of securing language
rights and political concessions similar to those provided in the Ban-
daranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. It waited for an opportunity to strike
a political alliance with any party that promised to deliver substantial
concessions to the Tamils. This political alliance was essential since
the FP "might at some moment hold the balance between rival
Sinhalese parties in the often closely divided Parliament. They would
then be in a position to bargain for the attainment of Tamil aims." 25
The opportunity came when neither the UNP nor the SLFP had a
clear majority to form a government after the March 1960 general
elections. At the outset, the FP tried to strike an alliance with the
UNP. The UNP had been called to form a government as the party
with the largest number of supporters in parliament, though not with
a clear majority. The UNP rejected the alliance because the proposals
!
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submitted by the FP for its support were close to the provisions of the
Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. When the UNP rejected the fed-
eralist demands, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, under the leadership
of Srimavo Bandaranaike, the former prime minister's widow, solic-
ited the support of the FP to form an alternative government, with an
understanding between the two parties that the Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam Pact would be enacted into law. Instead of calling
upon the SLFP and FP to form the government, however, the gover-
nor-general dissolved parliament and called for a new election. The
Federal Party's hopes evaporated when the SLFP won a landslide vic-
tory and formed a government without FP support. The SLFP was
instead obligated to the Sinhalese masses who returned it to power
and thus reneged on its agreement with the FP.
The SLFP government implemented its original language policy
making Sinhala the only official language and ignored the provisions
of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958. The govern-
ment even failed to recognize Tamil as a regional language and
declared that Sinhala should be the language of administration even
of Tamil areas. Legislation was also introduced making Sinhala the
only language of the courts. This sudden emphasis on "Sinhala only"
was partly intended to counter criticisms by the UNP and Sinhalese
Buddhist militants to the effect that Mrs. Bandaranaike was pre-
paring to sacrifice Sinhalese interests through a secret understanding
with the Tamils. The Federal Party responded by embarking on a
major civil disobedience (satyagraha) campaign that brought the
activities of the government to a halt in the Tamil areas. It also defied
the government by establishing a separate postal system to serve the
Tamil areas. The government, in turn, responded by arresting Tamil
leaders, banning the Federal Party, restoring its administrative con-
trol over the Tamil areas under a state of emergency, and dispatching
army units to ]affna. Some members of the army assaulted peaceful
demonstrators and innocent bystanders in]affna.
The state of emergency, which was imposed on April 17, 1961, was
lifted after 743 days. During the state of emergency the government's
attention was directed toward improving the economic conditions of
the nation and "Sinhalasization" of Sri Lanka. Many Tamil public ser-
vice employees, who were unable to become proficient in the Sinhala
language, were denied annual salary increments or forced to retire
during this period. The language issue is the one through which the
Tamils have suffered the most overt discrimination. The Federal Party
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was prepared to renew its civil disobedience campaign in August
1964 but called it off when Mrs. Bandaranaike's government decided
to take steps to implement the provisions of the Tamil Language
(Special Provisions) Act of 1958. The government also intended to
introduce legislation for establishing district councils that would
facilitate administrative decentralization and transaction of business
in the language prevailing in the area. Unfortunately, these proposals
were not enacted into law because Mrs. Bandaranaike's coalition gov-
ernment collapsed in December 1964.
The coalition government of Mrs. Bandaranaike was defeated in
the general elections of 1965, but the victorious UNP was ten seats
short of an absolute majority. It sought alliance with the FP, which
had by now watered down its demands to include the implementa-
tion of the Tamil Language Act of 1958 and some of the more impor-
tant provisions of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. A "Na-
tional Government" comprising the UNP, the FP, and the Tamil
Congress was formed and a non-elected Tamil member of the FP was
appointed to the cabinet for the first time since 1956. It was apparent
from the outset that the UNP was anxious to negotiate a political set-
tlement to the Tamil problem in return for the support it had
received from the FP to defeat the SLFP-Marxist coalition. The gov-
ernment also took precautionary measures to implement the Tamil
Language (Special Provisions) Regulations of 1966 without giving any
room for the opposition to criticize the UNP. In particular, it empha-
sized that all regulations would be drafted to conform to Bandara-
naike's Tamil Language Act of 1958 and the SLFP-Marxist coalition
proposals of 1965 (see Appendix III). These regulations, which were
approved by the parliament in January 1966, are still in force. They
provide for the use of the Tamil language in the Northern and Eastern
provinces for the "transaction of all government and public business
and for the maintenance of public records." Official government
communications are both in Tamil and Sinhala, and Tamil can be
used in correspondence between Tamil-speaking persons living any-
where in the country and government officials, and for correspon-
dence between local government bodies of Northern and Eastern
provinces and the central government.
These provisions were acceptable to the Federal Party and the Tamil
masses as long as they represented only the first step toward redress-
ing the legitimate grievances of the Tamils. On the other hand, the
coalition parties in the opposition and the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna
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accused the UNP of granting "parity of status" to the Tamil language
and thus permitting the Tamils to exploit the wealth of the country.
They claimed that the removal of restrictions imposed on Tamils seek-
ing public service jobs paved the way for the eventual takeover of the
country by Tamils. The regulations were actually similar to ones pro-
posed by Mrs. Bandaranaike's coalition government the previous
year. Nevertheless, the opposition parties sponsored strikes and dem-
onstrations on the day the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regu-
lations were tabled in the parliament, and these contributed to anti-
Tamil disturbances in Colombo (see Appendix III). The "Buddhist
bhikkhus were among those who denounced the regulations, and a
bhikkhu was accidentally killed by police firing against demonstra-
tors."26 Despite these anti-Tamil demonstrations, the Tamils re-
mained calm and even assisted the government in implementing the
Tamil Language Act and the "Sinhala only" legislation. It is neces-
sary to emphasize, however, that the belated recognition of Tamil as a
regional language was "as much a result of the consciousness of its
practical difficulty of enforcing it in the Tamil areas as an attempt at
political appeasement."27 Soon after the enactment of the language
regulations into law, public servants in Tamil areas sought Sinhala
training and accepted Sinhala as the official language. More than
seven hundred Sinhalese teachers assumed duties in Tamil schools on
invitation from the Tamils of the Northern and Eastern provinces.
The number of motor vehicles with Sinhala license plates proliferated
in the Northern and Eastern provinces, and signs in government
departments and public places were posted in both Tamil and
Sinhala.
By agreeing to the provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provi-
sions) Act, the Tamils had virtually accepted Sinhala as the only offi-
ciallanguage but the opposition parties continued to accuse the UNP
of having surrendered Sinhalese interests to the Federal Party. It was
thus not surprising that the District Councils bill, which was drafted
by the "National Government," failed to gain support from parlia-
ment, even though a similar one had been proposed by Mrs. Ban-
daranaike's government before the 1965 elections.
The District Councils Draft Bill of 1968 was designed to establish
district councils in each of the twenty-four administrative districts.
These councils were to be vested with powers and responsibilities in
respect of subjects to be mutually agreed upon between Mr. Senana-
yake and Mr. Chelvanayakam. These powers and functions included
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the "formulation and recommendation to the Government" regard-
ing "development loans schemes important to the district and to
raise with the approval of the Minister of Finance for works or public
services to be undertaken by the district." Although these powers
were limited in scope and were to function under the control and
direction of the central government, the hitherto neglected economic
development ofTamil districts could have been accomplished to some
extent, provided, however, that the central government allocated
adequate funds for development projects.
The members of the council were not to be specifically elected by
the people of the districts. The council was to be composed of the
government agent, "elected Members of Parliament of each electoral
district which lies within such administrative district, Appointed
Members of the House of Representatives, Mayors of Municipalities
and Chairmen of Local Bodies within the administrative districts."
Indeed, the district councils were merely designed to extend some of
the central government functions that were hitherto performed by
Kachcheries, and therefore the Bill did not contain any provisions
that would have made the district councils responsible for the people
at the district level.
Unfortunately, the District Council Bill did not furnish authority
to the councils to "select settlers for the colonization schemes in the
area under their administration," and have "powers over land devel-
opment and colonization," as was agreed in the "Senanayake-Chelva-
nayakam Pact." Therefore, even if this Bill had been enacted into
law, the most pressing concern of the Tamils regarding the conversion
of Tamil-dominated areas into Sinhalese-dominated areas via govern-
ment-sponsored colonization schemes would not have been alle-
viated. The Federal Party withdrew from the National Government
in 1968 and the District Councils proposal was not pursued any fur-
ther by Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake.
To the Tamils, the implementation of Tamil Language Regulations
did not produce any substantial benefits. They had hoped that the
National Government would enact legislation granting regional
autonomy to Tamil areas similar to that proposed in the Bandara-
naike-Chelvanayakam Pact. For the Tamil masses the ethnic issue had
become more political than economic in nature. They were outraged
with the government-sponsored colonization schemes designed to
settle people from Sinhalese districts on lands they considered to be
their traditional homeland. Nevertheless, opposition parties suc-
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ceeded in mobilizing public sentiment against the National Govern-
ment on many issues, including the language regulations, the district
councils proposal, and the measures it adopted to deal with strikes
and demonstrations staged by the opposition parties, including rul-
ing the country for more than a thousand days under a state of emer-
gency. The Federal Party had hoped that it could re-negotiate with
the UNP on the issue of regional autonomy for the Northern and
Eastern provinces, if the latter were returned to power in the 1970
general election. Unfortunately for the Tamils, Mrs. Bandaranaike,
whose SLFP had joined with two Marxist parties to form the United
Front (UF), was victorious and formed the new government.
The 1972 Constitution
The United Front government was in no great hurry to introduce leg-
islation to establish district councils, which Mrs. Bandaranaike had
proposed in 1964, since the coalition government did not owe any
political favors to the Federal Party. Mrs. Bandaranaike, however, was
obliged to satisfy the communal aspirations of her pro-Sinhala sup-
porters, who were made to believe that the Sinhala Only Act had
been compromised by the previous government in order to meet
Tamil demands. In order to allay their fears, a new constitution was
adopted in 1972 reaffirming the position of Sinhala as the only offi-
ciallanguage and conferring special status on Buddhism. An impor-
tant clause in the constitution declared that "it shall be the duty of
the state to protect and foster Buddhism."28 This provision aroused
the Tamils' suspicions that government funds would be used to try to
convert Tamils by establishing Buddhist schools, as had been done in
the past, and instructing Tamil children in Buddhism and in Sinhala.
The new constitution also eliminated a clause that read: "parliament
has no right to enact legislation which would confer an undue advan-
tage to a race, religion, or community." This clause had provided the
basis for the only legal recourse the Tamils had against the govern-
ment. Henceforth, laws passed by the National State Assembly could
restrict the fundamental rights and freedoms incorporated in the new
constitution. Therefore, the Tamils, whose leaders had pioneered the
constitutional reform movement and had made significant contribu-
tions to the political evolution and economic development of the
country, were relegated to the status of second-class citizens by the
l
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constitution. Tamil members of parliament had no alternative, bur to
boycott the constituent assembly that was drafting the constitution.
From 1972, Tamil leaders adopted new strategies to clamor for the
establishment of a federal state, a solution they had refrained from
advocating as long as the UNP assured them of their language rights
and a degree of regional auronomy for the Tamil provinces. The offi-
cial language controversy in the 1950s drove a deep wedge between
the communities, but no major Tamil parties proposed a total separa-
tion prior to the 1970s. The beginnings of concerted action by Tamil
leaders to resist Sinhalese domination can be traced to the formation
of the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972. The Tamil Congress and
Federal Party united and, for the first time since 1949, the Ceylon
Workers Congress, which represents the Tamils of Indian origin,
agreed to coordinate its political activities with Tamils of Sri Lankan
origin. The formation of the TUF was precipitated by many factors,
including the adoption of the 1972 constitution. Tamil leaders were
convinced that it was the lack of unity among the Tamils that had
encouraged Sinhalese parties to ignore their demands in the past and
for the SLFP and the UNP to manipulate the ethnic issue for their
own political gains. They could no longer overlook the fact that
Sinhala governments had, on several occasions, reneged on their
promises to enact appropriate laws to redress Tamil grievances, and
they realized they had to change their strategy in order to secure
political and linguistic rights for their community. Tamil leaders
believed that without regional autonomy the Tamils could not
improve economic conditions in their traditional homeland, which
have deteriorated to the point that there is widespread unemploy-
ment, underemployment, and general despair among the people.
The Rise ofSeparatist Movement and the Tamil United
Liberation Front
Initially, the major objective of the TUF was to secure regional auton-
omy for Tamil areas, but over the course of time its members were
compelled by circumstances to demand the creation of an indepen-
dent Tamil state, to be called Eelam. One of the most potent factors
in propelling the TUF toward separatism was "the rapidly increasing
impatience and militancy among the youths of the North, including
those associated with the TUF Yourh Organization," who questioned
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the effectiveness of the conventional tactics employed by the older
generation of leaders to secure the legitimate rights of the Tamils. 29
These young people accused their leaders of being inconsistent in
their demands for regional autonomy for Tamil areas, having expect-
ed them to cling to their original demands for the devolution of legis-
lative and executive powers to the Tamil areas under a federal form of
government. Instead, the leaders had shown themselves willing to
negotiate pacts that would have devolved only administrative func-
tions to Tamil areas, at first through the regional councils proposal
and then through the district councils proposal. They were further
outraged at the way agreements negotiated between Tamil and Sinha-
lese leaders to deal with pressing problems relating to colonization of
Tamil districts, educational and employment opportunities, the use
of the Tamil language for regional administration, and funds for the
development of irrigation, agriculture, industries, and the Kankesan-
thurai harbor in north Sri Lanka had been repudiated by Sinhalese
leaders under pressure from bhikkhus and a few Sinhalese extremists.
They felt that the civil disobedience campaigns of the FP and the
TUF merely encouraged Sinhala governments to ignore Tamil de-
mands and to renege on their promises.
They were appalled by the level of unemployment among educat-
ed Tamil youths and with how the Sinhala only policy, with its more
indirect forms of discrimination, had made it more difficult for them
to find suitable employment. It is true that the acute problem of
unemployment at this time was not limited to the Tamils. It was esti-
mated that as much as 24 percent of the labor force and approxi-
mately 47.7 percent of those who had earned a diploma in the Gen-
eral Certificate of Education or its equivalent, the Senior School
Certificate, were unemployed in 1973.30 As in many other develop-
ing nations, the rate of economic growth has not kept pace with the
growth of population, and both communities have been suffering,
but Tamil youths have been more adversely affected. Tamil youths
not only lacked employment opportunities but were also discriminat-
ed against with regard to university admissions. As one observer
noted, "in the years 1970-1975 the mode of access to higher educa-
tion was altered in such a way as to benefit the Sinhalese-largely at
the expense of Ceylon Tamils."31 The government had instituted
standardization of examination scores between language media, with
the result that persons taking the examination in the Tamil language
were required to achieve a higher score than those taking the exami-
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nation in Sinhala in order to gain admission to a university (see chap-
ter 4). In addition, admission to universities was based on the per-
centage of total population resident in a district under the district
quota system. Under this system, the Jaffna District, where most
Tamil students are concentrated, was only entitled to 5.54 percent of
the total allocated seats. The Tamil students were those "most
adversely" affected by both the standardization of scores and the dis-
trict quota system, since the "total share of Tamil admissions fell to
20.9 percent (from 25.9 percent in 1973 and 35.3 percent in 1970)";
by 1983, this figure had plunged to 19.3 percent. 32 The seriousness of
these discriminatory measures can only be gauged if the 5.5 percent
for the seats allocated to Indian Tamils were added to the 12.6 per-
cent of the Sri Lankan Tamil population. Tamil youths had anticipat-
ed in the early 1970s that this would happen in the 1980s.
The youths also predicted that the unemployment situation would
worsen in the 1980s, since the government did not represent the
interests of their community. After 1983, when Tamil parties were
proscribed and Tamil members of parliament elected from Tamil dis-
tricts could no longer serve as members of the opposition, the UNP
government appointed three Tamils to serve as members of the cabi-
net. To the Tamil youths, these three Tamil ministers, who are not the
elected representatives of the Northern and Eastern provinces were
merely stooges of the government. The government maintained that
Tamil interests were represented by the handful of Tamils who held
high positions of responsibility in the government. However, these
Tamils could have reached their high positions through seniority and/
or could have been arbitrarily selected to demonstrate to the interna-
tional community that the Tamils are not discriminated against.
Indeed, if the Tamil ministers and the few Tamil public servants had
been as influential as the government claimed, they would have been
able to persuade Sinhala governments to redress some of the Tamil
grievances and even to have prevented the periodic massacres of
Tamils by members of the armed forces. As it was, as a result of pref-
erential treatment, the Sinhalese were able to gain complete control
over the exercise of political power and the economic resources of the
country.
Tamil youths watched as the constitutional provisions for reason-
able use of Tamil language in limited areas became a dead letter; they
saw the government's failure to devolve substantial powers to govern-
ment bodies in Tamil areas and its reluctance to halt the planned
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resettlement of large numbers of Sinhalese in Tamil districts. With
the adoption of the 1972 constitution, they realized that all hopes for
the recognition of Tamil as the language of a national minority and
the devolution of substantial legislative and executive powers to
Tamil areas were nullified. Their frustration with the political strate-
gies adopted by their elders since the early 1950s is thus understand-
able; the strategies were clearly ineffective in securing concessions
"from a series of governments brought to power principally by Sinha-
lese votes." 33
The beginnings of the Tamil militant movements can be traced to
March 1973 when more than one hundred Tamil youths were arrested
for staging a black-flag demonstration during the visit of Mrs. Ban-
daranaike's cabinet ministers to ]affna. Militant youths for the first
time were able to persuade the Tamils ofJaffna to boycott schools and
colleges. In the same year, the government, using emergency powers,
arbitrarily arrested more than two hundred Tamil youths suspected of
being militants and held them in custody for four months. These
arrests provoked youths to retaliate and confront the government.
They soon became a political force powerful enough to compel the
TUF to reconsider its long-cherished objective to establish a federal
system of government. Its Action Committee "resolved upon a sepa-
rate state of Tamil Eelam as its goal" in May 1973. The youths were
able to pressure the TUF to move quickly toward a drastic solution,
which in their view could not be achieved as long as there was a
Sinhalese majority in parliament in control of the government. The
solution to the Tamil problem as they saw it was to persuade TUF
leaders to use whatever means at their disposal to create an indepen-
dent Tamil state. The leaders responded, at a conference, by recasting
the TUF as the Tamil United liberation Front (TUlF) and by reiterat-
ing its call for the establishment of the secular state of Tamil Eelam on
May 14, 1976. The influential Ceylon Workers Congress did not give
its support to this separatist movement. It was willing to support the
TUlF as long as the main objective of the party was to establish a lin-
guistic state within the framework of a federal system of government,
but it drew the line when it came to the call for an independent Tamil
state.
The members of the TUlF, for the most part, hold moderate views
on the methods to be adopted to secure a separate state for the
Tamils. Although the leadership of the TUlF had changed hands
from S.]. V. Chelvanayakam, who was committed to the use of Gan-
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dhian methods to secure Tamil rights, the policies of his successor,
Appapillai Amirthalingam, were a continuation of Chelvanayakam's.
However, some of his speeches openly advocating the establishment
of a separate Tamil state, with appeals to the Indian government and
the people of Tamil Nadu to support the Tamil cause. These appeals,
delivered partly in desperation and partly in response to militant
demands, enraged Sinhalese leaders. The TUlF's desire to establish
an independent Tamil state won the moral support of some leaders in
Tamil Nadu, which "in turn led to a widespread Ceylon Tamil convic-
tion that without sovereignty, the Ceylon Tamil people are destined
to second-class status in the larger Sinhalese polity as well as to a col-
lective'life of economic and cultural subservience under hostile
repressive Sinhalese governments."34 Nevertheless, TUlF has re-
mained committed to the use of democratic methods to establish
such a state.
The youth movements, on the other hand, most of which are
underground organizations with links to South India, have embraced
violence as the only means to establish an independent Tamil state.
The stage was set for direct confrontation between the government
and the Tamil militants in January 1974, when Mrs. Bandaranaike's
United Front coalition government, which was becoming increasingly
sensitive to the rise of youth movements, failed to give unconditional
approval for the holding of the fourth world conference on Tamil
language and Tamil Culture in Jaffna from January 3 to January 10,
1974. A public meeting held on the last day of the conference was
broken up when "the police on the pretext of an unwarranted public
meeting charged into the crowd with tear gas and baton, bringing
down the electric pylons and killing nine people in the process."35
This enraged the Tamil youths, more so because there was no inquiry
into the incident and the government offered no apology for it. The
militants considered this an intentional act designed by the govern-
ment to warn them and the TUlF of its determination to crush move-
ments that advocated terrorism and separation.
Violence by Government Security Forces and Tamil Militants
The government imposed restrictions on the activities of Tamil mili-
tants and, in retaliation, the militants organized a series of robberies
and even committed acts of violence against the police, military per-
sonnel, and others whom they considered to be traitors to the Tamil
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cause. Alfred Durayappah, the mayor ofJaffna and a member of the
SLFP, who was trying to build an organizational base for the party in
the North, became their first victim in 1975. Following his assassina-
tion more than one hundred suspected youths were arrested at ran-
dom, detained, and tortured. These repressive measures drove the
militant movements underground. The TULF, however, contemplat-
ed returning to the parliament with a new mandate from the Tamil
people.
In the parliamentary elections of 1977, the United National Party
was returned to power and TULF candidates swept all the fourteen
seats in the Northern Province, captured 70 percent of the total vote
in the province, and received a simple majority in the Eastern Prov-
ince. This victory gave a clear signal to the government that sizable
numbers of Sri Lankan Tamils were generally behind their leaders in
their demand for the creation of a separate state. 36 Nevertheless,
many Tamils hoped, even at this stage, that the need to establish a
separate state would not arise if the United National Party would take
appropriate measures to remedy Tamil grievances as promised in its
manifesto. Their hopes were shattered one month after the elections
when Sinhalese police in the Jaffna Peninsula ran amok when they
were not allowed to enter a carnival as nonpaying guests. Unruly
mobs repeated the carnage of the anti-Tamil riots of 1958 by burning
and looting homes and businesses, killing more than three hundred
people, and forcing approximately 35,000 Tamils to seek shelter in
refugee camps. Ethnic violence, which had hitherto been limited to
the burning and looting of Tamil homes and properties in Sinhalese
areas, affected the people of the Jaffna Peninsula for the first time.
This police rampage, which was also linked to a false rumor concern-
ing the killing of a Sinhalese policeman by Tamil militants, fueled
anti-Tamil riots in other parts of the island.
. It was this rampage by the police that precipitated the formation of
the Tamil Liberation Tigers, an underground movement which,
according to newspaper reportS, was planning to smuggle arms pur-
chased abroad into Sri Lanka. During the early stages of the militant
movement in 1976, there was no indication as to how many youth
movements were operating in Sri Lanka. Therefore, the name Tamil
Liberation Tigers was used to describe the movement as a whole. It
was only in April 1978, after a well-known Tamil police inspector,
who was instrumental in arresting Tamil youths for certain acts of vio-
lence, was ambushed and killed that one of the militant groups
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claimed responsibility for this incident and declared itself the libera-
tion Tigers ofTamil Eelam (lTTE). Although the lTTE was formed in
1977, it was not known until 1978 that it was this particular group
that was carrying out most of the violence against government troops
and government informants.
The reasons for the 1977 anti-Tamil riots were outlined in the
Report ofthe Presidential Commission ofInquiry into the Incidents
which TOok Place between 13th August and 15th September, 1977. It
attributed the cause to many factors, including the TUlF's anti-
Sinhalese propaganda advocating separatism, Sinhalese extremists'
statements claiming that Tamils intended to wipe out the Sinhalese
race, and acts of violence committed by the liberation TigersY The
immediate cause of the violence, however, was the rumor that Tamil
militants had attacked Sinhalese policemen in ]affna. In retaliation,
Sinhalese extremists moved against Tamils living in Sinhalese areas.
Tamils were infuriated when they learned that the government had
not taken swift action to contain the riot. Public statements made by
some Sinhalese politicians following the riots disheartened them fur-
ther. For their part, Sinhalese were outraged by the rhetorical threats
made by some TUlF members to the effect that South Indian assis-
tance would be sought to establish an independent Tamil state. In the
past, Sinhalese extremists had objected to political concessions on
these very grounds-that they would lead to the formation of "an
independent Tamil state, which would be bound to seek links with
India."38 Tamils had never contemplated seeking South Indian assis-
tance to secure their legitimate rights in the past, and a majority of
Sri Lankan Tamils still desired that the problem be amicably solved
between the Sinhalese and Tamils. Those who wanted to seek military
assistance to create a separate Tamil state in Sri lanka felt driven by
Sinhalese chauvinists to do so. Thus the public hearing on the 1977
anti-Tamil rioting was used effectively by both Sinhalese and Tamils
to blame each other for inciting people to riot, but the violence of
1977 and the events that followed it convinced many Tamils, of both
extreme and moderate views, of the need to establish a separate
state. 39
The Tamil liberation Tigers stepped up their program of violence
against the police and army personnel, who represented for them the
Sinhala government that was intent on imposing its rule on the Tamil
people, as well as against certain Tamils. In turn, the armed forces
and the police escalated their violence against innocent citizens in
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order to stem the tide of the youth movement and to discourage peo-
ple from supporting the movement. In 1977, before the riots, five
Tamil youths were arrested and detained for killing a government
informant. These five youths and forty-eight other detainees were
murdered by fellow Sinhalese prisoners in a maximum security prison
during the riots of)uly-August 1983. The government proscribed the
Liberation Tiger Movement and other similar organizations by intro-
ducing Order No. 16 of 1978, which permitted security forces to tor-
ture youths whom they detained.
The UNP government became increasingly concerned that the
1977 anti-Tamil riots had alienated the Tamils and that there was an
urgent need to appease them. As a first step, the government
adopted a new constitution in September 1978 that recognized limil
as a national language in Sri Lanka and improved on the Tamil lan-
guage provisions in order to offer better employment opportunities
to Tamils in the public sector. 40 The violence continued, however,
government regulations proscribing underground movements not-
withstanding. On September 7, 1978, a time bomb exploded on the
Air Ceylon Avro 748 on a flight from]affna to Colombo. This inci-
dent, plus the continued violence against security forces and infor-
mants, compelled the government to pass a series of harsh acts, some
of which have become permanent.
The relationship between the Tamils and Sinhalese was severely
strained and there was a danger of the outbreak of another communal
disturbance. Two months after the new constitution was adopted in
1978, Tamils had another problem to contend with. In November
1978, when the new university bill was debated, Cyril Mathew, the
minister of Industries and Scientific Affairs, alleged that Tamil lec-
turers in universities had virtually handed inflated scores to Tamil stu-
dents so that more of them could gain admission to universities,
thereby depriving Sinhalese students access to university education.
The government, however, was neither willing to inquire into these
allegations nor willing to withdraw the regulation dealing with the
racial quota system, which gave preferential treatment to Sinhalese
seeking admission to universities (see chapter 4). Tamils were also
angered when the government introduced legislation to incorporate a
portion of the Anuradhapura District into the newly redrawn Vavu-
niya District. The TULF complained that this legislation would
increase the number of Sinhalese living in the Northern Province,
and they boycotted parliamentary proceedings. In March of 1979,
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TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingam appealed to the Government
of India and to the people of Tamil Nadu to support the cause of Sri
Lankan Tamils for establishing a separate state, thus enraging the
Sinhalese. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) of Tamil Nadu
had on many occasions reiterated its enthusiastic support .for the Sri
Lankan Tamils in their bid to establish an independent Tamil state in
Sri Lanka. Even Tamil expatriates living abroad, many of whom have
relatives in Sri Lanka, supported the establishment of Eelam. At this
juncture, the TULF members in parliament were accused by the gov-
ernment of advocating the division of Sri Lanka and of jeopardizing
the country's development programs by influencing foreign govern-
ments against the Sri Lankan people. At the same time the president
vowed to wipe out terrorism in Sri Lanka. Communal tension at this
point was so intense that the government was forced to declare a state
of emergency in the]affna District on]uly 12, 1979. On]uly 19, the
Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48 was passed in keeping with the
president's promise to do away with such activity. The act permitted
suspects to be held incommunicado for up to eighteen months with-
out trial, thus creating classic conditions for torture. Atrocities com-
mitted by security and military forces under the protection of the Pre-
vention of Terrorist Act have been well documented by human rights
groupS.41 No sooner was the act passed than the government, adopt-
ing a "carrot and stick" approach, declared its intention to appoint a
commission to find a solution to the ethnic problem.
The Ill-Fated District Development Councils
The United National Party had conceded, during the 1977 election
campaign, that some of the Tamil grievances were justified and that
appropriate measures should be adopted to address these issues. It
emphasized the need for summoning an all-party conference to
resolve the ethnic problem within the consensus of public opinion.
Past experiences had shown that no government could expect to
implement agreements negotiated between Tamil and Sinhalese
leaders unless opposition parties and nonsecular groups were consult-
ed. In particular, President]. R. ]ayewardene was "persuaded that
means could-and indeed must-be found to bring a real measure of
decentralization without inevitably risking partition."42 By]uly 1979,
when the government appointed a Presidential Commission to
inquire into Tamil grievances and to recommend appropriate reme-
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dial measures, the political situation had deteriorated to its worst
level since 1956 and there was a danger of a further outbreak of com-
munal violence. As expected, the SLFP refused to serve on the com-
mission, but the TULF agreed to nominate a member. In order to
silence its Tamil critics, TULF made public statements on the same
day that its objective was to establish an independent Tamil state but
that it was still willing to consider, and even accept, any proposals
that would incorporate the regional councils provisions of the Ban-
daranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact.
The TULF and the government negotiated an agreement that
became the District Development Councils Act No. 35 of 1980,
although it did not incorporate many of the provisions of the regional
councils as set up in the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact. The pur-
pose in setting up the District Development Councils was to decen-
tralize certain administrative functions to the twenty-four administra-
tive districts and to encourage economic development in rural areas,
especially at the district level. In outlining the reasons why the TULF
accepted the proposal, its spokesmen declared that the TULF desired
to restore communal harmony, to improve the economy of Tamil dis-
tricts, and to work within the parliamentary framework to achieve its
ultimate objective-Tamil Eelam (see chapter 5). As expected, Tamil
militants took a harder line in dealing with the government. They
stressed that the District Development Councils (DOCs) were a poor
substitute for the concept of Eelam and that Tamils should continue
to fight for a separate state. They claimed that "extra-parliamentary
action could weary the Sinhalese into yielding to Tamil Eelam."43
The elections for the Jaffna District DOC were held in June 1981
under the watchful eye of the armed forces that were stationed in the
district. The government even nominated a slate of UNP candidates
in Jaffna and took security precautions to supervise the elections.
Strict security measures were imposed because the government was
aware that "extremists within the separatist movement . . . were
ardently opposed to any activity within the existing political frame-
work and viewed participation in the elections as compromising the
objective of a separate state."44 Tamil militants assassinated a promi-
nent UNP candidate a few days before the elections and a week later
two policemen were killed and two others were injured at a TULF
rally. In retaliation, off-duty Sinhalese policemen and Sinhalese sol-
diers went on a rampage, looting, killing, and setting fire to the Jaff-
na public library with its 95,000 volumes of rare books of historical
..
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and cultural significance to the Tamils.45 Indian Tamils suffered heav-
ily at the hands of roaming mobs of hoodlums who destroyed prop-
erty and killed innocent victims. Indian Tamils who had been pre-
viously settled in Vavuniya District, as refugees from the plantation
areas, were harassed by the army, and their Sri Lankan Tamil benefac-
tors were taken away for questioning. 46 Much of this violence was
instigated by racist statements made by Sinhalese extremists and
UNP backbenchers, during the DDCs election campaign, against
TUlF leader Amirthalingam, who was also head of the Opposition.47
Despite the violence, the election proceeded according to schedule
and, much to the disappointment of the government, the TUlF cap-
tured more than 80 percent of the votes and all the seats in the Jaffna
District Development Council. It also won control of five out of the
six DDCs in the other parts of the Northern and Eastern provinces.
The voter turnout in Jaffna was, however, low, and this might well
have been an indication that the people of the district disapproved of
the DDCs Act, or that they were shifting allegiance from the TUlF to
militant separatists, or that they were intimidated by the presence of
the military. Disappointed by the failure of the UNP to secure seats in
the North, a UNP member of parliament brought a no-confidence
motion against Amirthalingam on July 24, 1981, for inciting the
Sinhalese to riot with racist statements he made during the DDCs
campaign. However, PresidentJayewardene, who was anxious to end
this bitter confrontation with the Tamils, negotiated an agreement
with Amirthalingam on November 3, 1981, to implement the DDCs
Act.
Peaceful coexistence between the Sinhalese and Tamils lasted until
the first popular election for president was held in December 1982.
At this time, the dialogue between the Tamils and Sinhalese
appeared to break down, and the government placed the blame on
the Tamils. It cited many factors, including the antigovernment atti-
tude of the TUlF toward the presidential system of government, the
continuation of violence by extremists in northern Sri lanka, and the
nomination by the TUlF of a convicted terrorist to a seat in parlia-
ment. 48 Tamils, on the other hand, blamed the government for this
breakdown on the grounds that the latter had failed to implement
constitutional provisions regarding the use of Tamil as the language
of administration in the Northern and Eastern provinces, had given
inadequate powers and insufficient funds to the DDCs for develop-
ing Tamil districts, and had been reluctant to withdraw the Preven-
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tion of Terrorist Act, which gave unlimited powers to the armed
forces to deal with suspected terrorists and civilians. They also blamed
the government for "the recurrence of acts of indiscipline in the secu-
rity forces," and for the failure to conduct by-elections in Eastern
Province, where former members of parliament had failed in their
campaign against the 1982 referendum to extend the life of parlia-
ment until 1989.49 In the meantime, Tamil militants stepped up their
attacks on security forces and the latter retaliated by victimizing civil-
ians. The violence escalated as more youths joined the movement.
Moreover, the movement had "split into six or more rival and some-
times violently hostile groups, ... divided by ideology, caste, and
personal antagonism."~o It became increasingly difficult for the gov-
ernment to patrol the streets of Jaffna. Under these circumstances,
the government enacted Emergency Regulation 15a ofJuly 3, 1983,
which allowed security forces to bury or cremate the bodies of people
shot by them without establishing their identities or without in-
quests. 51
The government received no cooperation from the civilian popula-
tion to counteract terrorism in the North, where the population was
Tamil-speaking and the army of occupation mainly Sinhalese. In fact,
the separatists had no difficulty attacking police stations, army units,
government establishments, and government informers as long as
they were able to mingle with the population at large after each inci-
dent. Under these circumstances, the soldiers, who became frustrated
by their ineffectiveness in combatting terrorism and apprehending
the militants, moved against the civilian population. Moreover,
under the Emergency Regulation and the Prevention of Terrorism
Act, the security forces had a free hand to arrest civilians and to com-
mit acts of violence against innocent citizens, as happened one day in
mid-July 1983 when soldiers went on a rampage killing fifty-one peo-
ple in the Jaffna Peninsula. ~2 The Tigers, who called themselves the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, retaliated by ambushing a truck-
load of thirteen army personnel onJuly 23.~3
In the violence that followed, 175 Tamil houses in Jaffna were
burned, ten Tamils were killed or wounded by naval personnel in
Trincomalee, and fifty-three Tamil inmates of Welikade Prison were
murdered by fellow prisoners onJuly 25 and July 27. Many innocent
Tamils living in Sinhalese areas, primarily in Colombo, "were left
dead, many injured, thousands displaced, [with] great losses of prop-
erty, economic and physical dislocation, and a shocked population."
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Nearly one-half of the 141,000 Tamils living in Colombo were home-
less" and approximately 2,000 were killed, according to unofficial
estimates. H The riot of 1983 became a communal holocaust because
it was well organized, according to Gananath Obeyesekere, by the
Jatika Sevaka Sangamaya, a powerful trade union "which has an
effective say in the working of government offices and corpora-
tions."55 The Union's anti-Tamil attitude is ascribed to its Sinhala-
Buddhist political ideology as expounded by its president, Cyril
Mathew. However, government leaders made certain that the blame
was not placed on the union, with which some prominent ministers
were associated. Instead they attributed the violence to the Sinhalese
people in general. Even the president failed to impose a curfew until
the damage was done, apparently due to bad advice, and no effort
was made by any Sinhalese leaders to show any compassion toward
the Tamil community for the untolled suffering it was subject to at
the hands of Sinhalese mobs. This outraged the Tamil community
and further convinced its leaders that unless the Tamil community
was granted substantial political concessions to take care of its affairs
in the Northern and Eastern provinces it will continue to be vic-
timized in this manner. Following the riots large numbers of youths
were rounded up by security forces in the Northern and Eastern prov-
inces and thousands ofTamils fled from Sri Lanka to become refugees
in South India. It has been estimated that since the 1983 ethnic vio-
lence 30,000 Sri Lankan Tamils have moved into government-funded
camps in Tamil Nadu and between 10,000 and 40,000 Tamils may
have entered Europe. 56 By 1986, more than 100,000 Sri Lankan
Tamils had taken refuge in South India.
Of the violence perpetrated by Tamil militants, the government
claimed that "between 1976 and a major terrorist incident in July
1983, 73 persons were slain by the Tiger underground movement,
and in the five-year period 1978-1983 the Tigers were responsible for
more than 265 bombings, robberies, assaults, and other criminal
acts," but the government did not maintain any figures on the thou-
sands of Tamils who have been slain by Sinhalese mobs and security
forces.57 Since the mid-1950s, thousands of Tamils have been killed,
rendered homeless, and had their businesses destroyed by Sinhalese
mobs. The government accused the TULF and a few leftist political
parties of inciting the 1983 anti-Tamil riots and proscribed them in
August 1983.
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The All-Party Conference and Mediation from India
PresidentJayewardene was fully aware of the futility of these violent
acts and announced, in late 1983, that he would call an "all-party
conference" to discuss Tamil grievances and to seek appropriate solu-
tions. It had taken seven years, the trauma of the 1983 riots, and ini-
tiatives on the part of the government of India to persuade the Sri
Lankan government and the TULF to attempt a political settlement
to the problem by convening an all-party conference inJanuary 1984,
as the UNP had promised to do in its manifesto of 1976.
There were many factors that compelled India to assist the Sri
Lankan government to resolve its ethnic conflict. First, many thou-
sands of Tamils had fled from Sri Lanka as refugees into South India
following the riots of 1983. Second, with the TULF proscribed and its
members excluded from parliament, many prominent South Indian
Tamils, party leaders, and Sri Lankan Tamil leaders, including former
Sri Lankan members of parliament who had to forgo their seats in the
legislative body because of their stand on the separatist issue,
appealed to the Indian government to persuade the Sri Lankan gov-
ernment to put an end to the violence. Third, India desires to main-
tain the neutrality of the Indian Ocean, and this can only be accom-
plished if major powers are not invited to take sides in the ethnic
conflict. Fourth, India desires to maintain friendly relations with its
neighbors. This need to maintain friendly relations with Sri Lanka,
according to some, is motivated by the desire on the part of India to
keep the super-powers out of the Indian Ocean and to persuade Sri
Lanka to return to the nonaligned fold. Finally, India became aware
that the Tamil Nadu Tamils were genuinely concerned about the
plight of the Sri Lankan Tamils. In fact, the government may have
been aware that the Tamil militants were using South India as a base
for their operations against security forces in Sri Lanka, but it was not
certain to what extent Indian Tamils were sympathetic to the Sri
Lankan Tamil cause. Tamil militants had been using Tamil Nadu as a
base for their operations since 1980 with the support of some Tamil
Nadu politicians. Only when five militant leaders were arrested by
the Tamil Nadu police after a shooting incident in May 1981 was it
revealed that they had bases in South India. It was then that the gov-
ernment became aware of the strong moral support that the Sri
Lankan Tamil militants had from the Tamil Nadu Tamils, because
there was pressure from nearly all the political parties in India not to
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extradite the five Liberation Tiger leaders captured by the police. 58
With the 1983 anti-Tamil riots the Indian government made serious
efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the ethnic conflict
between the Sinhalese and Tamils.
Preliminary talks took place between Prime Minister Indira Gan-
dhi's special envoy, G. Parthasarathy, and Sri Lankan officials, and it
was agreed that the all-party conference would consider the proposals
documented in Annexure C, which was prepared by Indian govern-
ment officials under Parthasarathy's direction with the approval of Sri
Lankan government officials (see Appendix IV). These proposals pro-
vided for: (1) the creation of regional councils if the people of the
region so desired; (2) the election of the chief minister of the council;
(3) regional councils with legislative powers to "enact laws and exer-
cise executive powers in relation thereto on certain spe<;:ified listed
subjects"; (4) regional councils to be endowed with power to levy
taxes, mobilize resources through loans and other financial resources
provided by the central government according to a formula; (5) all
settlement schemes to be based on ethnic proportion; and (6) the
armed forces to reflect the national ethnic position. In the Northern
and Eastern provinces, the police force for internal security would also
reflect the ethnic composition of these regions. The proposals specify
that the laws dealing with the official language Sinhala and the
national language Tamil be accepted and implemented. The confer-
ence was attended by government leaders, officials, representatives of
eight political parties, including the TULF, and representatives of
ethnic and religious groups. The participation of prominent mem-
bers of the Buddhist organization was considered essential, since it
was the Sangha that had persistently resisted the granting of political
and language concessions to the Tamils. Unfortunately, the SLFP,
whose cooperation is vital for the implementation of any proposals
dealing with this issue, withdrew from the conference soon after it
was convened in January 1984, claiming that the UNP, its traditional
rival for power, was giving away too many concessions to the Tamils.
The provisions in Annexure C would have given some measure of
regional autonomy to Tamil provinces and empowered regional coun-
cils to have jurisdiction over large areas to enact laws on specific sub-
jects; to maintain internal law and order; to administer justice; to
provide for social and economic development; to have control over
cultural matters and land policy; and to collect funds to initiate major
development projects. Tamil-dominated areas would have been able
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to preserve their territorial integrity through the Regional Councils.
President ]ayewardene, however, under pressure from the Buddhist
clergy, Sinhala extremists, and opposition parties, did not present the
proposals. Instead he submitted for consideration a modified version
of the ill-fated District Development Councils concept of 1980 (see
Appendix V), which dealt with interdistrict coordination and collab-
oration without any reference to the regional councils referred to in
the Annexure C proposals. The District Development Councils pro-
posal itself did not grant any measure of autonomy to Tamil-domi-
nated districts, and the district councils lacked legislative powers to
develop the Northern and Eastern provinces in order to solve their
unemployment and food shortage problems. The idea of regional
councils and the TUlF's proposal that all the districts in the Northern
and Eastern provinces that have substantial Tamil populations should
be administered as a single unit were rejected by the Buddhist clergy
and representatives of Sinhalese parties on the grounds that the large
Tamil unit, with its human and physical resources, might pose a chal-
lenge to the central government's resources and power. The govern-
ment's modified proposal, which would permit district councils to
form provincial councils, was not acceptable to the Tamil leaders.
In December 1984, the TUlF announced that the government's
proposals were not acceptable because they did not resolve the con-
cerns of Tamils on matters dealing with: (1) the preservation of the
territorial integrity of Tamil areas; (2) the procedure for selecting
allottees to colonization schemes in Tamil provinces; and (3) the pro-
cedures for financing major projects (see Appendix VI). These con-
cerns of the Tamils were never considered by the conference because
the president cancelled it abruptly on the grounds that the demands
of TULF were unreasonable. Without the support of the SLFP, and
being pressured by the Buddhist clergy not to grant substantial con-
cession to Tamils, the president had no alternative but to cancel the
conference. Although there was no indication that the talks were can-
celled because the Sinhalese population agitated against the estab-
lishment of regional councils, the president was aware that the TUlF
would never compromise on the issue of regional councils and that it
would be unwise to negotiate on modified proposals that would
definitely be rejected by the TUlF, as well as displease most of the
Sinhalese participants in the talks. He therefore used TULF's press
announcement that it would not accept the government's modified
proposals as a pretext to cancel the conference.
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The conference did not accomplish any positive results except to
bring the Sri Lankan government, representatives of Sinhalese politi-
cal parties and the Buddhist clergy, and the TULF to the negotiating
table. The Tamils of the Northern and Eastern provinces, who had
been most directly affected by the violence and backed the TULF in
its demand for the devolution of powers to regional councils, were
disheartened by the collapse of the conference. The militants, who
were all along pessimistic about the outcome of the talks and warned
the Tamil community that the only means to secure Tamil rights was
through force, stepped up their violence against government forces.
The government, on the other hand, wanted to reassure the Sinhalese
community that it did not convene the talks because of its inability to
fight the militants and in turn stepped up its efforts to wipe out the
militants. The Indian government's efforts to bring about a nego-
tiated settlement to the ethnic issue had failed, but it did not aban-
don the peace process. Within six months of the failure of the all-
party conference it had convinced both the Sri Lankan government
and Tamil militants to agree to a cease-fire and begin peace talks in
Thimphu, the capital of Bhutan.
The Tamil Militant Movement
The Tamil militant movement consists of more than twenty militant
organizations that espouse violent methods to resist the imposition of
Sinhala rule over Tamil-dominated areas and to establish a separate
independent Tamil state called Eelam. 59 The number of groups
operating in the Northern and Eastern provinces is not known, but.
they are collectively referred to as "Tigers" by the Sinhalese. To the
Sinhalese, the Tamil militant movement is synonymous with "Tiger
Movement," since the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE), led
by Veluppillai Prabakaran, was the first militant group to use violent
methods to confront the government. The Tiger Movement, which
continues to wage war against the Sinhala government, had its begin-
nings in 1972, but its violent methods were not actively pursued until
1976, when it was renamed the LITE. Personality clashes between
Prabakaran and Vma Maheswaran, the chairman of the executive
committee of the LITE, compelled the latter to break away from the
organization and form the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil
Eelam (PLaTE) in 1980. In the early 1980s, PLaTE stormed police
stations, killed a number of policemen, and robbed banks of large
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sums of money, but it has claimed no responsibility for incidents
involving the killing of Sinhalese civilians and members of security
forces in Tamil areas, unlike the LTIE. The LTIE continues to reject
any type of negotiations with the government, even though the latter
is making use of helicopters and light planes to bomb militant bases
in an attempt to find a military solution to the ethnic problem.
In addition to the LTIE and the PLaTE, three other organizations
have played an active role in the militant movement. The Tamil
EelaID'Liberation Organization (TELa), which was originally formed
by Thangathurai, one of the Tamil inmates who was killed in the
Welikade Prison riots of 1983, has claimed credit for the storming of
well-fortified police stations in Chavakachcheri and Murugandy, as
. well as the bombing of a train transporting soldiers from Colombo to
]affna. TELa was led by Sri Sabaratnam until he and most of his men
were massacred by the LTIE in 1986 because of rivalry between the
two groups.
The Eelam People's Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) and the Eelam
Revolutionary Organization of Students (EROS), whose origins can
be traced to the mid-1970s, have become prominent only in the
1980s. The EPRLF, which is led by K. Padmanabha, has claimed
responsibility for the successful rescue of prisoners from the Batticaloa
Prison in 1983, the abduction of an American couple in 1984, and
the attacks on the army camp in Gurunagar and the naval base in
Karainagar. EROS, which expounds radical ideologies, was founded
in London in 1975, and its activities are presently directed by V. Bala-
kumar in Madras and Rajanayagam in London. It does not advocate
random killings and robberies but believes in the effectiveness of sab-
otage, such as the bombing of the Oberai Hotel in Colombo and the
unsuccessful attempt to destroy the TV antenna at Mount Pedro in
the central hill country.
Ideological differences and disputes over tactics with which to con-
front the government and its security forces as well as personality
clashes, most of which have been confined to the leadership of these
organizations, have, to a large extent, reduced the ability of the Tamil
militant movement to achieve its objectives. Although the five main
groups have approximately 10,000 trained fighters, there is no con-
certed action by the organizations against defined targets. Each group
tends to operate and get its support from different areas of Sri Lanka.
The LTIE appears to be entrenched in the ]affna Peninsula while the
PLaTE seems to receive its support from a larger region, including
•
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the Muslim-dominated areas in the Eastern Province. Substantial
support for the EROS and the EPRLF comes from the plantation
workers in the hill country.
The militant movement is also weakened by the inability of its
leaders to agree on a common strategy with which to fight the enemy.
The hit-and-run surprise attacks on security forces by the LTTE are
considered by the PLOTE to be ineffective. PLOTE apparently
believes that guerrilla tactics are not adequate to fight security forces
and that a liberation people's army consisting of members of all orga-
nizations should be formed to rout the enemy and end the struggle.
LTTE believes that guerrilla warfare is an integral part of the people's
war and that the people will ultimately adopt guerrilla tactics to liber-
ate the Tamil areas. Hit-and-run tactics, according to the TELO, have
to be adopted to demoralize the enemy, but once it has been demor-
alized, the people's liberation army will be able to inflict heavy losses
on the enemy in a pitched battle. Therefore, while the main objective
of all the militant organizations is to establish an independent
socialist state of Eelam, there appears to be no consensus on how this
objective is to be achieved.
The cycle of violence, which was confined to the Tamil-dominated
areas until May 14, 1985, spread into Sinhalese areas and resulted in
the killing of 146 Sinhalese civilians by Tamil separatists in Anura-
dhapura, apparently in revenge for a series of incidents involving the
killing of Tamil civilians in army reprisal attacks in several districts
prior to 1985. Following this and a number of other atrocities com-
mitted by the armed forces on civilians in predominantly Tamil areas,
the government, the leaders of TULF and militant separatist groups.
agreed to a "cessation of hostile activity" onJune 18, 1985, in order
to create "a proper climate" for a political settlement. The Indian
government played a major role in arranging for this cease-fire and in
persuading the leaders of Tamil militants and TULF to meet with the
representatives of the Sri Lankan government in Thimpu to work out
a political settlement. Under pressure from the Indian government
and Sri Lankan Tamils in Sri Lanka and abroad, the LTTE, EROS,
EPRLF, PLOTE, and TELO formed the Eelam National Liberation
Front (ENLF) in order to negotiate with the Sri Lankan government
officials at the Thimphu talks in 1985. Unfortunately, the govern-
ment rejected most of the proposals submitted by the ENLF and
TULF, including the linkage between the Northern and Eastern prov-
inces, as well as the Annexure C proposals, and failed to present any
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new proposals that deviated markedly from the president's proposals
on District Development Councils which were submitted during the
unsuccessful all-party conference ofJanuary 1984. The basic disagree-
ment between the Sri Lankan government and the militants re-
mained the critical issue of devolution of power to Tamil areas.
Although the Thimphu talks failed, the five militant organizations in
the ENLF continued to speak with one voice on Thmil demands in
1986, but operate as separate organizations with regard to military
activities. Armed confrontations between Sri Lankan forces and Tamil
militants are forcing thousands of Tamil people to flee their homes
and take refuge in camps. Incidents involving killings by rival groups
continue to plague the militant movement as a whole and personal
rivalry between leaders of some groups limits the effectiveness of the
movement.
It is clear that the government is not inclined to grant substantial
devolution of power to Tamil areas and that the Tamil militants, as
well as the TULF, are equally determined to reject any proposals that
will perpetuate the present political structure and discriminatory
policies of the government. The Tamils reiterate that they possess the
same aspirations as the Sinhalese and long to reap the social, eco-
nomic, and political benefits of the freedom from colonial rule that
Sri Lanka has enjoyed since 1948. True freedom, according to the
Tamils, can only be achieved if the government can recognize their
right of self-determination, the identity of Tamils as a distinct nation-
ality, and the territorial integrity of Tamil areas. To many Tamils,
these conditions can only be met when substantial legislative, execu-
tive, and fiscal powers are in the hands of a single legislative body
that will have jurisdiction over the Northern and Eastern provinces.
The government, on the other hand, continues to reject Tamil
demands on the grounds that it has granted substantial concessions to
the Tamils under its new proposals and that any further devolution of
power would lead to Tamil domination. Likewise, what the Sinhalese
leaders are offering to the Tamils, according to A. Jeyaratnam
Wilson, is a "case of 'too little too late,' and a solution acceptable
some ten to fifteen years ago could now be jibbed at by the Sri
Lankan Tamils."60 This is not to imply that the Sri Lankan Tamils,
especially the militants, are unwilling to abandon their objective of
establishing Eelam through violent struggle. The fact that the mili-
tants were willing to negotiate with the government at the Thimphu
talks suggest that they are prepared to work within the framework of
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a united Sri Lanka, provided substantial regional autonomy were
granted to Tamil-dominated areas. With the failure of the peace
talks, however, the government decided to take military action
against the Tamil militants.
The government's decision to find a military solution to the ethnic
problem is based on the premise that its security forces have become
better equipped and trained in 1986 than previously to destroy mili-
tant bases from the air and to capture militants on land by "search
and destroy operations." Incidents involving the bombing of sus-
pected militant hideouts in the densely populated ]affna Peninsula
and the "search and destroy missions" elsewhere in the Tamil-
dominated areas demonstrate that innocent citizens rather than the
militants are often the main victims of these operations. Unless the
militants are equipped with surface-to-air missiles, it would be
impossible for them to furnish protection to the people, and this
might hurt their cause. On the other hand, pressure from the inter-
national community, especially India, would compel the government
to abandon such military operations involving the bombing of Tamil
areas. Whether these military operations will persuade the militants
to modify their demands for a separate autonomous state in Sri
Lanka, especially since India is opposed to these demands, is not cer-
tain. India is deeply committed to a negotiated settlement of the eth-
nic problems and there were signs during the early months of 1986
that a large number of Tamils, living within and outside Sri Lanka,
were willing to accept the TULF's proposals for the establishment of a
Tamil linguistic state within a federal union of Sri Lanka. The TULF,
however, does not command the support of the Sri Lankan Tamils;
and although many Tamil civilians have been killed by government
forces in reprisals for militant attacks, the militants continue to com-
mand respect from the Tamil population for their aggressive actions
against government forces.
Unless the Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan government are
directly involved in the peace negotiations, however, there will never
be any lasting political settlement to the ethnic problem. Events of
the last three decades have shown that, in the words of the executive
director of the International Human Rights Law Group, "It is not
with guns and tear gas that peace and security will be restored to Sri
Lanka. Determination to end communal strife and dedication to the
rule of law are what will save Sri Lanka now."61
CHAPTER 3
Tamil Districts: Conflict over
Traditional Homelands, Colonization,
and Agricultural Development
THE Tamil districts are located in a well-defined region of the Dry
Zone where Tamils make up the dominant ethnic community (see
Figure 1). It is not known when Tamils became the dominant com-
munity in these districts or who occupied the Dry Zone prior to the
establishment of the Sinhalese and Tamil settlements. Archaeological
evidence suggests that a culture, resembling that of the Megalithic
culture of South India, existed in the nonhwestern coastal area of the
island during prehistoric times. l Whether these prehistorical people
were the Nagas, Yakshas, or Dravidians is not known, but Sinhalese
historians believe that the first Sinhalese immigrants landed some-
where in the Dry Zone, most probably along the northwestern coast
of the island, which is the closest point to the South Indian coast and
not far from the archaeological site of Megalithic remains. 2 In the
course of time, the settlers moved southeast along the river called
Aruvi Aru (Malwattu Oya) and established tank settlements. It is also
suggested that a second group of Sinhalese immigrants landed some-
where along the northeast coast and moved inland up the river called
Mahaweli Ganga before establishing permanent settlements (see Fig-
ure 2).3 Although no reference is made in the Pali Chronicles to the
origin of Tamil settlements in the Dry Zone, it is believed "that some
Sri Lankan Tamils may have come to Sri Lanka as early as or even
before the Sinhalese."4 There is little doubt that many of the Tamil
settlements of the Tamil districts are of ancient origin, since many of
them, especially in Mannar, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa districts, are
closely associated with Hindu temples that were built in the early
Christian era. 5 Most of the Sinhalese settlements of ancient Sri Lanka
were located outside the present-day Tamil districts; the largest con-
centrations of stone inscriptions, Buddhist monuments, and major
irrigation projects named after Sinhalese rulers are confined to the
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well-watered river valleys of the Anuradhapura, Kurunegala, and
Polonnaruwa districts of northern Sri Lanka. 6 These Dry Zone settlers
developed a very productive agricultural system by using advanced
technology to irrigate crops via a series of tanks, anicuts, and chan-
nels. With the support of benevolent rulers, the settlers harvested
enormous quantities of rice to sustain a population of more than two
million in the Dry Zone. 7 This highly developed civilization col-
lapsed in the thirteenth century A.D. as a result of environmental and
nonenvironmental factors, including the Chola invasions from South
India.
Following the collapse of the Sinhalese kingdom, the Sinhalese
population abandoned the Dry Zone districts known as Nuwara Kala-
wiya and Tamankaduwa and drifted toward the Wet Zone in the
southwest. Tamils, too, abandoned their original settlements and
relocated in the ]affna Peninsula and in the more favorable coastal
sites in the Northern and Eastern provinces. As a result of the move-
ment of the Sinhalese from the Dry Zone to the Wet Zone, Tamils
became the only ethnic community to occupy the northern and east-
ern parts of Sri Lanka. By the fourteenth century A.D., the Tamil
kingdom extended its suzerainty over a large part of northern Sri
Lanka and the large number of Tamils who had migrated from South
India settled in different parts of the present-day Tamil districts. The
Tamil settlements of the northern and eastern parts of the island were
completely isolated from the rest of the country. It was in the relative
isolation of the Tamil districts that the Sri Lankan Tamils developed
the sense of collective identity based on language, culture, and terri-
tory that is a prerequisite of nationality. Thus, Tamil claims to an
ancestral or traditional homeland are based on more than 700 years of
uninterrupted settlement in a territorially demarcated area of Sri
Lanka where towns, villages, and natural and manmade features are
known by Tamil-derived names of ancient origin. Sinhalese extremist
nationalists, however, contend that the Tamils have no right to recog-
nize these districts as their traditional homeland since the whole of
Sri Lanka belongs to the Sinhalese, who were forcefully driven out of
the northern parts of the island by Tamils.
The Fall of the Ancient Sinhalese Civilization and the
Abandonment of the Dry Zone
Sinhalese hostility toward Tamils is partly attributed to events that
transpired more than seven centuries ago when South Indian invad-
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ers, according to Sinhalese traditions, destroyed the ancient Sinhalese
civilization of the Rajarata. As noted in chapter 1, this is a popular
view held by the majority of the Sinhalese that has been used effec-
tively by Sinhalese extremist nationalists to justify Sinhalese coloniza-
tion of the predominantly Tamil districts and to deny basic rights to
the minority. Even the Ceylon lear Book, published by the Depart-
ment of Census and Statistics, supported this view, stating, "Incur-
sions of marauders from the neighboring sub-continent, recurring
century after century, eventually destroyed the irrigation works which
alone made fertile and invaluable the arid lands known as the Dry
Zone."8 Contrary to the belief that Tamils forced the large Sinhalese
population to relocate to the sourhwest, there are convincing sugges-
tions that the decline and fall of the Sinhalese civilization was due to
a host of factors, including invasions, some of which were encouraged
by rivalries within royal households, civil wars and internal dissen-
sions, climatic change resulting in decreased amounts of precipita-
tion, intellectual and aesthetic exhaustion, social disintegration,
decreasing soil fertility after centuries of use without fertilization,
siltation of tanks, malaria epidemics, and the inability of weak gov-
ernments to control and mobilize the people in order to repair and
maintain the irrigation systems in working order. 9 While it is true
that all of these factors were responsible for collapse of the civiliza-
tion, the contribution of the climatic factor toward the civilization's
eclipse cannot be overlooked.
It has been suggested that to cite climatic change as a major cause
for the sudden fall of the civilization is "so simple, but not often
applicable in the absence of direct or convincing evidence."10 How-
ever, it is not improbable for the region to have experienced a series
of years with either abnormally low or high amounts of rainfall due to
the failure of the monsoon or to the high frequency of intensive
cyclones. These abnormal weather conditions need not be associated
with climatic change. Even in recent years, the failure of the north-
east monsoon to deliver adequate water to irrigation tanks has result-
ed in poor harvests; the floods of December 1956 and January 1957
destroyed many irrigation systems and disrupted agricultural activi-
ties. 11 It took almost two years for the Irrigation Department to repair
the extensive damage caused to major and minor irrigation systems
by these floods. Moreover, a prolonged drought, lasting for several
years, could have adversely affected a large portion of the Dry Zone,
while the Jaffna Peninsula could have weathered the adverse effects
of the severe drought because of its unique environmental character-
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IStlCS. Although the annual effective dry period in the peninsula is
the longest of all the settled areas in the Dry Zone, prolonged
droughts would not deplete the reservoir of underground water and
hinder agricultural activities. This unique character of the environ-
ment has bestowed upon the peninsula the capacity to sustain a large
population, continuously. Apparently, the Tamil people had to flee
the Vanni like their Sinhalese counterparts, but they found refuge in
the Jaffna Peninsula to the north. The population of the Jaffna Pen-
insula grew rapidly, and when the first census was taken in 1871, it
had the highest population density, 251 persons per square kilometer,
in the Dry Zone (see Table 4).
The census of 1871 also indicated that the island of Mannar off the
western coast of Sri Lanka, including the narrow coastal stretch along
the mainland, and the Puttalam coast had the next highest densities
of 11 and 8 persons per square kilometer, respectively (see Table 4).
These areas were not depopulated after the thirteenth century, unlike
the rest of the Dry Zone, because of their unique soil characteristics.
The regosols are excessively drained and impede surface flow ofwater,
but soil moisture is held a few feet below the surface and is accessible
for human consumption. Many of the settlers in the Mannar area
were apparently fishermen who relied on this source of water supply
for domestic use and on other regions for rice. The Batticaloa coastal
stretch of sandbars on the eastern side of the island is another region
in the Dry Zone that had a high population density in 1871. This
Table 4. Population Densities of Selected Regions in the Dry Zone for the Years
. 1871,1931, and 1946
Density
Population (persons per sq. km)
1871 1931 1946 1871 1931 1946
]affna Peninsula 241,454 347,283 420,115 251 367 444
Mannar Coast 21,063 25,137 31,471 8 10 12
Puttalam Coast 24,551 35,078 42,669 11 15 18
Vanni 28,753 32,413 36,115 5 6 7
Trincomalee Coast 19,449 37,492 68,635 7 14 26
Batticaloa coastal sandbars 212 247
Tamankaduwa' 4,770 7,909 12,907 3 6
Source: B. H. Farmer, Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon, pp. 6-14.
'The portion of the Dry Zone with abandoned tanks and ruins of the ancient capital, Polon-
naruwa. Such low densities were recorded for the Nuwara Kalawiya region with its ancient capi·
tal, Anuradhapura. Tamankaduwa and Nuwara Kalawiya are Sinhalese districts.
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high density is attributed to a combination of rich alluvial soils for
paddy cultivation, availability of water from shallow wells, and reli-
able precipitation duting the Maha or rainy season rainfall, compared
to the rest of the Dry Zone. Except for the Trincomalee coast, where
regosols are common, the hinterland of the Dry Zone was almost
completely empty in the nineteenth century. 12 Other areas in the Dry
Zone, such as the Vanni, the Eastern, North-Central, and Northwest
provinces, had low population densities in the nineteenth century.
These are the areas where underground water resources for domestic
and agricultural uses are limited.
Had the disaster that befell the Sinhalese settlements been in the
form of floods from intense cyclones, the results could have been
devastating to areas with dense networks of irrigation channels and
tanks. Areas like the Jaffna Peninsula, where falling rain is not
retained on the surface because of the peninsula's underground rocks
and topography, would not have been as vulnerable. There are no
prominent relief features and rivers in the peninsula to impound
water behind dams. In contrast, the underlying metamorphic rocks
and the topography of the mainland are suitable for the construction
of dams and for retaining water in tanks at many locations. There-
fore, considering that in many places the ratio of tanks to cultivated
area was almost 1: I, exceptionally heavy rains could have breached
dams and caused havoc to agriculture and settlements on the main-
land. The probability of high waters breaching the dams is great
because the tanks were laid in a steplike manner along valleys and the
failure of dams upstream would have threatened others downstream
because of increasing discharge. The nature of damage incurred from'
flooding depends primarily on the quantity of water discharged by
streams in different regions. Some of the rivers draining the North-
Central Province have their source in the Wet Zone, and during
periods of excessive rainfall more water is discharged by streams flow-
ing through what are the Sinhalese areas than through the Vanni.
This might have spared the Tamil settlements from being marooned
or destroyed by floods. Damage to irrigation systems and settlement~
could have been particularly severe in the Sinhalese areas known as
Nuwara Kalawiya and Tamankaduwa, because the Mi Oya, the Kala
Oya, Aruvi Aru, the Mahaweli Ganga. Yan Oya, and Maduru Oya
discharge large quantities of water in these areas, compared to other
regions in the Dry Zone. Nuwara Kalawiya was the region surround-
ing the ancient capital, Anuradhapura, and the portion of the Dry
--
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Zone with the abandoned tanks and ruins of the ancient capital
Polonnaruwa was known as Tamankaduwa.
Once the floods receded, the tanks and canals, which were heavily
silted and extensively breached, could not be restored by those surviv-
ing the floods. Prior to this period, recurring floods, perhaps not
destructive enough to decimate the population, had on many occa-
sions destroyed irrigation works, but many were restored because
rulers were able to organize a massive labor force to accomplish this
major undertaking. 13 Moreover, the pools of stagnant water resulting
from the breaching of bunds and dams became breeding areas for the
malaria-carrying vector Anopheles cultfacies. The final stage in the
depopulation of the Sinhalese settlements in the Dry Zone occurred
when the Dry Zone became infested with malaria. The absence of
tanks and canals in the Jaffna Peninsula spared the inhabitants there
from malaria.
Tamil Districts as the Traditional Homeland of the Tamils
With the establishment of the Kingdom ofJaffna, the northern part
of the island as well as a large portion of the Batticaloa and Trincoma-
lee districts were almost entirely populated by Tamils. Very little land
that extends from the hill country to the coast, including the Battica-
loa District (which is also referred to as the Bintenne), was occupied
by Sinhalese. 14 Even as late as 1871, the population of the Bintenne
was fewer than 32,500, of whom the major portion were Tamils. 15 It
was in the Kingdom of Jaffna that the Tamils of Sri Lankan origin
developed the customs and traditions that distinguish them from the
Tamils of South India. While it is true that the origins of the "undis-
puted antiquity of the Tamil cultural traditions which has always
been a source of pride" to the Tamils of the island are in South India,
Sri Lanka Tamils did not identify themselves politically with Tamil
Nadu. 16 Indeed, Sri Lanka was divided into two nations and three
kingdoms at the beginning of the sixteenth century, and the Sri
Lankan Tamils lived as a distinct nationality in their traditional home-
lands in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka. 17
This division was maintained by the Portuguese and the Dutch,
who, when they occupied Sri Lanka in the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, administered the three states separately. The Dutch, in
particular, regarded Tamils as an ethnic group with a linguistic, cul-
tural, and territorial identity ~f their own. They codified Tamil cus-
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toms and traditions relating to property rights, inheritance, and mar-
riage in order to administer the traditional Tamil areas. IS The British,
however, abolished the separate system of administration for low-
country Sinhalese, Kandyan-Sinhalese of the hill country, and Tamils
on the grounds that it perpetuated the division of the country along
ethnic lines. Although the two communities were brought together
under a unitary state, they never shed their separate identities, which
had evolved in diverse geographical regions over seven centuries. It
was in the Wet Zone, which was rapidly developed by the British for
commercial purposes, where Sinhalese and Tamils came into direct
contact with each other for the first time. Tamils, concerned about
the problems of overcrowding, landlessness, and the lack of employ-
ment opportunities in their water-deficient homeland, which was
neglected by the British, sought employment in the Sinhalese areas
of the Wet Zone (see Figure 3). Therefore, the Sinhalese-dominated
Wet Zone became the focus of competition between Sinhalese and
Tamils for employment. Tamils, by virtue of their proficiency in the
English language, competed successfully with the Sinhalese and
acquired a disproportionately high percentage of employment in the
government services and in the professions. However, they continued
to adhere to their traditional values and culture wherever they settled
outside their homeland, returning to their place of birth in northern
and eastern Sri Lanka after retirement. Consequently, the two com-
munities did not mingle freely with each other and behaved as
though members of separate nationalities. Even before indepen-
dence, underlying intergroup prejudices and cultural revival move-
ments had aroused communal self-consciousness among the members·
of each community, but Sinhalese leaders did not advocate the enact-
ment of laws that were specifically designed to discriminate against
the Sri Lankan Tamils.
The beginnings of Sinhalese nationalism can be traced to the 1930s
when leaders of the two communities began to mistrust each other as
political reforms were introduced by the British to grant greater Sri
Lankan representation in the State Council. Priorto 1931, communal
representation made it feasible for the minorities to safeguard their
interests against majority domination, but this concession was abo-
lished in 1931. The Donoughmore Commission abolished communal
representation in 1931, even though it was fully aware that there were
two distinct communities that were suspicious of each other and that
the majority community was determined to eliminate communal rep-
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resentation in order to weaken the political power of minorities. The
Soulbury Commission did not revive communal representation in
1946, but it was aware of the need to safeguard the rights of all
national minorities, especially the Tamils, against discrimination by
the Sinhalese majority. Therefore, it provided for adequate represen-
tation for minorities from the sparsely populated Tamil provinces by
delimiting electorates according to area and population. The area
provision did furnish adequate representation to Tamils and Muslims
from the predominantly Tamil-speaking areas until the 1950s, but
this and other constitutional provisions that guaranteed fundamental
rights to minorities were ineffective in preventing the Sinhalese-
dominated parliament of independent Sri Lanka from enacting legis-
lative measures that did not recognize Tamils as a distinct nationality
within the state of Sri Lanka. Therefore, it was only in the mid-1950s,
following the passage of the Sinhala only legislation without any pro-
visions for the reasonable use of Tamil, that the Tamils began to give
serious consideration to the questions of Tamil nationality and home-
land. By this time, "underlying group prejudices accentuated by
awakened memories of past conflicts [had] aroused communal con-
sciousness and antagonism" between the communities. 19
Demands for the recognition of Tamils as a distinct nationality and
the identification of their districts as the Tamil homeland have been
rejected by many Sinhalese leaders for various reasons: First, they
consider Sri Lanka as the homeland of one nationality-the Sinhala
Buddhists-since the island was originally settled by Sinhalese and
bequeathed to them by Buddha. Accordingly, they do not recognize
the Tamils as a distinct nationality in the nation of Sri Lanka regard-
less of their status as a separate nationality for more than seven hun-
dred years, in a well-defined territory on the island. Many Sinhalese
nationalists fail to distinguish between the concepts of "nation" and
"nationality," although history has shown that two or more nationali-
ties can live peacefully in a multinational nation, such as Switzerland.
Even in India, the homelands of major nationalities have been recog-
nized by the creation of ethnically based states. Second, Sinhalese
extremist nationalists claim that the nation of Sri Lanka has always
been unified under one ruler, even though history shows that the
island was fragmented into several kingdoms, including the ]affna
kingdom, prior to the nineteenth century. Finally, Sinhalese are of
the opinion that Tamils have no right to object to the settlement of
Sinhalese people in Tamil districts since Tamils, who had access to
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jobs in the South, had settled in large numbers in Sinhalese districts,
although Tamil settlements were not sponsored by the government or
established in specific areas in the South in order to change the
demographic composition of Sinhalese districts. Tamils used their
rights as private citizens to secure jobs and purchase property in both
Tamil and Sinhalese districts.
The concept of a traditional Tamil homeland was not rejected by all
the Sinhalese leaders, however, although none of them was successful
in overcoming the opposition from Sinhalese extremists to carry out
the promises they made to the Tamil people. Indeed, S. W. R. D.
Bandaranaike recognized the concept of the traditional Tamil home-
land when he was willing to devolve administrative powers to
regional councils in the Northern and Eastern provinces, under the
provisions of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1957 (see
Appendix I). The proposed regional councils in Tamil provinces were
to be granted powers for selecting allottees to colonization schemes
that would be established in Tamil districts. The pact also included
provisions that recognized Tamils as a distinct nationality and Tamil
provinces as the traditional homeland by permitting the use of Tamil
for administrative purposes in the areas to be administered by sepa-
rate regional councils. Likewise, the concept of a traditional home-
land was recognized by Dudley Senanayake when he agreed, under
the provisions of the Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact of 1965, to
specify the priorities that would be observed by district councils of the
Northern and Eastern provinces when granting lands to allottees
under colonization schemes (see Appendix II). These provisions were
intended to reduce the number of Sinhalese who would be settled in
Tamil districts under government-sponsored colonization schemes.
Dudley Senanayake could not enact the pact into law, but his govern-
ment was compelled to formulate the Tamil Language (Special Provi-
sions) Regulations of 1966 in order to administer the predominantly
Tamil provinces. Indeed, these language regulations, which are cur-
rently in force, acknowledge that the Northern and Eastern provinces
are distinctly Tamil areas and that they cannot be administered unless
special provisions are formulated to transact all government and pub-
lic businesses and maintain all records in Tamil. Had the provisions of
either the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact or the Senanayake-
Chelvanayakam Pact been enacted into law, the policy of settling
large numbers of Sinhalese people in Tamil districts would have been
automatically discontinued. Instead, the policy of colonizing Tamil
-
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districts with Sinhalese peasants goes on unabated, and the ethnic
composition of these districts, especially in the Eastern Province, has
changed radically since the mid-1950s. Moreover, the government
formulated a plan in the 1980s to settle more Sinhalese in Tamil dis-
tricts in order to reflect the nationwide population ratio of 75 percent
Sinhalese and 25 percent minorities.
The Government's Colonization Policy
It is not the purpose of this discussion to outline the history of peas-
ant colonization in the Dry Zone but to explore the nature and pur-
pose of the overall policy of government-aided colonization in Sri
Lanka. Peasant colonization schemes are sponsored by the govern-
ment to settle peasants away from their native villages on crown lands
in the Dry Zone. During the colonial period, large areas designated
as the property of the crown were granted to the highest bidder, but
since the 1930s, crown lands have been mapped out and developed in
the Dry Zone for the benefit of peasant colonists. Soil and engi-
neering surveys are conducted at the planning stage of a colony
before allotments are blocked out and channels and roads are con-
structed through the coordinated efforts of the departments of Land
Development and Irrigation. Colbnization schemes are associated
with major river basin projects, such as the Gal Oya scheme, or with
projects involving the restoration of old irrigation tanks, such as the
Kantalai Tank, although not all are provided with irrigation facilities
(see Figure 3).
Peasant colonists, who are selected from the list of applicants, are
allotted a lowland lot on which to cultivate paddy and a highland lot
with a house. While colonists are selected from applicants on the
basis of need, Tamil politicians have claimed that preference was
given to Sinhalese over Tamils in the selection of allottees for coloni-
zation schemes that are located in Tamil districts. The size of the lot
varied from one to three acres of highland and two to five acres of
paddy land. In the past, the government provided assistance to the
colonists for clearing forest, ridging, fencing, construction of toilets,
and construction of wells. In new projects associated with major river
basin projects, peasants are settled on land with irrigation facilities.
Lowlands are even machine-cleared, stumped, ridged, and rippled by
the Land Development Department. Settlers are also given addi-
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tional allowance for a temporary structure, seed paddy, cash for the
purchase of implements, and eighteen months offood aid.
On paper, the major objectives of government-aided colonization
of the Dry Zone are to relieve the pressure of population from densely
populated areas and to increase domestic food production. There is a
necessity to relieve the population pressure on limited agricultural
land both in the Wet Zone, where the Sinhalese are concentrated, as
well as in some of the Dry Zone districts, where a substantial number
of Tamils have been landless for centuries. This landlessness is due
both to the dense population and the lack of water to expand agricul-
ture. The people in the densely populated Dry Zone districts face
acute problems because of the lack of water and the absence of other
avenues of employment, yet preferential treatment has been given to
the peasants of the Wet Zone in the allocation of land and water
resources. It is well documented that a high percentage of the Tamils
of the ]affna and Batticaloa districts was unemployed and landless,
compared to peasants of other Dry Zone districts, when government-
aided land colonization began in the 1930s, yet the government
showed little urgency in developing the Vanni in order to alleviate the
problems of the ]affna peasants. 20 While the major objectives of
state-aided colonization were to ameliorate the conditions of the
peasantry and to increase domestic food production, it was apparent
from the outset that the government had other motives in pursuing
an aggressive policy of moving a large number of Sinhalese families
from the Wet Zone to the Dry Zone. Some of the newly appointed
Ceylonese ministers to the State Council in the 1930s made these
motives clear when they envisioned the recreation of the glories of the
Sinhalese civilization of the Rajarata through planned colonization of
the Dry Zone and restoration of the irrigation works.
Restoration of ancient irrigation works and resettlement were
undertaken in colonial times prior to the 1930s in Batticaloa, Trinco-
malee, Mannar, Anuradhapura, Polonnaruwa, Puttalam, and Ham-
bantota districts but major effortS to transfer peasants from the Wet
Zone to Dry Zone districts considered by Tamils to be their traditional
homeland did not take place until later. Except for the Tabbowa and
Malay colonies, the Dry Zone was not colonized in 1931, but by the
year 1953 twenty-seven peasant colonies had been established in this
water-deficient region. 21 The only colonization schemes that helped
to ease, even in a minor way, the problem of unemployment and
overcrowding in the Tamil-dominated districts were the Iranamadu
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colonies of Paranthan and Kilinochchi in the ]affna District and the
Unnichchai colony in the Batticaloa District, which were established
in 1936 and 1950, respectively (see Table 5 and Figure 3). From the
very beginning, colonization schemes in the Eastern Province were
not designed to alleviate the overcrowding and unemployment prob-
lems in the Tamil districts but were intended to change the ethnic
composition of the province, since the allottees were largely Sinhalese
rather than Tamils. This was dearly demonstrated when the number
of Sinhalese colonists selected for settlement in the Allai, Kantalai,
and Gal Oya colonies established in the early 1950s exceeded the
number of Tamil peasants selected from the local district. Of the
47,931.2 hectares ofland alienated to 16,532 allottees, between 1931
and 1953, the Tamils received only 17.4 percent of the total allot-
ments. 22
Between 1953 and 1960 the number of families settled in coloniza-
tion schemes, excluding the Gal Oya and Uda Walawe projects,
increased from 16,532 to 37,908, an increase of 129 percent in fewer
than ten years. More "crown land," located along the western and
southern portions of the Eastern and Northern provinces, respec-
tively, was alienated to Sinhalese peasants under the Village Expan-
sion Scheme. Peasants from Sinhalese districts were settled in new
Village Expansion Schemes that involved the restoration or recon-
struction of tanks in portions of Tamil districts that are adjacent to
present-day Sinhalese population centers in the Polonnaruwa and
Anuradhapura districts. Colonization schemes involve the settlement
ofpeasants away from their native villages, while "village expansion':
involves the settlement of peasants on land near their native village.
In the Kantalai and Padawiya colonies in Trincomalee District, for
example, Kantalai Tank was reconstructed and its water supply aug-
Table 5. Peasant Colonization in the Northern and Eastern Provinces
at the End of 1953
Tamils as
a % of
Total Sinhalese Tamils Sinhalese
Northern Province 656 0 656 100
Eastern Province 5,199 2,976 2,223 75
Whole Island 16,532 2,976 2,879 17
Source: B. H. Farmer, Pioneer Peasant Colonization in Ceylon, pp. 108-
209.
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mented from the Amban Ganga in 1959. These improvements in the
Kantalai scheme contributed to the expansion of the area under
paddy and sugar cane farming and to the settlement of a large num-
ber of Sinhalese peasants and Sinhalese sugar cane factory workers in
the Trincomalee District. At the end of 1963, Vavuniya, Trincomalee,
Batticaloa, and Puttalam districts had 46.7 percent of all the peasants
settled in the Dry Zone under the Village Expansion Scheme (see
Table 6). It is estimated that the total investment in irrigation and
land development from 1932 to 1964 was approximately US $156
million, most of it concentrated on major schemes involving Sinha-
lese settlements in both Sinhalese and Tamil districts.
Of the twenty-seven colonies established in the Dry Zone before
1953, Gal Oya in Amparai District and the Parakrama Samudra in
Polonnaruwa District were the largest in terms of allottees and invest-
ment; no single development scheme of the magnitude of these two
has ever been planned or developed in the Northern Province. More
than 15,000 people, most of whom are Sinhalese, were also per-
manently settled as peasants and industrial workers in the Gal Oya
Valley in the early 1960s. Seasonal employment was made available to
approximately 10,000 additional people when the project was com-
pleted. 23 Before the development of the Gal Oya River project, the
population of the Batticaloa District was predominantly Tamil and
the present-day Amparai Electorate District formed part of the Batti-
caloa District. The settlement of large numbers of Sinhalese peasants
Table 6. Alienation of land to Peasants for Village Expansion in the Dry Zone,
1961-1962/1963
% of Total
End of End of Allottees Total Area % of
Distticts 1961-1962 1962-1963 in 1962/1963 (hectares) Total Area
]affna 4,502 4,779 2.9 3,741.4 2.8
Mannar 4,794 4,880 3.0 4,404.7 3.3
Vavuniya 17 ,564 17,597 11.0 14,851.9 11.1
Batticaloa 20,102 19,897 12.5 17,185.4 12.8
Trincomalee 12,928 15,763 9.9 31,618.4 23.7
Puttalam 18,246 21,324 13.3 13,380.8 10.1
Anuradhapura 38,637 39,513 25.0 21,514.8 16.0
Polonnaruwa 6,318 6,560 4.1 7,642.2 5.7
Hambantota 28,771 29,125 18.3 19,440.7 14.5
Total 159.438 134,230.3
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Ceylon Year Book, 1963 and 1966.
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in the Gal Oya Basin made it feasible for the government to create a
separate electoral district for the Sinhalese and increase Sinhalese rep-
resentation in the parliament. Indeed, the Amparai Electoral District
is represented by a Sinhalese member of parliament (see Figure 1).
Amparai was the site of the first communal riots. These riots occurred
one year after the publication of B. H. Farmer's Pioneer Peasant
Colonization in Ceylon, in which Farmer had optimistically stated,
"Communalism causes relatively little trouble in the colonization
schemes, in spite of the marked division within the national popula-
tion... ."24
The restoration of the Padawiya Tank on the Ma Oya River, the
Kantalai Tank on the Kantalai River, the Parakrama Samudra on the
Mahaweli Ganga, and other major reservoirs on the Yan Oya, and the
Aruvi Am (Malwatu Oya) have resulted in the settlement of many
thousands of Sinhalese colonists in the predominantly Tamil areas of
the Northern and Eastern provinces. The number of families settled
under colonization schemes (excluding the Gal Oya and Uda Walawe
river basin projects) went from 16,532 in 1953 to as much as 60,000
by 1968, an increase of 263 percent. In addition to these legalized
settlements, there was considerable encroachment on crown land by
retail traders and laborers all along the lower reaches of the Mahaweli
Ganga in the Eastern Province. 25 The government has not been suc-
cessful in evicting these squatters since the 1950s, and in recent years
it has even permitted Sinhalese squatters to live and conduct business
on crown lands in the Eastern Province. 26 Yet, Tamil squatters are not
shown the same tolerance and are often evicted by the army and
police from major irrigation and colonization projects located in'
Tamil districts.
Government Investments in River Basin Development Projects
It is estimated that the number of landless families settled in the Dry
Zone colonization schemes by the mid-1970s could be anywhere from
80,000 to 160,000 people. Another 600,000 landless peasants were
settled under the Village Expansion Scheme.27 Since 1977, major
emphasis has been placed on river basin development projects, and
more than 34,480 families had been settled under the Accelerated
Mahaweli Development Program by 1983.28 The Accelerated Maha-
weli Development Program involves the diversion of water from the
Mahaweli Ganga, which has its source of water supply from the Wet
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Zone of the hill country, to the Dry Zone rivers, such as the Maduru
Oya. This plan is designed to expand the area under irrigated agricul-
ture and peasant settlements in the Dry Zone. This does not include
the thousands of additional people who have found employment in
such nonfarming activities as irrigation, manufacturing, and generat-
ing hydro-electric power. 29 It is estimated that 303,192 hectares of
land had been brought under cultivation under the scheme by 1983
and more than one-third of this area is under irrigated crops, particu-
larly rice. The yield of paddy under the Mahaweli Development Pro-
gram was as high as 5,131 kilograms per hectare during the 1982-
1983 rainy season. Moreover, approximately US $730 million have
been spent on the Mahaweli Ganga Diversion Project by the end of
1983 and it has been estimated that an additional sum of US $1.5 bil-
lion would be spent on this and related projects before completion. 3D
Large areas have also been irrigated and thousands of families set-
tled under the Uda Walawe project. The Uda Walawe project involves
the impounding of the waters of the Walawe Ganga that flow
through the Moneragala and Hambantota districts in southern Sri
Lanka. This project is intended to bring large areas of land under
paddy, sugar cane, cotton, citrus, and vegetables and also increase the
supply of water to areas that are already under paddy. Between 1981
and 1983 more than 50,000 hectares were brought into cultivation
and approximately 19,000 families were settled under this projectY
Most of the benefits of this massive investment will accrue to the
thousands of Sinhalese who are already settled on existing projects or
to those who will be settled in new colonization schemes such as the
Maduru Oya. The Maduru Oya scheme involves the diversion of the
waters of the Mahaweli Ganga into the Maduru Oya River, which
flows through Amparai and along the border between the Polon-
naruwa and Batticaloa districts before it empties into the sea north of
Kalkudah in the Batticaloa District. It is designed to extend the area
under paddy cultivation in the Amparai and Polonnaruwa districts.
The surplus water from the Mahaweli Ganga will largely benefit the
settlers in the Elahera, Minneriya, Giritala, Kaudulla, Kantalai, and
Padawiya schemes (see Figure 3). The Maduru Oya River project,
which is part of the Mahaweli Ganga Diversion Project, like the Kan-
talai, Allai, Padawiya, and Gal Oya projects, is one of the five major
irrigation projects designed specifically to benefit the Sinhalese. The
cost of this project is estimated to be $6.4 million and, at full devel-
opment, 100,000 people, most of them Sinhalese, are expected to
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move into this colony. While these massive irrigation and land devel-
opment projects, involving large sums of money, are designed to
improve the economic conditions of the Sinhalese districts and Sinha-
lese peasantry, no steps have been taken by Sinhala governments to
improve the economic conditions of the people in the predominantly
Tamil areas.
The Extent ofSinhalese Colonization ofTamil Districts
Statistical data on the number of people who have moved from non-
Tamil districts to Tamil districts from 1953 to 1983 are not available
and thus it is necessary to use an indirect method of estimation to
determine the extent of colonization. To derive these estimates, the
actual growth of population for Tamil districts, as presented by the Sri
Lankan government in the Census of Population, was compared with
their projected growth of population if the population growth rate of
these districts was similar to that of the island as a whole (see Table 7).
The actual population growth of Tamil districts, except for]affna Dis-
trict, was larger than the projected growth because, in addition to
natural increases, large numbers of people have been settled in these
districts under government-sponsored colonization schemes. Al-
though definite conclusions cannot be made on the actual number of
people who have migrated from Sinhalese districts into the Tamil dis-
tricts, these estimates furnish vital information on the nature of
Sinhalese colonization in these districts since the 1950s.
The actual growth rate of population in the ]affna District was
below the projected growth rate by 69,146 people, suggesting that a
substantial number of people continued to seek employment else-
where in Sri Lanka or abroad. In other Tamil districts, actual growth
has always been greater than the potential growth and the gap
between the actual and projected has widened dramatically since the
1960s (see Figure 4). It is particularly interesting to note that the dif-
ference between the actual and projected population in the Vavuniya
District was 49,344 before the boundaries of the Vavuniya District
were redrawn in 1979. When the population of the newly created
Mullaitivu and Vavuniya districts are combined, the difference is as
high as 116,049, with much of the difference coming from the
annexation of population centers from Anuradhapura District. The
annexation of a small portion of the Mannar District to the newly
created Mullaitivu District merely redistributed the Tamil population
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Table 7. Actual Versus Projected Population Increases in Tamil Districts, 1953-1983
Difference
between
Actual'and
Projected
Districts 1953 1963 1971 1983 (1983)
jaffna -69,146 (1)
Actual 491,148 612,955 701,603 868,000
Projected 644,320 772,539 937,146
Mannar 29,636 (2)
Actual 43,689 60,095 77,780 113,000
Projected 57,235 68,624 83,364
Vavuniya (I953-1978l 49,344 (3)
Actual 35,112 68,712 95,243 111,000
Projected 45,996 55,149 61,656
Vavuniya andMullaitivu (I953-1983) 116,049 (4)
Actual 35,112 68,712 95,243 183,000
Projected 45,966 55,149 66,951
Trincomalee 113,881 (5)
Actual 83,917 137,878 188,245 274,000
Projected 109,931 131,807 160,119
Batticaloa andAmparai (I 953-1983) 246,882 (6)
Actual 270,493 409,122 529,326 763,000
Projected 354,345 424,859 516,118
Batticaloa (I963-1983) 65,030 (7)
Actual 197,022 256,672 352,000
Projected 236,229 286,970
Amparai (I963-1983) 102,067 (8)
Actual 212,100 272,605 411,000
Projected 254,308 308,933
Total Difference between ActualandPredicted:
i. (1) + (2) + (3) + (5) + (7) + (8) 290,812
ii. (1) + (2) + (4) + (5) + (6) 432,302
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Review ofthe Economy; Department of Census and Statistics,
Ceylon Year Book; Department ofCensus and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book ofthe Demo-
cratic Socialist Republic ofSri Lanka.
'The rate of population increase for the whole nation was as follows: 1953-1963 = 31 %; 1963-
1971 = 19.9%; and 1971-1983 = 21.48%.
bThe population ofVavuniya cannot be computed for 1979-1983 because it was redrawn after
1978.
of these districts, but the annexation of a portion of the Anuradha-
pura District to the newly created Vavuniya District involved the
addition of a large number of Sinhalese to the population of a Tamil
district. With the establishment of the district councils in 1980, the
southern boundary of the Vavuniya District reverted to its original
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position. Trincomalee District, which has been a region of aggressive
colonization by Sinhalese peasants, shows a difference of more than
113,881 people. Finally, if the population figures of Batticaloa and
Amparai (which became separate districts in the 1960s), representing
the original Batticaloa District, are combined, the difference is more
than 246,880 people. Even when the Batticaloa and Amparai districts
are considered separately, the figures are 65,030 and 102,067, respec-
tively. The widening gap between the actual and projected popula-
tion figures in the districts of the Eastern Province demonstrates that
a large number of Sinhalese colonists from the non-Tamil provinces
has been systematically resettled in this province via government-
aided colonization and village expansion schemes. If these estimates
are considered for the Tamil districts, at least 432,302 additional peo-
ple have been added to the population of the Tamil districts through
modification of the boundaries of some of these districts and through
colonization schemes between 1953 and 1981. This does not take into
consideration the iarge number of Sinhalese who were settled in the
Eastern Province prior to 1953.
It is possible to estimate the number of Sinhalese who were reset-
tled in the predominantly Tamil districts by comparing the actual ver-
sus projected population increases of Sinhalese in the Eastern and
Northern provinces (see Table 8). Since Sinhalese colonization of
Tamil districts began prior to 1953, the number of people added to
the Trincomalee, Amparai, and Vavuniya districts would be larger
than the figures presented in Table 8. Indeed, the whole region from
the central hills to the east coast, referred to as the Bintenne, and tJ:1e
Trincomalee coast had populations of only 39,043 and 19,449,
respectively, in 1931.32 My estimates are that more than 165,000
Sinhalese have been added to the population of the Eastern and
Northern provinces through colonization schemes between 1953 and
1981. During the same period approximately 84,000 Tamils from the
non-Tamil districts were settled in the two provinces. Indeed, if the
number of Sinhalese who were settled in the Tamil districts prior to
1953 were included, the figure would be much larger, considering
the fact that an estimated 90,000 colonists and their families were set-
tled in the Dry Zone at the end of 1953. 33
The question is often posed as to why Tamils have objected to the
settlement of landless peasants in the Tamil districts where there are
more stretches of uninhabited land for establishing colonization
schemes than in any other areas in the Dry Zone. This question can
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Table 8. Actual Versus Projected Population Increases of Sinhalese in the Eastern and
Northern Provinces, 1953-1981
Difference
between
Actual' and
Projected
Districts 1953 1963 1971 1981 (1981)
jaffna -6,231 (1)
Actual 5,902 6,130 20,402 4,615
Projected 7,731 9,270 10,846
Mannar 4,857 (2)
Actual 2,097 2,404 8,710
Projected 2,747 3,293 3,853
Vavuniya andMullaitivu 8,920 (3)
Actual 5,934 12,039 19,824
Projected 7,773 9,320 10,904
Trincomalee 58,274 (4)
Actual 15,237 39,985 55,308 86,341
Projected 20,007 23,989 28,067
Batticaloa andAmparai 99,852 (5)
Actual 31,107 67,420 94,150 157,017
Projected 40,750 48,859 57,165
Total Difference between Actualand Predicted:
I. Sinhalese 165,672
ii. Tamils (excluding Muslims and Indian Tamils) 84,425
iii. Sinhalese and Tamils 250,097
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Review ofthe Economy; Department of Census and Statistics,
Ceylon Year Book; Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book ofthe Demo-
cratic Socialist Republic ofSn' Lanka.
'The rate of population increase for the whole nation was as follows: 1953-1963 = 31 %; 1963-
1971 = 19.9%; and 1971-1981 = 17.0%.
only be satisfactorily answered if the areal size of each district in the
Dry Zone is compared with the actual population increases that have
occurred since 1953 (see Table 9). It is clear from Table 9 that the
highest rate of population increase and the highest population den-
sity are recorded for the ]affna District. Although Tamils from ]affna
have, in the past, lived and found employment in Sinhalese areas,
the population has continued to grow in the district, accompanied by
overcrowding, unemployment, and food shortage problems. The
government, however, has not taken steps to assist the ]affna Tamils
by settling them in those colonization schemes that were established
in the Tamil districts of Vavuniya, Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and
Amparai. On the contrary, some of these schemes were largely settled
by Sinhalese peasants form the North-Central Province and from the
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Table 9. The Number ofPeople Added to a Square Kilometer of Area in Selected
Dry Zone Districts from 1953 to 1983
Area Density of Population Number of Persons
(in square (person per square Added to a Square
kilometers) kilometer) Kilometer of Area
District 1983 1983 1953-1983
Amparai 4,539.2 91 43.8b
Batticaloa 2,464.6 143 62.9b
Amparai and
Batticaloa 7,003.8 109 70.3
]affna 2,072.5 419 181.8
Mannar 2,002.1 56 32.1
Vavuniya 3,664.64 (1978) 30 20.7'
Vavuniya 2,645.2 (1983) 39
Mullaitivu 1,966.1 (1983) 41
Trincomalee 2,618.2 105 72.6
Anuradhapuraa 7,129.2 87 48.0b
Polonnaruwaa 3,403.8 82 48.1 b
Anuradhapura
and
Polonnaruwaa 10,533.0 85 48.1
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Ceylon Year Book, 1963 and 1966; Department
of Census and Statistics, StatisticalPocket Book ofthe Democratic Socialistic Republic ofSri
Lanka, 1980 and 1984; Central Bank ofeeylon, Review ofthe Economy, 1979 and 1983.
'Sinahalese districts with very few Tamils.
bComputed forthe period 1963-1983.
'Computed for the period 1953-1983 (before the creation of Mullaitivu District).
Wet Zone. ]affna Tamils could not col~nize Mannar and Mullaitivu
districts in large numbers because there were no major projects like
the Kantalai or those in Amparai District to absorb them. Even Vavu-
niya District, which has registered the smallest increase in population
between 1953 and 1978, was not developed to accommodate the
overflowing population from the ]affna District. Only a few minor
irrigation projects were established in Vavuniya to assist a small num-
ber of Tamil and Sinhalese settlers. Since 1978, however, the area of
Vavuniya District has been expanded to include a substantial number
of Sinhalese from the Anuradhapura District, and the Tamils can no
longer rely on this district to solve their population and agrarian
problems. Vavuniya's original southern boundary was restored in
1980. Problems relating to overcrowding and lack of irrigation facili-
ties to expand agriculture have also plagued the Tamils of Batticaloa
District for centuries, yet they were not given preference in the selec-
tion of colonists for the Amparai colonization scheme. Instead, the
Amparai region became the focus of rapid colonization by Sinhalese
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peasants, and what was once a no-man's land had a population den-
sity of 91 persons per square kilometer in 1983. The highest popula-
tion increase per square kilometer has occurred in the Trincomalee
District where a large number of Sinhalese from other districts have
been resettled through colonization and village expansion schemes.
Even though the Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa districts are much
larger and are less densely populated than the Trincomalee District,
this Tamil district was specifically selected for peasant colonization.
An analysis of the information furnished in Tables 7, 8, and 9 dem-
onstrates that the Tamils are justified in criticizing the manner in
which the policy of government-aided colonization has been pursued
since the 1950s. There is, and has been, sufficient land, especially in
the larger districts of Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa, to settle land-
less peasants from the Wet Zone, yet Tamil districts of smaller size
and higher density were selected for colonization by Sinhalese peas-
ants. Instead of caring for the needs of the local population of the
Tamil provinces, the government brought in Sinhalese peasants in
large numbers to settle in colonization and village expansion
schemes, which were established deliberately in Tamil areas.
The Development ofWater Resources in the Dry Zone
The physical environment, particularly the climate, imposes serious
limitations on the development of water resources and agriculture in
the Dry Zone. Nowhere is the land 100 meters above sea level, and it
slopes very gradually from the central hill country toward the coast as
evident by the flow of rivers (see Figure 2). Old, resistant metamor-
phic rocks lie under the Dry Zone except for the ]affna Peninsula and
a narrow strip of the northwestern coast, which are composed of lime-
stone. 34 The limestone is exposed in many locations on the peninsula
and buried under a thick layer of sand on the mainland. On the
mainland, rivers flow in broad valleys between low ridges giving the
landscape an undulating character and, wherever the topography is
suitable, rivers have been dammed to irrigate crops. Although the
]affna Peninsula is devoid of rivers because of the presence of joints in
the limestone bedrock, the limestone holds a vast reservoir of under-
ground water, while the impermeable crystalline rocks of the main-
land yield very little ground water. It is the underground water
resources that have contributed to the survival of the Tamil settle-
ments in the Dry Zone since the thirteenth century and to the deve!-
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opment of one of the most intensively cultivated and settled areas on
the island. On the mainland, agriculture and settlements are almost
exclusively dependent on surface water stored behind bunds in large
tanks along river valleys. Agricultural activity is, however, hampered
because many of the rivers discharge very little water during the pro-
longed dry period when evapotranspiration rates are high.
Indeed, the most-critical factor limiting agricultural productivity in
the Dry Zone is the quantity of available soil moisture. 35 Soils are
mainly recharged with moisture from October to December, when
the northeast monsoon, as well as tropical cyclones, supply approxi-
mately between 1,016 to 1,524 millimeters of rainfall. The Mannar
and the Hambantota districts receive the least quantities of annual
precipitation, but, as a whole, the Tamil areas are hotter, drier, expe-
rience a longer period of water deficit, and warrant more irrigated
water than the Sinhalese districts for successful agriculture. In fact,
the regional variations in agricultural productivity in the Dry Zone
can be explained with reference to the quantity of rainfall as well as to
the length and intensity of the prolonged dry period. It is also clear,
based on available climatological data, that the highest annual and
monthly average temperatures in the Dry Zone are recorded in the
Tamil areas where meteorological drought lasts for seven to eight
months of the year. The longest effective dry period, lasting for
approximately seven months and occurring with a probability of 100
percent, has been recorded in the ]affna Peninsula; the effective dry
period is on the whole longer in the Tamil districts, compared to the
Sinhalese districts of the Dry Zone (see Figure 3).36 Manfred Domros,
who utilized the Papadakis formula to compute the water balance for
selected stations in Sri Lanka, emphasizes that the "water deficit
starts in March and April (e.g., Batticaloa), or even in February (e.g.,
]affna and Mannar): these areas also experience an eight month-long,
continuous period of water deficit" (see Table 10).37 Even the driest
Sinhalese Dry Zone districts, such as Puttalam and Hambantota,
have fewer months ofwater deficit than all of the Tamil districts. Not-
withstanding the fact that agricultural development in the Tamil dis-
tricts is hampered by the paucity of water resources, major irrigation
projects continue to be located in Sinhalese districts.
Indeed, the economic development of the Tamil areas, outside of
the ]affna Peninsula, is seriously hindered by the lack of adequate
supplies of irrigated water to cultivate rice and secondary food crops.
It is imperative, given the high density of population in the penin-
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Table 10. Climatic Parameters for Selected Dry Zone Stations
Anura-
dhapura Barricaloa Mannar Jaffna Trincomalee Puttalam Kurunegala
(TE)" 27.3 27.4 27.8 27.6 28.0 27.3 27.0
PEb 1680.0 1713.0 1793.0 1728.0 1763.0 1705.0 1683.0
PRE' 1446.0 1756.0 1011.0 1352.0 1646.0 1126.0 2155.0
Dd 357.0 480.0 782.0 645.0 473.0 579.0 26.0
Dry< 04.0 05.0 06.0 06.0 05.0 04.0 03.0
Source: C. W. Thornthwaite and Associates, "Average Climatic Water Balance Data of the
Continents, Part II. Asia;' Publications in Climatology, pp. 56-58; Manfred Domros, Agrocli-
mate ofCeylon, pp. 77-124.
'Mean annual temperature (in celsius).
bAnnual potential evapotranspiration using Thornthwaite's formula (in millimeters).
'Annual precipitation (in millimeters).
dSoil moisture deficit as defined by the formula: potential evapotranspiration minus actual eva-
potranspiration in millimeters.
'Average duration (in months) of effective dry period.
sula and the lack of employment opportunities for Tamils in the pri-
vate and public sectors, that major irrigation projects be initiated in
the predominantly Tamil areas. The Tamils, however, lack the re-
sources and the machinery to augment the supply of water to north-
ern rivers in order to solve their agrarian problems without govern-
ment assistance. Table 11, giving mean annual yields of water from
river basins in the Dry Zone, demonstrates the dilemma the Tamils
face in striving to develop agriculture. 38
As the information on the annual discharge of water from river
basins in different parts of the Dry Zone clearly shows, Tamil settle-
ments are confined to areas where the supply of surface water is rela-
tively inadequate. Of the approximately twenty streams that drain
exclusively in the Tamil areas in the Northern Province, only Kanaka-
rayan Am and the Parangi Am basins discharge, individually, more
than 125 million cubic meters of water, annually, into the ocean;
most of the basins discharge between 10 to 40 million cubic meters of
water annually. The total river basin discharge from the Tamil area of
the Northern Province is less than 750 million cubic meters, annually.
In contrast, Kala Oya and Moderagam Oya, which originate and
drain through the Sinhalese districts of the North-Western and
North-Central provinces, discharge more than 515 million cubic
meters of water. The basin of the Amvi Am, which includes both
Tamil and Sinhalese districts, discharges almost 285 million cubic
meters of water annually. The Amvi Am, nevertheless, is extensively
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tapped at its upper reaches to fill the Nuwara Wewa, Turuwila, and
Nachchaduwa tanks in the Sinhalese district of Anuradhapura. Only
a small portion of the total discharge of Aruvi Aru is used for irrigat-
ing paddy in the Vavuniya and Mannar districts. The Yan Oya and Ma
Oya rivers discharge approximately 890 million cubic meters of water
annually from their basins and, although they drain into the sea via
the Northern and Eastern provinces, a large portion of this discharge
is stored in reservoirs, such as Huruluweva, Wahalakada, and Pada-
wiya tanks for the benefit of Sinhalese peasants resettled in coloniza-
tion schemes. The Gal Oya Basin, and the recently inaugurated
Maduru Oya Basin, which have become the focus of Sinhalese coloni-
zation of the Eastern Province, discharge more than 650 million cubic
meters ofwater. The Unnichchai Basin of the Eastern Province, where
most of the settlers are Tamils, discharges only 85 million cubic
meters of water. Finally, large quantities of water from the Mahaweli
Ganga Basin have been used effectively to augment the supply of
water in the river basins of the North-Central and Eastern provinces.
With these additional supplies of water, agricultural productivity has
been increased and paddy cultivation extended to new areas for the
benefit of Sinhalese peasants.
Table 11. Mean Annual Discharge from River Basins in the Dry Zone
River Basins
Mahaweli
Gangaa
Million
Cubic Meters Major Contributions
4,933 Parakrama Samudra, Minneriya, and Kadulla tanks
(existing) in Polonnaruwa District; augmenting
water supply to existing tanks in Anuradhapura and
Trincomalee (only Kantalai) districts; Mahaweli
Project will extend irrigation facilities to Maduru
Oya region (area of new peasant colonization bene-
fiting Sinhalese) and supply additional water to
existing tanks in Sinhalese districts. If the whole
project were to be carried out according to the mas-
ter plan, many of the tanks in the newly created
Vavuniya District will have additional water to
increase rice production. However, the original plan
to augment the supply ofwater of rivers that flow
into the]affna lagoon (creating a fresh-water
lagoon) has been left out. The Mahaweli Ganga
Project has been designed primarily to assist Sinha-
lese peasants of Sinhalese and Tamil districts.
continued
Table 11. (continued)
Million
River Basins Cubic Merers
Madum Oya' 518
Yan Oya' 368
Kala Oya' 313
Amvi Am 285
Moderamgam
Am' 204
Karagarayan
Am 180
Mi Oya' 170
GalOya' 148
Parangi Am 141
Kantalai' 100
Unnichchai 86
Nay Am 84
Pali Am 82
Mandekal Am 56
Pankulam Am 39
MaOya' 37
Akkarayan Am 37
Munde! Am 28
Pallavarayan
Am 27
Kal Am 23
Nethali Am 22
Major Contributions
Proposed Mahawe!i Ganga Project will provide ade-
quate water to extend paddy cultivation. Sinhalese
residents from Polonnamwa and other districts are
to be settled in colonization and village expansion
schemes.
Humlu Wewa and Wahalkade tanks in Anuradha-
pura District.
Kala Wewa and Kumnchikulam in Anuradhapura
District.
Nuwara Wewa, Humlu Wewa, Nachchaduwa, and
Mahagalkaduwala tanks in the Anuradhapura Dis-
trict; Pavatkulam in Vavuniya District; Giant's Tank
and Paraiyanalankulam in Mannar District.
Nikaya Wewa in Anuradhapura District.
Irranamadu Tank inJaffna District.
Thbbowa Wewa in Puttalam District.
Senanayaka Samudra in Amparai District.
Paddy in the downstream section.
Kanatalai in Trincomalee District but benefits
Sinhalese colonists (Elahera-Minneriya-Yoda Ela
canal augments water supply from Mahawe!i).
Unnichchai Tank in Batticaloa District.
Irra-Illuppalakkulam in Mannar District.
Iraniyankulam inJaffna District.
Batticaloa District (no important tank).
Pankulam in Trincomalee District.
Padawiya Tank in Vavuniya District (Sinhalese colo-
nization), additional water from Mahawe!i Ganga
Project.
Akkarayan Kulam benefitsJaffna and Mullaitivu
districts.
Benefits Amparai and Batticaloa districts.
Jaffna District (minor tanks).
Upper reaches in Anuradhapura District and down-
stream in Mannar District.
Jaffna District (no important tank).
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Ceylon Year Book; Central Bank of Ceylon,
Review olthe Economy; S, Arumugam, water Resources olCeylon; R. L. Brohier, "Under-
ground Water Supply of Northern Ceylon," pp. 39-42; R. L. Brohier, "The Jaffna Peninsula
Lagoon Scheme," pp. 212-213; S. Selvanayagam, "Agrarian Problems and Prospects of Devel-
oping theJaffna Region of Ceylon"; Manfred Domros, The Agroclimate olCeylon, pp. 201-
211; B. L. C. Johnson and M. LeM. Scrivenor, Sn'Lanka: Land, andEconomy, pp. 58-71.
'Benefits Sinhalese districts and Sinhalese settlements in Tamil districts.
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The government continues to invest large sums of money on the
Mahaweli Ganga Project to augment the supply of water and extend
paddy cultivation in Sinhalese areas, while the Tamil areas continue
to be neglected. It is the scarcity of irrigated water that restricts the
expansion of rice cultivation and limits yields in Tamil districts, rela-
tive to Sinhalese districts, and many Tamils are convinced that
Sinhala governments are deliberately unwilling to remedy this situa-
tion. They thus find it necessary to demand the devolution of sub-
stantiallegislative and fiscal powers to Tamil areas so that the govern-
mental units in these areas will have the authority to initiate major
irrigation and colonization projects for the benefit of the local resi-
dents. As yet no substantial governmental powers have been de-
volved to Tamil areas and the Tamil districts continue to lag behind
Sinhalese districts in rice production. Many new irrigation projects in
the Dry Zone continue to be associated with the resettlement of
Sinhalese peasantsin the Dry Zone, while many of the Tamils of the
water-deficient districts, such as ]affna and Batticaloa, have been
neglected.
Agricultural Development
Nowhere in the Dry Zone are the local people so dependent on agri-
culture as are the residents of]affna and Batticaloa districts. The peo-
ple of the two districts have for centuries sustained a viable agricul-
tural system in order to support a large population with limited
resources. By the year 1962, the percentage of land devoted to culti-.
vation in the ]affna and the Batticaloa districts was as high as 27.4
and 18.05, respectively, and additional land could not be brought
under cultivation to meet the needs of the increasing population
because of the lack of water. 39 From the mid-1940s, the people of the
two districts have pinned their hopes on the government to initiate
major irrigation and colonization projects, to resettle landless peas-
ants, and to increase rice production.
Prior to the 1950s, most of the intensively cultivated lands in the
Dry Zone, particularly in the ]affna and Batticaloa districts, was
developed almost entirely by the local people without any assistance
from the government. To their dismay, most of the major govern-
ment-sponsored irrigation projects in both Sinhalese and Tamil dis-
tricts were primarily designed to resettle Sinhalese peasants (see Fig-
ure 3). If the major objective of the colonization and irrigation
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projects was to relieve pressure of population on agricultural land,
major schemes should also have been initiated to resettle Tamil peas-
ants. Colonization schemes intended to resettle Sinhalese peasants
from the Wet Zone could have been largely restricted to Sinhalese
districts, especially given that the population densities per acre of
agricultural land area were only 0.16 and 0.14 in Anuradhapura and
Polonnaruwa districts, respectively, in 1963.40 In contrast, the popu-
lation densities per acre of agricultural land area in the ]affna and
Batticaloa districts were as high as 0.99 in the]affna District and 0.32
in the Batticaloa District, respectively, in the same year.
According to statistical data relating to the extent of area sown to
rice on an annual basis for the years 1980/1981, 1981/1982, and
1982/1983, the Tamil districts in the Northern Province ranked at the
bottom of the list of all the Dry Zone districts (see Table 12 and Fig-
ures 5 and 6). Between 1963 and 1983, the greatest increases in the
area sown to rice were recorded in the Amparai and 'frincomalee dis-
tricts where large numbers of Sinhalese were settled in colonization
schemes.
The ]affna District had a population of 868,000 and a density of
419 persons per square kilometer in 1983, yet the area sown to rice
was only two-thirds of the area devoted to rice in the Anuradhapura
District, which had a population of 622,000 people and a density of
only 87 persons per square kilometer (see Thble 13). The population
densities in the Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya districts are small
enough to accommodate some of the landless and unemployed peo-
ple from the ]affna District under government-sponsored irrigation
and colonization schemes. Unfortunately, few major government-
sponsored irrigation and colonization schemes have been established
in the Northern and Eastern provinces in recent years. Most of the
new irrigation schemes are minor projects that are barely adequate to
supply supplementary water for crops grown during the rainy season.
Indeed, the water that is applied to previously rain-fed land does not
even guarantee one season of water supply during years of abnormally
low rainfall. It is true that the extent of the area sown with paddy in
Tamil areas has increased as a result of the development of minor irri-
gation schemes, but the yields are not as high as those cultivated
under major irrigation projects where there is better control of water
supply.41
Yields of rice have increased dramatically in Sri Lanka with the
introduction of hybrid seeds as part of the Green Revolution. How-
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Table 12. Changes in Gross Extent of Area Sown and Yield Per Hectare of Rice in
Dry Zone Districts, 1961/ 1963 to 1981/ 1983'
Annual Gross Extent of Atea Sown
Yield Per
Change from Hectate
% under 1963-1983 1981/1983
1961/1963 1981/1983 Yala Maha + Yala (kilogtams)
(hectates) (hectates) 1981/1983 (hectates) Maha Yala
Sinhalese Districts
Polonnaruwa 37,340 54,802 41 17,462 4,572 3,815
Anuradhapura 53,932 52,790 11 -1,142 3,217 3,558
Hambantota 26,923 31,745 42 4,819 3,984 3,886
Moneragala 1,750 13,477 22 11,727 3,324 3,174
Total 32,866
Tamt! Districts with Major Colonization Schemes
Amparai 50,109 75,607 36 25,498 4,163 4,320
Trincomalee 23,330 40,001 26 16,671 2,812 3,786
Vavuniyab 22,103 24,720 4 2,617 2,366 3,336
Total 44,786
Tamt! Distnets
Batticaloa 34,584 54,873 18 20,389 2,703 3,347
]affna 33,013 35,546 13 2,533 2,336 4,033
Mannar 14,014 16,372 2 2,358 2,977 2,996
Total 25,280
Soutce: Department of Census and Statistics, Ceylon Year Book, 1963, 1966, and 1967. Centtal
Bank of Ceylon , Review ofthe Economy, 1978, 1981, 1982, and 1983.
'The values are averaged forrhree consecutive years: 1961, 1962, and 1963, as well as 1981,
1982, and 1983. Only those districts entirely in the Dry Zone are included.
bThe latest values for Vavuniya do not apply to the period 1981-1983 but to the year 1978 when
the district was redrawn.
ever, these increases were recorded only in areas where adequate water
was made available in the form of irrigation, in such districts as Trin-
comalee and Amparai. In particular, supplementary irrigation during
the Maha or rainy season contributed to high yields of rice in the
Polonnaruwa, Amparai, and Anuradhapura districts from 1981 to
1983 (see Table 14). Except for the Mannar District, the percentage of
sown land under irrigation was much greater in the Sinhalese districts
than in the Tamil districts in 1979/1980. Therefore, while most of the
Sinhalese districts recorded yields ranging between 3,200 to 4,570
kilograms per hectare during the Maha season, when most of the
paddy lands are under cultivation, all other districts recorded less
than 3,000 kilograms per hectare in 1981/1983. The]affna District
was at the bottom of the list with 2,336 kilograms per hectare.
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Table 13. Changes in the Annual Per Capita Production ofRice in Dry Zone
Districts, 1961/1963 to 198111983'
Production
Populationb Density (per Per Capita
(thousands) % Change square km) (kilograms)
1963 1983 1963-1983 1983 1963 1983
Sinhalese Districts
Polonnaruwa 114 278 143.8 82 870 790
Anuradhapura 280 622 122.1 87 387 268
Hambantota 275 449 63.2 173 197 270
Moneragala 132 298 125.7 53 34 144
Tamtl Distnetl> with Major Colonizatton Schemes
Amparai 212 411 93.8 88 450 754
Trincomaleec 138 274 98.6 105 336 432
Vavuniyad 102 39 335
Tamil Distn'cts
Batticaloa 197 352 78.6 143 317 426
]affna 613 868 41.5 419 82 104
Mannar 60 113 88.3 56 528 419
Mullaitivud 81 41 490
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Ceylon Year Book, 1963,1966, and 1967. Central
Bank of Ceylon, Review o/the Economy, 1978, 1981, 1982, and 1983 (Provisional estimates fot
1983 population see Table 54).
'The figures for annual per capita production of rice are computed by using assumptions and
procedures presented by Barbara Harriss, "Paddy and Rice Situation in Sri Lanka," in B. H.
Farmer, ed., Green Revolution, pp. 20-30, note 12.
bProvision for 1983.
'The percentage of Sinhalese increased from 18.2 to 33.6 in the Trincomalee District between
1953-1981. In the Amparai District the percentage of Sinhalese increased from less than 25
prior to 1963 to more than 38 in 1981. The percentage of Sinhalese population in the Vavuniya
District in 1981 was 16.6.
dThese two districts were carved out of the original Vavuniya District in 1978.
Obviously, Tamil districts lag far behind the Sinhalese districts in the
production of rice.
The regional variations in agricultural productivity in the Dry Zone
can be best expressed by comparing the annual per capita production
of rice, on a district basis. Indeed, great disparity exists between the
Tamil and Sinhalese districts in their capacity to support the local
populations.42 In 1963, the highest and the lowest per capita pro-
ducers of rice were Polonnaruwa and Moneragala districts, respec-
tively, but, by 1983, Jaffna District was at the bottom of the list (see
Table 13). The position ofJaffna District as a self-sustaining region
has deteriorated in recent years because the area under irrigation
remains small compared to the size of its population (see Table 14).
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Table 14. Size ofland Holdings and Percentage of Sown Area
under Irrigation in the Dry Zone (Maha 1979/1980)
Sinhalese Distnets
Polonnaruwa
Anuradhapura
Hambantota
Moneragala
Tamil Distnets
Trincomalee
Vavuniya
Batticaloa
]affna
Mannar
% of Sown Area
Irrigated
95.3
92.7
92.5
63.2
56.6
83.4
30.4
31.6
94.7
Average Size of
Holdings
(hectares)
4.0
4.1
3.0
3.9
3.1
5.7
2.7
1.3
3.7
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Ministry of Planning Imple-
mentations, Socia-Economic Indicators a/Sri Lanka.
The per capita production of rice in the ]affna District was only 104
kilograms in 1983, while it was more than 268 kilograms in most of
the districts. Moreover, the per capita production of rice in the North-
ern Province in 1983 was only 182 kilograms, while it was 433 and
625 kilograms in the North-Central and the Eastern provinces,
respectively. Therefore, the Northern Province, especially the ]affna
District, lags behind other regions in the production of rice and in
the capacity of the local population to rely on locally produced rice
for survival. The ]affna District has become increasingly dependent
on other districts for rice as its population soars because of natural
increase and the influx of refugees from the rest of the island, where
employment opportunities for Tamils in the public and private sec-
tors have become almost nonexistent. In the view of many Tamils,
this dependency has been deliberately engineered by successive gov-
ernments in order to weaken the minority's economic and political
stronghold over their traditional areas.
For Sri Lanka Tamils, the ethnic problem is closely linked to the
political and economic issues on which the communities differ. Politi-
cally, the Tamils believe that they have as much right as the Sinhalese
to consider the island their legitimate home, by virtue of their long
tenure on the island. However, the prospects for Tamils living and
working in the Sinhalese areas are limited, given the policy of dis-
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crimination and the acts of violence that have been perpetrated
against them since 1956. Therefore, to ensure their freedom and sur-
vival, the Tamils desire to preserve their homeland and institutions.
Indeed, Tamil areas have served as a refuge for those who have been
adversely affected by anti-Tamil riots in the past. The Tamils are
deeply concerned about the gradual encroachment of Sinhalese set-
tlements into Tamil areas and dread that they will become a minority
in their own homeland. Tamils fear that, given the record of succes-
sive governments, their districts will continue to be economically
neglected. They are convinced, however, that if substantial powers
are devolved to Tamil areas, the issues of economic development of
Tamil areas, the need for Tamils to work in Sinhalese areas, and the
problem of discrimination will subside. Nevertheless, any proposals
that do not recognize the right of the Tamil population to preserve
the integrity of their areas will be rejected by militants and moderates
alike. Apparently, increasing numbers of Tamils strongly believe that
they have the right to self-determination since they possess many
characteristics that contribute to nationhood. Tamils have "a shared
historical experience, a continuous linguistic and cultural tradition, a
common way of life, the result of a traditional system of beliefs and
values dominated by Saivaism and, most important of all, a defined
territory as homeland."43
CHAPTER 4
Education, Employment, Economic
Development ofTamil Districts,
and Electoral Representation
TAMILS of the moderate persuasion and Tamil militants may differ
with each other on the tactics with which to resist Sinhalese domina-
tion, but there is a large measure of agreement among them on the
issues of cultural identity, the right of self-determination, the territo-
rial integrity of Tamil areas, and citizenship rights for Tamils of
Indian origin. The laws and regulations of successive Sinhala govern-
ments have discriminated against the Tamils in higher education,
employment, and development of Tamil districts. While some Tamils
still believe that Tamil demands can be met by establishing a federal
form of government and others are strongly convinced that a nego-
tiated settlement to the ethnic problem is no longer feasible and that
the Tamils have to establish an independent state, the Tamil people
as a whole are determined to obtain substantial concessions from the
government.
In the 1950s and 1960s, when Tamil leaders indicated their disap-
proval of the use of Sinhala for administrative purposes in Tamil areas
by staging peaceful demonstrations, they did not receive the full
backing of the Tamil people, partly because some Tamils were confi-
dent that they might ultimately overcome the language barrier to
employment by mastering the Sinhala language. Tamils living in
rural areas may even have been grateful to the government for pro-
viding an opportunity for their children to be educated in their
mother tongue for the first time in many centuries. Education in
most schools was conducted in the English language, and it was diffi-
cult for children from rural areas to master a foreign language in
order to secure employment. Children from urban areas, on the other
hand, had adequate opportunities to become proficient in the
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English language and to secure employment in the civil service or to
gain admission to universities. It was now possible for children from
rural areas to be educated in their own tongue and compete success-
fully with those children from the urban areas for jobs. It was also
feasible for children educated in the Tamil medium to secure govern-
ment employment merely by becoming proficient in Sinhala. Unfor-
tunately, with the passage of time, it became apparent to the Tamils
that the Sinhala Only Act was primarily contrived to exclude them
from certain categories of jobs. Administrative regulations were even
issued stipulating that Tamil children could not be educated in the
Sinhala language on grounds that Sinhala is not the language of their
parents. Nevertheless, it was not until the early 1970s, when the gov-
ernment issued discriminatory regulations curtailing the number of
Tamil students selected for certain faculties in the universities, that
Tamil youths began to challenge their leaders and to demand more
militant action to secure Tamil rights. As we have seen, they insisted
on drastic action, which came in the form of a demand for the estab-
lishment ofa separate Tamil state to be called Eelam.
Discrimination in Education
The problem of discrimination in education cannot be adequately
analyzed without some background information on why Sri Lankan
Tamils rely on education rather than on land for their livelihood in
this agricultural country. For centuries the Tamils of northern Sri
Lanka managed to live geographically isolated from the rest of the
island by making effective use of the resources of the water-deficient
environment of this region. Seasonal rains and plentiful supplies of
underground water have been ingeniously channeled onto paddy
fields and onto carefully prepared garden plots of subsidiary food
crops and tobacco. Given the ecological constraints of the local envi-
ronment, however, the agricultural resources have become limited in
relation to the needs of the rapidly increasing population. In the Bat-
ticaloa and ]affna districts in particular, the inhabitants face severe
agrarian problems, such as the small size of the holdings, the large
size of peasant families, fluctuating and unteliable income, the high
cost of farming, and lack of adequate credit. 1
The ]affna region, which includes the ]affna Peninsula and the
eleven nearby islands, is the cultural hearth of the Tamils of Sri
Lanka. In 1981, approximately 75 percent of the Sri Lankan Tamil
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population of the northern provinces or 40.6 percent of the Sri
Lankan Tamil population of the island resided in the region.
Although resources are limited, the population of the region has
increased rapidly, from 241,451 in 1871 to nearly 800,000 in 1983.2
Agricultural productivity has not kept pace with the population
growth in the region, especially in the]affna District, because most of
the suitable agricultural land has been under cultivation for hundreds
of years; crop yields have been low until very recently. It is estimated
that 40 percent of the region's 1,151.8 square kilometers is sandy,
alkaline, and consists of rocky waste. The population density in the
effectively occupied areas of agriculture, settlement, and other uses
was almost as high as 1,180 persons per square kilometer, while the
density in the]affna municipality would have been at least 2,580 per-
sons per square kilometer in 1983. The capacity of the local environ-
ment to support the increasing population began to diminish in the
nineteenth century. ]affna Tamils had no recourse but to seek
employment outside the region. Migration to other Dry Zone dis-
tricts was not feasible since the development of the Dry Zone did not
effectively get under way until well into the twentieth century when a
few colonization schemes were established.
The major option open to them was to leave the peninsula and
secure employment in the public service of the colonial government.
Opportunities to acquire proficiency in the English language had
been made available to Tamil youths by Christian missionaries, who
established a large number of schools in the ]affna region. Roman
Catholic missionaries arrived on the island with the Portuguese in the
sixteenth century and established Catholic schools in the coastal are~s
throughout the island. The Church of England came to the island
with the British in the nineteenth century, but it was the English
Methodist and the American Congregationalist Church missionaries
who had the greatest impact on the spread of Christianity and
English education in the]affna Peninsula. Many of the Protestants on
the island are ]affna Tamils who were converted by American mis-
sionaries. In the ]affna region, the Catholic Church, the Anglican
Church, the Congregationalist Church, and the Methodist Church
operated dozens of primary schools and a large number of secondary
schools in which the medium of instruction was in the English lan-
guage. 3 The Christian missionaries received financial aid from the
colonial government to provide education in English for those who
could not afford it. The colonial government had to support and
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encourage mission schools in order to create a supply of people who
were literate in English and capable of running the civil administra-
tion of the country. The ]affna region supplied a large number of
English educated men who were willing to work as clerks in the pub-
lic service. Since English education was the only means to secure
employment in the public service and in other professions, ]affna
Tamils did not object to the establishment of Christian schools in the
]affna Peninsula. The Sinhalese of the Wet Zone did not face the
same adverse economic conditions that the Tamils of the ]affna region
r
did. Moreover, there were clear indications that the Buddhist revival-
, ist movement of the nineteenth century was somewhat militant and
J ' "was never wholly without political overtones."4 Therefore, Christian'\ missionaries did not receive from the Sinhalese people the same wel-
come extended to them by the Tamils of]affna for the establishment
of large numbers of English-language schools in Sinhalese-dominated
districts.
/
1\ This does not imply that the number of Tamils attending schools in
r / the North was greater than that in the other provinces, but the num-
l/ I ber of Tamils employed in the public service was proportionally
\
greater in relation to the actual size of the population it represented.
More Tamils sought work at various levels of the government service
and in the professions, including medicine, engineering, and law
because of the lack of opportunities in the]affna region. This reason-
ing was effectively expressed by A. Sivanandan when he stated, "The
industry of a people who had worked an ungiving land was now given
over to education, and the government service, into which education
could take them. Education was land."5 Tamil children were pres-
sured by their parents to master English, mathematics, and science
subjects as a means to secure employment that brought fame, high
status, and monetary benefits to the family. In fact, "Tamil children
were good in figures and their parents goaded them in their academic
work for fear of unemployment or hard work as the price of failure." 6
There is no denying that Tamils who were educated in the English
medium took advantage of the favorable treatment accorded them by
the British to secure promotions to high positions in the civil service
and to receive professional university degrees. Nevertheless, this does
not suggest that Tamils were appointed to high positions in the pub-
lic service if they were less qualified than Sinhalese applicants for
these jobs. Sinhalese as well as Tamils were denied access to the public
service and were assigned to low-paying minor positions if they lacked
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proficiency in the English language. A few of the English-educated
and more adventurous Tamils who were denied employment in the
government service emigrated to Malaysia between 1860 to 1925.7
Many of those who worked elsewhere on the island or in Malaysia
returned to the ]affna region upon retirement, bringing with them
substantial sums of money to purchase land, build homes, educate
their grandchildren, and furnish needed capital for business ven-
tures. With the enactment of the Sinhala only legislation, many
Tamils had to take early retirement and thus to rely more heavily on
the meager resources of their traditional homeland.
One would have thought that once Sinhala was made the official
language of the country grievances against the Tamils would gradu-
ally be dropped, but the situation worsened as the number of Sinha-
lese seeking public service employment increased. The introduction
of Sinhala as the official language, the change in the medium of
instruction in schools, and the establishment of a number of regional
and Buddhist universities enabled a large number of Sinhalese to
gain admission to universities and to qualify for jobs in the public ser-
vice. On the other hand, the introduction of SinhaIa as the official
language drastically reduced the number of Tamils employed in the
public service and increased the number of unemployed Tamil high
school graduates. Moreover, these unemployed youths with high
school diplomas found that admission to certain faculties in the uni-
versities was closed to them because of government-imposed restric-
tions.
Until 1969. admissions to universities were based on the results ~f
the final examination at the high school level (General Certificate of
Education Advanced Level Class). Both Sinhalese and Tamil students
were required to take the same GCE Advanced Level Examination,
but Sinhalese and Tamil students took the examination in the
medium in which they were educated. The medium of instruction for
those seeking admission to the artS faculty changed from English to
Sinhala and Tamil in the 1960s. It was only in 1970 that the first
batch of students seeking admission to science faculties were permit-
ted to take the General Certificate of Education (Advanced Level)
examination in Sinhala and Tamil. Students do not automatically
qualify for admission to the university even if they perform well in
the examination. Since the number of places available for admission
to different fields of study is limited due to the lack of facilities, the
final selection is based on open competition whereby only those stu-
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dents scoring above a certain percentile rank in a combination of sub-
jects are selected.
The United Front Party came to power in 1970 at a time when
many prominent Sinhalese claimed that the two-language policy was
not effective enough in increasing the number of Sinhalese students
admitted to science programs in universities. As long as university
admissions were based strictly on merit, they argued, the Tamils
would have the advantage and many deserving Sinhalese students
would be excluded from universities. In addition, it was rumored
that out of 160 students admitted to the faculty of engineering of the
University of Ceylon at Peradeniya, Kandy, in 1970, a hundred were
Tamil-medium students. This aroused communal feelings on campus
and the "complaints of unfair selection, though unsubstantiated,1dl
on receptive ears and a lower qualifying mark was set for Sinhalese-
medium candidates seeking admission to science based courses so
that a 'politically accepted' proportion of Sinhalese candidates could
be selected."8
Indeed, the United Front government of Mrs. Bandaranaike
decided that it was difficult to evaluate the relative performance of
students who were educated in the Sinhala medium with those who
were educated in the Tamil medium, especially when Tamil students
were performing exceptionally well in the science disciplines com-
pared to the Sinhalese students. Sinhalese students had also sought
admission in large numbers to science faculties, but many of them
could not compete successfully with Tamil students in open competi-
tive examinations, even when the medium of instruction was in
English. In order to admit more Sinhalese students to the science
faculties, the government reduced the minimum requirements neces-
sary for them to secure admission to these faculties (Table 15). The
minimum requirements for Tamil students seeking admission to sci-
ence faculties were raised relative to those required for Sinhalese stu-
dents. In justification of this argument, they decided to identify dif-
ferent sets of minimum marks that students educated in the different
media would have to score to be admitted to the different fields of
study in the university. Since Tamil students have traditionally sought
admission to the science faculties because employment opportunities
are limited for those graduating in the arts disciplines, yet the gov-
ernment decided that a greater number of Tamil students could be
admitted by lowering the minimum standards for admission to the
arts faculty.
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Table 15. University Admissions Based on
Minimum Marks, 1971
Course ofStudy Medium Minimum Marks
Arts Sinhalese 187
Tamils 170
Engineering Sinhalese 227
Tamils 250
Medicine and Sinhalese 229
Dentistry Tamils 250
Bio-Science Sinhalese 175
Tamils 181
Physical Sciences Sinhalese 183
Tamils 204
Source: C. R. de Silva, "The Impact of Narionalism on
Education: The Schools Take-Over (1961) and the Univer-
sity Admissions Crisis 1970-1975," in Michael Roberrs,
ed., Collective Identities, Nationalism, andProtests in
Modem Sri Lanka, pp. 486.
12.1
In the early 1970s, some Sinhalese scholars and politicians com-
plained that Tamil students were overrepresented in universities,
especially in the sciences and engineering. When English was the
medium of instruction in the universities, examiners could not be
accused of favoring Tamil students in certain subjects, relative to a
large majority of Sinhalese students, since both Sinhalese and Tamil
examiners were using a language not their own. When the students
seeking admission to universities began to be evaluated in both die
Sinhala and Tamil media by Sinhalese and Tamil examiners, com-
plaints of favoritism were raised. Sinhala and Tamil were adopted as
the media of instruction in the science faculties in 1970 in order to
assist students from rural areas to follow university courses in profes-
sional fields, such as engineering and medicine. Complaints of favor-
itism became more intense as the number of Sinhalese students
desiring to enter science and engineering faculties increased dramati-
cally in the 1970s.
This increase in the number of Sinhalese students seeking admis-
sion to science faculties was brought about by a gradual expansion of
science in secondary education. Moreover, the great majority of high
school graduates preferred to pursue science degrees, since most of
those who had graduated with arts degrees in the 1960s were unem-
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ployed. Instead of increasing the funding for higher education to
meet the growing demand for science degrees at the national and
regional levels, however, Mrs. Bandaranaike's government decided to
change the system of selecting students for admission to the universi-
ties, which was based on "open competition."
Some scholars and politicians in the majority community justified
such a change on grounds that Sinhalese students could not compete
with Tamil students in professional fields as long as the Tamil districts
had more schools, better educational opportunities, and smaller class
sizes. 9 They also claimed that the ability of Tamil students to score
better marks than Sinhalese students in science subjects was attribut-
able to the availability of better laboratory facilities in Tamil districts.
On the contrary, a regional analysis of available data on the percent-
age of the population enrolled in schools and colleges for the 1978/
1979 academic year demonstrates the following: (1) Over 21 percent
of the illiterate population of Tamil districts have no schooling com-
pared to 23 percent for the island as a whole. (2) The highest literacy
rates on the island are found in the Wet Zone districts with pre-
dominantly Sinhalese populations, and include Colombo, Gampaha,
Kalutara, and Matara districts (see Table 16). (3) The percentage of
population attending primary and secondary schools in the Tamil dis-
tricts was below the national average. Only 6.67 percent of the estate
population had secondary schooling. Despite this low level, the gov-
ernment adopted no measures to develop special ethnic quotas for
Indian Tamils. lO (4) A higher percentage of the population of the
Tamil districts had passed the General Certificate of Education (GCE)
Ordinary Level examination, relative to other areas, but the figure for
High School Certificate or GCE Advanced Level examination for
Tamil districts was below the national average. ll Finally, contrary to
popular belief, the percentage of the population with undergraduate
degrees for Tamil districts was less than one-half of the national aver-
age. Moreover, both urban and rural areas of Sinhalese districts
tended to fare better than the Tamil districts in the size of the under-
graduate population and in the number of persons who had passed
degree examinations. In fact, except for the category of those who
had passed the GCE (OL), the rest of the figures for Tamil districts are
below the national average. Thus it can be seen that Tamil districts
did not offer more educational opportunities, relative to those of
Sinhalese districts. Moreover, the percentage of the Tamil population
in Tamil districts did not have greater access to university education
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Table 16. Analysis ofPopulation with Different Levels of Education, 1978/1979,
by Region
Estate Zone I Zone II Zone III Zone IV Zone V
Educational (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) All
Level (in percentage ofpopulation in each region) Island
No Schooling
(illiterate) 43.58 19.47 25.38 21.60 27.10 19.08 23.40
No Schooling
(literate) 1.08 0.69 0.70 2.97 0.83 1.25 0.97
Primary 47.39 36.70 42.36 37.22 40.94 32.41 38.92
Secondary 6.67 31.04 23.72 25.81 22.81 31.76 26.43
Passed
SSC/GCE (OL) 1.28 10.23 6.58 11.53 7.24 13.11 8.64
Passed
GCE(AL) 0.00 1.19 0.64 0.79 0.66 1.36 0.88
Undergraduate 0.00 0.21 0.12 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.14
Passed degree 0.00 0.36 0.42 0.18 0.30 0.65 0.34
Other 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.08
Source: Editorial Notes, "Notes and Documents: Human Rights Violations and Ethnic Vio-
lence in Sri Lanka," p. 149.
(a) Zone I: Wet Zone districts with predominantly Sinhalese population, including Colombo
District (excluding the Colombo Municipality), Gampaha, Kalutara, Galle, and Matara dis-
triers; (b) Zone II: Dry Zone districts with predominantly Sinhalese population, including
Hambantota, Moneragala, Amparai, Polonnaruwa, Anuradhapura, and Puttalam districts; (c)
Zone III: Dry Zone districts with predominantly Tamil population, inciudingJaffna, Mannar,
Vavuniya, Trincomalee, and Batticaloa districts; (d) Zone IV: Wet Zone largely highland dis-
tricts with predominantly Sinhalese population but including the estate population ofIndian
Tamils. This region includes Kandy, Matale, Nuwara Eliya, Badulla, Rarnapura, Kegalle, and
Kurunegale districts; (e) Colombo municipality.
compared to Sinhalese districts. The level of educational attainment
among the Tamils was less than that of the low-country Sinhalese, but
slightly better than that of the Kandyan Sinhalese .12
There was, however, no justification for introducing a lower uni-
versity entrance qualifying mark for Sinhalese-medium students seek-
ing admission to certain faculties since no discrepancies were uncov-
ered in the grading standards between media. Even before the
standardization scheme replaced the minimum marks scheme, the
percentage of Tamils in universities had begun to decline because of
the change in the medium of instruction in certain faculties. Sri
Lankan Tamils, who constituted 10 percent of the population, were
overrepresented in 1948 when they held 31 percent of the places in
the university, but this percentage had dropped to less than 16 per-
cent by 1970. 13 By 1970, Sri Lankan Tamils together with Indian
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Tamils were underrepresented in the universities, since they constitut-
ed 21.6 percent of the population, but held only 16 percent of the
places. 14
To the disappointment of some Sinhalese extremists, this new sys-
tem of selecting students to universities did not reduce the number of
Tamils gaining admission to some of the prestigious faculties and
Sinhalese schools in backward rural areas continued to lag behind
urban areas in their ability to assist students to secure entrance to sci-
ence faculties. In order to rectify the disparity existing among Tamil
students, Sinhalese students, urban areas, and rural-backward areas,
many plans involving various combinations of standardization and
district quotas were experimented with between 1973 and 1976. In
1973, the government introduced a new procedure by which univer-
sity admission came to be determined according to standardized
marks for different media, as well as for different subjects. Under this
procedure marks in the two media were reduced to a uniform scale.
The rationale for adopting this scheme was that Tamil students have
adequate opportunities to attend schools that are well equipped to
impart instructions in science courses, and thus it was appropriate to
reduce the marks they score in the General Certificate of Education
Examination (Advanced Level) to a level that corresponds to the
marks they would have scored if they had attended Sinhalese schools
that are poorly equipped and staffed to teach science subjects. The
uniform scale was determined in such a manner that the number of
students qualifying in each medium would be proportional to the
number taking the examination in each medium.
This system appealed to certain sections of the Sinhalese popula-
tion since it dramatically increased the percentage of Sinhalese
entering the faculties of engineering and medicine, but it did not sat-
isfy the Sinhalese politicians who represent the less developed, rural
districts, especially the Kandyan areas. They complained that stu-
dents in these districts did not have the educational facilities to com-
pete with students from urban areas. In order to satisfy this constitu-
ency, the government introduced the District Quota System in 1974
and used it concurrently with the Standardization System introduced
in 1973. Under the District Quota System some seats in the universi-
ties were set aside to be allocated to different districts according to the
percentage of population in each district. The quota was not applied
uniformly to all subjects and more places were allocated for science
subjects.
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The greatest negative impact of all these experiments was felt by
the Tamils rather than by the affluent Sinhalese of the rural and
urban areas. Sinhalese historian C. R. de Silva, commenting on the
impact of standardization and district quota systems on the compara-
tive strength of ethnic communities in universities, states that" eth-
nically there is little doubt that the major blow fell on Ceylon
Tamils."15 The Indian Tamils have not gained by standardization even
though "they have the poorest schooling facilities on the island." 16
The percentage of Tamils entering engineering courses fell from 48.3
percent in 1970 to 16.3 percent in 1974 (see Table 17). Likewise, the
percentage of Tamils admitted to the faculty of medicine declined
from 48 percent in 1970 to 26.2 percent during the same period. On
the whole, admission of Tamil students to science-oriented courses
dropped from 35.5 percent in 1970 to less than 21 percent in 1973.
De Silva also noted that, on the other hand, "the Sinhalese emerged
Table 17. Changes in the Ethnic Composition of Candidates Admitted to the
Different Faculties in Sri Lankan Universities between 1970 and 1983
Physical Medicine Agriculture
Biological and and
Arrs Architecture Engineering Dental Veterinary Law
Sinhalese and Tamils' (percentages)
1970 89.1 69.7 51.7 49.2 39.2 57.7
(6.9) (27.6) (48.3) (48.0) (53.6) (34.6)
1971 89.7 68.0 55.9 51.7 59.4 54.2
(7.0) (28.6) (40.8) (43.0) (34.4) (33.4)
1972 92.7 67.0 62.4 53.7 59.6 85.8
(4.7) (31.2) (34.7) (41.8) (38.5) (10.2)
1973 91.8 73.1 73.1 57.5 54.9 77.3
(5.9) (23.6) (24.4) (38.4) (42.2) (18.1)
1974 86.0 75.1 78.8 69.9 80.9 .
(10.0) (22.0) (16.3) (26.2) (15.2)
1981 82.8 63.5< 67.2 72.7d 73.0
(13.3) (31.8) (28.1) (23.1) (16.2)
1983 77.1 73.4< 66.4 72.8d 78.1
(16.4) (23.1) (28.1) (22.1) (11.5)
Source: C. R. de Silva, "The Impact of Nationalism on Education: The Schools Take-Over
(1961) and rhe Universiry Admissions Crisis 1970-1975," in Michael Roberrs, ed., Collective
Identities, Nationalism. andProtests in Modern Sri Lanka, pp. 494-495; Editorial Nores,
"Notes and Documents: Human Rights Violations in Sri Lanka," p. 146.
'Percentage of Tamils in each category presented wirhin parentheses.
bThe values for law and arts are combined.
'This only applies to physical sciences.
dThis only applies to medicine.
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as the main beneficiaries. Their share of admissions to science-based
faculties rose from 75.4 percent in 1974 and to over 80 percent (esti-
mate) in 1975."17 On the other hand, Tamil students' share of admis-
sions to the science-based faculties fell from 35 percent in 1970 to
19.3 percent in 1983, whereas the total share of Sinhalese admissions
was at 75 percent in the same year. The Sinhalese share of admissions
in the fields of physical sciences, biological sciences, engineering,
medicine, and law was 73.4, 70.3, 66.4, 72.8, and 75 percent,
respectively, in 1983. 18 Thus the popularly held notion that Tamils on
the average account for 50 percent of all students admitted to the
faculties of science, engineering, medicine and law is not true; Sinha-
lese have always had at least 60 percent of the university admissions in
these fields and in recent years their representation in these fields has
approached and even surpassed their proportion of the population at
large in Sri Lanka.
Until 1974, Tamil undergraduates were educated on the two cam-
puses of the national university, one in Colombo and the other in
Peradeniya. Sinhalese undergraduates were also educated at this
national university, as well as at two other institutions of higher learn-
ing that were elevated from the position of Buddhist seminaries into
Vidyodaya and Vidyalankara universities in the late 1950s. There
was, however, more competition from students to enter the national
university because it offered undergraduate education in all the sci-
ences and professional fields. Since the university could not accom-
modate all the students who qualified in the General Certificate of
Education (Advanced Level) examinations, admission was based on
an open competitive examination. Both Sinhalese and Tamil students
competed with each other for the limited places in the university. As
long as the procedure for admitting students to the national univer-
sity was based on open competition, Tamil students had no problems
filling a large number of the allotted places in the different fields of
study, except in the arts. With the introduction of the Standardiza-
tion and the District Quota systems, large numbers of deserving
Tamil students were intentionally kept out.
By 1974, Sinhalese leaders became aware that the introduction of
the Standardization and District Quota systems had alienated the
Tamil community as a whole and that there was an urgent need to
appease them. One way was to establish a campus of the University of
Ceylon in]affna, which they had demanded since the 1960s, so that
more Tamils could gain admission to the university. Therefore, after a
EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
period of rapid decline in the number of students admitted to profes-
sional fields in universities, there was a slight improvement in the
proportion of Tamils entering engineering, science, and medical
courses after the establishment of a makeshift ]affna Campus in
1974. Tamil students were gradually squeezed out of the main cam-
puses where facilities for studying in the professional fields were
excellent.
The standardization scheme was modified in 1976, when it was
decided that 70 percent of students would be chosen on the basis of
their marks and 30 percent on the basis of district quotas. The gov-
ernment eventually abolished the system of standardizing marks for
admission to universities, but a comparison of the figures for 1974
and 1983 suggest that the percentage of Tamils admitted to the engi-
neering faculty has improved while the percentage of students
selected to the faculty of medicine continues to decline. 19 The num-
ber of Sinhalese students entering the faculties of engineering and
medicine has increased since the middle 1970s when additional cam-
puses were established. Moreover, "the damage done by discrimina-
tory measures against the minorities is considerable and suspicion
between the Sinhalese and the Tamils is unlikely to die away even if
the university admissions issue is resolved to the satisfaction of both
parties."20 The system of "standardization" with its district quotas is
considered by the Tamils to be one of the most discriminatory of the
regulations designed to restrict the educational opportunities of the
Tamil community, a community that places a high premium on edu-
cation. It was the issue of university admissions, more than any ot~er
factor, that compelled unemployed and educated Tamil youths to
clamor for the establishment of a separate Tamil state.
Discrimination in Employment
While regulations dealing with the standardization of marks were
intended to trim the competitive advantage Tamil students had with
regard to university admissions, the Sinhala only legislation by
requiring a knowledge of Sinhala among the qualifications for vari-
ous jobs eliminated Tamil competition on a larger scale because the
administrative regulations of the Act that stipulated that children
must be educated in the language of the parents was "in practice a
denial of Sinhala media education to Tamils."21 Students who were
educated in the Tamil medium were denied access to public service
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jobs, and unemployment among the GCE Ordinary Level Certificate
holders was at a deplorable state in the late 1960s. High unemploy-
ment, however, was not limited to Tamil youths, since as many as
80.2 percent of those who had passed the GCE Ordinary Level exami-
nation and 96.3 percent of those who had passed the GCE Advanced
Level examination in Sri Lanka were unemployed in the middle
1970s.22 The unemployment rate among Tamil males who had suc-
cessfully passed the GCE Advanced Level was as high as 41 percent,
while it was only 29 percent for Sinhalese males in 1983, according to
the Labor Force and Socia-Economic Survey published by the Minis-
try of Plan Implementation and the Department of Census and Sta-
tistics. 23
The language regulations further aggravated the problem of
unemployment among the Tamils, especially because a significantly
higher percentage of Tamil youths had passed the GCE Ordinary
Level examination in comparison to Sinhalese youths by 1979 (see
Table 15). Discriminatory laws and regulations had already reduced
the number of Tamils employed in government services. Prior to
independence, 30 percent of those employed in the government ser-
vice in Sri Lanka were Tamils, but by 1975 the figure had dipped to
nearly 6 percent. 24 It is true that Sinhala governments may have been
justified in reducing the number of Tamils holding government jobs
in order to rectify the imbalance in ethnic representation in the pub-
lic service, but this need not have implied that the Tamils should be
virtually shut out from government services and the Sinhalese over-
represented (see Table 18).
The recruitment of Tamils to the administrative service, the teach-
Table 18. Ethnic Representation in Public and Corporation Sector
Employment in 1980
State Sector Public Sector
(corporations excluded) (state and corpotations)
Categoties Sinhalese Tamils Sinhalese Tamils
Professional and Technical 82 12 82 13
Administrative and
Managerial 81 16 83 14
All Categories 84 12 85 11
Source: Department of Census and Statistics and Ministry of Planning Implementa-
tion, Census ofPublic and Corporation Sector Employment, 1980, and Editorial
Notes, "Notes and Documents," pp. 141-142.
•
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ing profession, and the public-sector corporations had also declined
by the 1970s. Among the hundred persons selected for administrative
services in 1973, only four were Tamils and two were Moors (Mus-
lims). Moreover, of the 23,000 persons appointed to the teaching
profession between 1971 and 1974, only 1,867 were Tamils and 2,507
were Moors. 25 According to Satchi Ponnampalam, the recruitment of
1,867 Tamil teachers in this period was not adequate to compensate
for the 3,500 Tamil teachers who would have retired during these
three years. 26 The number of Tamils recruited to the police depart-
ment, the army, and naval forces also declined precipitously; of a
total of 10,000 persons who became members of the armed forces
between 1977 and 1980, only 220 were Tamils (see Table 19).27 Ac-
cording to many Tamils, the government has systematically excluded
Tamils from the armed forces in order to be able to impose its will on
the Tamil people. Atrocities committedby the security forces in the
Ta~~~!:1~~rJIle:P::r~~~~_~f_rnaintainingIawand' ~rder, could)~
,have beef.1._~~C?!dedj(;l.~l:l~stafltial number of the army personnel I
were Tamils. Tamils dominated certairi seCtions of the public secto~ .
-johsm-the-past, particularly in the fields of accountancy and engi-
neering, but this situation has changed in recent years. Indeed, the
figures released by the Department of Census and Statistics and the
Table 19. Tamils' Share of Government ServiceJobs for Selected Years'
Categories (% ) 1956 1965 1970 1980
Administrative Service (a) 30 20 5
Administrative and Managerial (b) 16b
Professional and Technical (c) 60 30 10 12b
Clerical Service (a) 50 30 5
Army, Navy and Police (e) 40 20 4.0
Teachers 10.7
Prima Flour Mill
Plants in Tamil area (d) 19.2
All Categories (b) 12.0b
Source: (a) W. Scharz, Tamils ofSn"Lanka, p. 13; (b) Editorial Notes, "Notes
and Documents," pp. 141-142; (c) Schwarz, TamilsofSn'Lanka, and A.
Sivanandan, "Sri Lanka: Racism and the Politics of Underdevelopment"; (d)
Angelito Peries, "Historical Background to the Genocide of Tamils in Sri Lanka,"
pp. 19-24; (e) Peries, "Historical Background," and Sivanandan, "Sri Lanka."
'Information obtained by combining data from different sources because no sin-
gle source provides data for the whole period, 1956 to 1970.
bThis figure applies merely to state sector but if this was combined with the pub-
lic sector corporations, figures are 13, 14, and 11 percent, respectively.
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Ministry of Plan Implementation indicate that the percentage of
Sinhalese in all categories of employment in the state sector in 1980
was as high as 84 percent compared to 12 percent for the Tamils (see
Table 18).28 The Sinhalese comprise 74 percent of the population but
hold 82 percent of the jobs in professional and technical fields and 83
percent of the jobs in the administrative and managerial categories in
the state and public sectors. The Sri Lankan Tamils, who comprise
12.6 percent of the population, had 13 percent of professional and
technical positions and 14 percent of administrative and managerial
positions in 1980. The 1983 estimates of public sector employment
reveal that while the Sinhalese share of employment in this sector was
85 percent, the Tamil share was only 11 percent. 29 This figure of 11
percent has been drastically reduced since the anti-Tamil riots of
1983.
Discrimination in Public-Sector Employment
Public-sector corporations include a large number of labor-intensive
industries that have been established in various parts of the island
with foreign aid. Although state-run industries were set up during
World War II in Sri Lanka, no large-scale industries were developed in
the Tamil areas prior to 1950. The decision to locate a major industry,
such as the Kankesanthurai cement factory in the Jaffna District, in a
particular region was dictated entirely by the presence of large quan-
tities of the basic raw materials, such as limestone and clay, in close
proximity to each other. Prior to the establishment of the Kankesan-
thurai cement factory in 1950, plywood, leather, ceramic, and glass
factories were opened in Sinhalese areas where abundant supplies of
raw materials are available. Similarly, the Paranthan chemical factory,
which manufactures DDT and caustic soda, was located in the Jaffna
District because there was an urgent need to eradicate malaria before
colonization schemes could be planned in the Dry Zone. This factory,
which became operational in 1955, is ideally situated both in relation
to the supplies of raw material from the salterns at Elephant Pass and
to markets via road and rail. The production of salt at Elephant Pass
became a government-run industry in 1957. Another major industry
established in Tamil areas prior to the 1960s is the paper factory at
Valaichchenai. The reason for locating this industry in the Batticaloa
District was the availability of paddy straw, water, and illuk grass in
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the vicinity of the factory. The only other factory located in pre-
dominantly Tamil areas is the mineral sands factory at Pulmoddai.
Only four state-run industries, excluding the salt operation at Ele-
phant Pass, have been established in predominantly Tamil areas since
independence. These factories were set up during the early days of
independence when the Tamil Congress extended its cooperation to
the government, and G. G. Ponnampalam, a]affna Tamil, was the
Minister of Housing and Industries. All the other government-run
industries have been located in either Sinhalese districts or in Tamil
districts where Sinhalese have been settled in colonization schemes.
In particular, labor intensive sugar cane plantations and sugar cane
factories were established at Kantalai and Gal Oya to provide
employment to the large number of Sinhalese who settled in the dis-
tricts under colonization schemes. Although the productive capacities
of the cement and paper factories have been increased to meet the
growing demand for cement and paper products, these improve-
ments have been accomplished with minimum capital investment
and without having to employ a large number of Tamil workers (see
Table 20).
A comparative analysis of the employment and capital investment
figures on government-run industries for 1965/1966 and 1982 dem-
onstrates that Tamil areas have been discriminated against in the allo-
cation of resources for industrial development. Of the approximately
Table 20. Government-Sponsored Industries in Sri Lanka, 1965-1982
Capital Investment % of % of.
(Millions ofRupees) Total Employment Total
Industry' 1965/1966 1982 (1982) 1965 1982 (1982)
National Milk
Board 14.7 221.4 3.4 1,116 1,738 2.5
Ceylon Oil and
Fats 21.9 165.2 2.6 550 1,083 1.6
Sugara.b 87.1 546.6 8.6 1,104 7,269 10.5
Flour'·b
Milling (11.1) (69.8) (1.0) 63 600 0.9
Salta 2.1 68.6 1.0 953 1,485 2.2
Tobaccob 3.8 30.6 0.4 112 939 1.4
Distilleryb 3.9 104.7 1.6 77 1,919 2.8
Textiles 50.3 465.9 7.3 1,212 8,816 12.8
Wellawatteb
Spinning 73.1 1.1 2,322 3.4
Leather 5.2 44.2 0.6 550 1,070 1.5
continued
1,264 1.9
Employment
1965 1982
Table 20. (continued)
Capital Investment % of
(Millions of Rupees) Total
Industry' 1965/1966 1982 (1982)
Plywood 2.8 170.3 2.6
Timberb 10.1 62.7 1.0
Paper' 29.0 894.9 14.0
Printingb 3.6 79.1 1.2
Chemicals' 12.3 47.8 0.6
Petroleumb 183.2 811.9 12.8
Fertilizer 7.2 2.4 0.3
Tireb 55.0 173.7 2.7
Rubberb (10.7) (47.8) (0.7)
British1Ceylon
Corporation 65.1 1.0
Colombo Gas
and Water 21.8 0.3
Ceylon Oxygen 101.9 1.6
Ceramics 8.1 485.3 7.6
Cement' 61.4 1,117.0 17.6
Mineral Sands' 11.0 169.1 2.7
Mining and
Minerals 121.1 1.9
Steelb 115.9 313.7 4.9
(Endaramulla)
Hardware 15.1 46.5 0.6
Total 725.5 6,406.6 100.0
685
1,228
1,005
92
242
378
90
650
145
324
1,016
600
596
290
13,078
3,547
2,119
4,562
555
543
5,944
975
1,959
(326)
332
389
6,161
6,614
570
2,370
2,305
1,385
68,835
% of
Total
(1982)
5.2
3.1
6.6
0.8
0.7
8.7
1.4
2.8
(0.4)
0.5
0.6
8.9
9.6
0.8
3.4
3.3
2.1
100.0
Source: D. R. Snodgrass, Ceylon: An Export Economy in Transition, pp. 394-396; R. R.
Nyrop et al.. Area Handbook/or Ceylon, pp. 355-363; B. L. C. Johnson and M. LeM.
Scrivenor. Sri Lanka: Land, People andEconomy, pp. 121-128; and Central Bank of Ceylon,
Review o/the Economy (1969). pp. 50-87; (1970). pp. 64-65; (1981). p. 61; (1982). p. 63.
'Located in Tamil areas: one of three cement factories; one of three sugar cane factories. but
located in Sinhalese-dominated Kantalai colonization scheme; the only mineral sands indus-
tries; one of the many salterns; the only chemical industry; the only paper manufacturing fac-
tory; and one of the two flour mills. Excluding the flour mill, all of them were constructed in
the 1950s. Of the approximately 40 major government-sponsored industrial units, only 6 are
located in Tamil-dominated areas. More than 20 were established between 1960 and 1980.
bData for the years 1965/1966 and 1982 are not available and data for other years have been
substituted as follows: Sugar-capital. 1969/1970. and employment. 1966/1967; Flour-
employment. 1967/1968. and capital. 1981; Distillery-capital. 1973, and employment.
1966/1967; Tobacco-capital. 1972; Wellawarre mills-capital. 1981; Timber-capital and
employment. 1968/1969; Printing-capital and employment. 1969/1970; Tire-capital and
employment. 1967/1968; Rubber-capital, 1981. and employment. 1980; Steel-capital and
employment. 1966/1967.
'The capital investment for fertilizer is underestimated according to the information for 1981
and since the capital investment figures for Flour and Rubber are for the year 1981. they are not
included to derive the total investment or the percentages.
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13,000 people who were employed in state industrial enterprises in
1965/1966, more than 3,000 or 23 percent were employed in the five
industries located in predominantly Tamil areas (see Table 20).
Between 1965/1966 and 1982, the number of people employed in
state-run enterprises located in the predominantly Tamil areas in-
creased from 3,000 to only 8,800 or less than 12.8 percent of the
employees in twenty-eight major industries throughout the country.
During the same period, the total number of people employed in
state-run industries rose from approximately 13,000 to 68,835, a
whopping increase of 429 percent. This increase was accomplished
through an investment of Rs. 5.6 billion between 1965/1966 and
1981, with most of the capital investment designated for improving
economic conditions in Sinhalese districts. Not a single labor-inten-
sive industry similar to the textile industries in Veyangoda, Tulhiriya,
Mettegama, Pugoda, and Minneriya was ever planned for the Tamil
districts, even though the ]affna District has the highest level of
unemployment in the country.
Mo!c::~er, capital investmentJ<Limprove the PE~cll!.<=!iv_ecapacities
of existing industri~~_has_be~I1.1imi!_ed_to _thosejndusJri~~_lgcated in ,/
Sinh:tJese-districts. It was this preferential treatment that conr.dbuted
to the meteoric rise of the Puttalam District as the leading producer
of cement in Sri Lanka. This was accomplished by rerouting Murun-
gan clay, which was originally designated for the exclusive use of the
Kankesanthurai factory in ]affna, to the Puttalam factory. The net
result is that in 1982, the productive capacity and production of
cement in Puttalam was 440,000 and 333,555 metric tons, resp~c-
tively. In contrast, the productive capacity and production of the
Kankesanthurai factory in the same year were 298,000 and 225,772
metric tons, respectively, despite the fact that the Kankesanthurai
factory has the better location for cement production.
Even when the advantages for locating an industry in a Tamil dis-
trict were ideal, the government was not necessarily interested in pro-
ceeding with the project. For example, in the 1960s the World Bank
recommended that the Thunukkai-Pooneryn region in the ]affna
District was ideal for establishing a large sugar cane plantation and a
factory. Instead of following up on this recommendation, the govern-
ment expanded the area under sugar cane at less suited sites, particu-
larly at the Walawe Ganga River Basin project. In addition, whenever
new industries were established in Tamil districts, the local popula-
tion was not exclusively selected to work in such enterprises. Special
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mention might be made of the procedure adopted by the Ministry of
Planning and Plan Implementation of selecting workers for the Japa-
nese-financed Pima Flour Mill in Trincomalee. Of the 451 persons
selected to work in this mill, 379 were Sinhalese; Tamils, who consti-
tuted nearly 35 percent of the population of the Trincomalee District,
received only 72 positions. Thus the Sinhalese, who constitute less
than 34 percent of the population of the district, had more than 84
percent of the positions in the mill. It is estimated that of the
189,000 persons selected to work in public-sector corporations during
the period 1956 to 1970, 99 percent were Sinhalese. 30
Discrimination in Private-Sector Employment
Opportunities for the Tamils to find employment in the private sector
are also limited, since industrial enterprises sponsored by foreign aid
have not been established in Tamil districts. Government regulations
prohibit the establishment of certain categories of industries outside
the "Free Trade Zone," which is located around the city of Colombo.
Many successful labor intensive industries were financed and oper-
ated in the Free Trade Zone by Tamils before they were destroyed by
mob violence in 1983. There is no reason why these people, with Free
Trade Zone regulation, could not establish similar enterprises in the
Tamil districts. Transportation links between the Tamil districts and
the rest of the island are adequate to distribute manufactured prod-
ucts from the Tamil districts to the other areas of the island and
abroad. Fish, onions, tobacco, and paprika have been shipped from
the Tamil areas to Sinhalese districts by road and rail without any dif-
ficulty until very recently. Even a large portion of the fish caught off
the coast of the Jaffna Peninsula are trucked to Colombo for export.
Agricultural and manufactured products, however, cannot be export-
ed directly to foreign countries from the Jaffna Peninsula since the
Kankesanthurai Harbor on its northern coast has not been developed
by the government. Whether the decision not to improve the Kanke-
santhurai Harbor was motivated by political reasons is not certain,
but conditions for expanding the fishing industry, as well as market-
oriented industries, would have improved if successive governments
had followed through with the recommendation of the World Bank
to develop the harbor. Instead, it was decided to improve the Trinco-
malee port. Moreover, the improvements at Trincomalee were con-
templated only after it was made certain that large numbers of Sinha-
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lese civilians had been settled and a large contingent of military and ~.
naval personnel had been stationed in the Trincomalee District. )
Since published information on employment in the private sector
is unavailable, the number of people registered with the Employees
Provident Fund (EPF) for two different periods has been used to esti-
mate these figures on a regional basis. 31 Although all the employees
who made at least one contribution to the Employees Provident Fund
have not registered with it, the data presented in Table 21 provide
some indication of the employment opportunities available in the
private sector in different regions. There is clear evidence that
employment opportunities in the private sector are largely confined
to Colombo and its suburban areas where more than 20 percent of
the population is concentrated. Elsewhere, there seems to be a close
relationship between the number of people registered with the EPF
and the population of the districts. Kandy, Kurunegala, Galle, Kalu-
tara, and]affna are the most populated districts, with at least 5.6 per-
cent of the population registered with the EPF in each district. Each
of these populated districts, except]affna, had a share of at least 2.69
percent of all those who were employed in the manufacturing sector
in 1977 (see Table 21). ]affna District's share was only 1.90 percent,
clearly demonstrating that this district has been neglected. The gov-
ernment has not established state-run industries or assisted individu-
alS in establishing private-run industries in the ]affna District since
independence. In 1978, the Northern Province, which is made up of
the districts of]affna, Mannar, Mullaitivu, and Vavuniya, comprised
more than 7 percent of the island's population and yet only 2.4 per-
cent ofall persons employed in manufacturing activities in the pri-
vate sector resided there. Moreover, Vavuniya and Trincomalee dis-
tricts had the lowest percentage of employees in manufacturing for
the year 1977. Employment data for Amparai District have not been
reported, indicating the possibility that its figures are combined with
that of Batticaloa. Thus, it may be seen that employment opportuni-
ties for people living in the predominantly Tamil areas are available
neither in the agricultural sector nor in the industrial sector.
Tamils were, however, successful in trade and businesses that were
established outside the Northern and Eastern provinces. Because of
this fact there is a widely held opinion among the Sinhalese that a
handful of Tamils dominate the private sector of the economy. While
this may not be true, many Tamils from the North had to seek
employment in the private sector, particularly in retail trade, busi-
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Table 21. Number ofEmployees Registered under the Employees Provident Fund on
a District Basis, 1967 and 1977
Manufacturing Population
Manufacturing Nonagricultural % of IotaI % ofTotal
District 1967 1977 1977 1967 1977 1978
Colombo (Municipal
Council area) 198,033 496,796 46.36
Colombo (111,692) 89,363 170,339 69.44 20.92 20.95
Kalutara 4,654 15,012 37,144 2.90 3.51 5.69
Kandy 4,917 11 ,479 59,852 3.06 2.69 9.07
Matale 1,362 4,339 12,234 0.85 1.02 2.49
Nuwara Eliya 368 1,739 15,263 0.23 0.41 3.30
Galle 5,318 12,602 38,865 3.31 2.95 5.74
Matara 1,944 6,036 22,092 1.21 1.41 4.65
]affna 3,058 8,116 24,727 1.90 1.90 5.65
Mannar 127 1,813 3,300 0.08 0.42 0.64
Vavuniya 98 335 2,461 0.06 0.08 0.78
Batticaloa 639 21,554 32,625 0.40 5.05 4.34
Trincomalee 335 723 19,055 0.21 0.17 1.57
Puttalam 12,067 23,367 33,141 7.50 5.47 3.08
Anuradhapura 455 950 8,475 0.28 0.22 3.24
Polonnaruwa 474 916 5,363 0.29 0.21 1.33
Badulla 1,527 3,376 27,689 0.95 0.79 6.29
Ratnapura 585 4,166 19,333 0.36 0.98 5.21
Kegalle 1,007 6,270 22,037 0.63 1.47 5.06
Hambamota 346 1,131 5,620 0.21 0.26 2.74
Kurunegala 9,866 15,844 40,855 6.13 3.71 8.18
Total 160,839 427,164 1,091,913 100.00 100.00 96.18'
Source: Central Bank of Ceylon, Review ofthe Economy, 1969 and 1978.
'Moneragala and Amparai had 1.60 and 2.22 percent of the total population, respectively.
Employment figures were not furnished for these two districts.
ness, and industries, because of limited opportunities at home. Of
course, Tamils would not have been successful in business and trade if
they had not possessed entrepreneurial skills and the willingness to
take risks. A few of them succeeded in establishing large-scale busi-
ness enterprises that had Sinhalese as well as Tamil shareholders and
directors. It is estimated that the percentages of Tamils who held
posts as directors, chairmen, and partners /proprietors in Sri Lankan
commercial companies for the period 1979 to 1981 were 18.62,
20.96, and 20.54 percent, respectively.32 Moreover, many of the
Tamil-owned labor intensive industries that were located in the Free
Trade Zone employed thousands of Sinhalese inhabitants of the
South rather than Tamils from the North, where thousands of educat-
ed youths are unemployed. Outside the capital city of Colombo,
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many Tamils succeeded in establishing retail trade on a minor scale at'
locations where such services were nonexistent; wherever such services
were already available the Tamils competed successfully with Sinha-
lese retail traders. Contrary to the opinion held by some Sinhalese, it
was not the motive of Tamil retailers to exploit and deceive the local !
people. After all, Tamil retailers had conducted business with sinha-I!
lese villagers for more than a century. In the past, they had provided
basic necessities to isolated villages but in recent years they found
themselves branded as exploiters. Many of these Tamil retailers,
businessmen, and industrialists have been forced, under tragic cirt
cumstances, to flee to the North. The predominantly Tamil areas,
however, can no longer absorb the influx of more people because ec6-
nomic development of these areas has been deliberately neglected by
the government.
Economic Development in Tamil Districts
Once Sri Lanka became independent, the government sought to deal
with the problems of unemployment, landlessness, scarcity of food,
and lack of water for irrigating crops through investments in irriga-
tion and Dry Zone development projects. A major aim was to provide
opportunities for local farmers to grow food. Prior to 1977, there were
many restrictions on the importation of food products that would
compete with local products. It was the practice of all governments
since independence to purchase food items from farmers at higher
prices and sell them to the consumers at lower prices through various
guaranteed price schemes.
The open economic policy, which was initiated by the present gov-
ernment in 1977, removed all the restrictions that were imposed by\
successive governments on the imports of agricultural and manufac- )
tured products from foreign countries. This policy has devastated the'
market-oriented farming economy of Tamil districts, especially in the'
]affna Peninsula, where a large section of farming population
depends for its livelihood on the sale of chillies (paprika), onions
(shallots), and tobacco throughout the island. 33 The imposition of
restrictions on the imports of onions and chillies, the introduction of
guaranteed price supports for these crops, and the availability of
cheap credit, as well as storage and marketing facilities, had made Sri
Lanka self-sufficient in onions and chillies from the 1960s. The]affna
region constitutes only a tiny fraction of the island, yet it produces a
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great share of the island's onions and chillies. The Jaffna Peninsula
produced more than 15 percent of the island's chillies although the
area planted with chillies in the peninsula was only 7.8 percent of the
total area devoted to chillie cultivation on the island. By the early
1970s, the Jaffna District produced more than 83 percent of the
island's domestic requirements for onions while the peninsula, which
had 43 percent of the total area devoted to onion cultivation on the
island, produced more than 50 percent of the nation's onion crop.
The successful cultivation of onions and chillies, as well as tobacco,
raised farm income and encouraged farmers to modernize agricul-
ture.
In the late 1970s, when the United National Party governmentj (lifted the ban on the imports of onions and chillies from India, the\ .Ieconomic prosperity enjoyed by the Jaffna farmers began to crumble.
Farmers were forced to cut onion production drastically because the
government imported large quantities of onions in order to establish
a buffer stock of cheaper onions. These cheaper onions were sold in
the South during the off-season when the price ofJaffna onions was
high. The buffer stock program and import practices resulted in tem-
porary shortages, temporary gluts, and spoilage of large quantities of
onions from time to time. Tamil farmers considered this import pol-
icy to be deliberately designed to discriminate against them. They
believe that the government is apathetic to the needs of the northern
farmers and that the import policy is one more discriminatory mea-
sure designed to stifle the economic development ofTamil areas.
Agricultural development involving the expansion of the acreage
under irrigation, improving crop yields by modernizing agriculture,
and assisting farmers to market their crops under favorable guaran-
teed price schemes can ameliorate only some of the agrarian problems
of landlessness, small holdings, unreliable income, and unemploy-
ment in rural parts of the Tamil districts. Agriculture alone cannot
absorb all of the unemployed in the rural areas nor can it raise the
standard of living of the people substantially. Nonagricultural re-
sources will have to be tapped and labor intensive industries estab-
lished in Tamil areas with adequate facilities to market finished prod-
ucts if the situation is to be improved. Unfortunately, the region lacks
most of the minerals essential for the development of heavy indus-
tries. The only minerals found in large quantities in the Jaffna region
suitable for industrial use are limestone, which became the basis for
the establishment of the first cement factory on the island at Kanke-
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santhurai, and salt. Although the industries in the ]affna District for
producing cement, salt, and chemicals, including the production of
fertilizer at the Paranthan chemical factory, could have been expand-
ed, no government since their inception in the 1950s has been willing
to invest large capital to accomplish this. The cement factory at
Kankesanthurai employed approximately 1,500 in 1980, an increase
of less than 500 employees since 1965 (see Table 20). The saltern at
Elephant Pass employed, at most, 500 persons per year. The Paran-
than chemical factory employed 543 persons, an increase of 300 since
1965. Since the 1950s, however, no other major industries have been
established in the region. In 1965, these three industries employed
11 percent of all those working in government-sponsored industries
on the island, but by 1982 this figure had plunged to 3.6 percent. In
1982, government-sponsored textile industries in various parts of the
country, including the spinning mill at Wellawatte in the Colombo
District, employed more than 11,135 workers, but the ]affna region
did not have any such labor-intensive industries. It is true there are
several privately owned handloom and powerloom centers in the
region producing high-quality textiles, but most of these are oper-
ated on a small scale for the local market with minimum capital. Gar-
ment manufacturing at the Layden Mill in ]affna town employed
approximately 300 people in 1980. Most of the industries are small-
scale operations employing few workers.
Small- and large-scale industries could playa vital role in reducing
unemployment in the Jaffna region, if the government would issue
permits to operate them, facilitate the influx of foreign capital into~
the region, develop the Kankesanthurai Harbor to facilitate the trans- \
port of manufactured products to foreign nations and the import of \
raw materials, and provide tax and other incentives to entrepreneurs, \1
as is done in the Free Trade Zone. Many successful labor-intensive
industries were financed and operated in the Free Trade Zone by i
Tamils until they were destroyed by mob violence in 1983; there is no I
reason why these very people cannot establish such industries in the I
northern region to reduce the severe unemployment problem. More- I /
over, many foreign-owned companies would be more than willing to . \
take advantage of the cheap labor, as they have done in Singapore, to
set up labor-intensive industries in the region, iLthe_g?vernment
were willing to permit them. .
'~The prospects fon:leveloping a highly profitable fishing industry in
the region are promising, since the continental shelf around the ]aff-
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na region and on the Pedro Bank provide an ideal environment for
fish breeding: Unfortunately, the fishing community does not have
the funds to purchase large fishing boats, trawlers, and modern nets
to improve the catch. To modernize fishing operations, the Kanke-
santhurai Harbor and other small fishing ports, such as Myliddy and
Point Pedro, will have to be developed and equipped with facilities
to refrigerate fish on a large scale. The government has neglected
these ports, however, and even discouraged the successful operations
of the Ceylon-Norway Development Foundation. At one time, this
privately funded project employed approximately 1,250 persons at
Karainagar and ]affna town to build boats, repair nets, and process
fish. 34 By 1976, this project had become a profitable operation, with
the profits going toward community development in Karainagar.
Unless the government is inclined toward encouraging such privately
funded and government-sponsored projects in the region, the econ-
omy of this part of the country will continue to deteriorate.
The use of the natural resources of the island largely to benefit the
Sinhalese community is a result of the lack of Tamil representation in
decision-making bodies. 35 In 1956, when they were excluded from
the executive branch of government, elected representatives of the
Tamil community lost the ability to secure tangible benefits for their
constituents. Even in parliament, Tamil representatives failed to
secure the support of its members to improve the economic well-
being of the Tamil people. Moreover, the TULF, the only party that
truly represented the Tamil people, and whose members were non-
militant, was proscribed in 1983. This situation is likely to continue
unless substantial administrative, legislative, and fiscal powers are
granted to the Tamil community.
Colonization, Electoral Gerrymandering, and Electoral
Representation
The resettlement of Sinhalese peasants in Tamil areas through coloni-
zation schemes is the issue that Tamil leaders have always insisted
must be resolved before any accord can be reached on other issues.
The colonization policies of Sinhala governments, according to the
Tamils, have been designed to transfer political control of the Tamil
districts to the Sinhalese. The Tamils naturally desire to preserve elec-
toral control over their districts in order to safeguard their language,
preserve their culture, live and move freely without apprehension,
and improve the depressed state of the regional economy.
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Colonization schemes that brought Sinhalese peasants into Tamil
provinces contributed to an unprecedented growth of population in
these areas during the last three decades. In the years 1953 to 1981
the population growth in the Tamil districts, excluding the ]affna
District, ranged from 145 to 394 percent, whereas the islandwide
population growth was approximately 85 percent during the same
period (see Table 22). The Vavuniya District in the Northern Prov-
ince, which is contiguous to the Sinhalese district of Anuradhapura
and which has been the focus of major colonization and village
expansion projects, recorded a population increase of 394 percent
during the same period. Trincomalee District and the combined dis-
tricts of Amparai and Batticaloa have also been the focus of aggressive
colonization by Sinhalese peasants, and population growth in these
two districts has been as much as 192 and 166 percent, respectively,
during this period. The Sinhalese population in the Eastern Province
increased by 424 percent between 1953 and 1981.
Table 22. Distribution ofEthnic Communities in Predominantly Tamil Districts,
1953-1981
Tamils
Sinhalese
Vavuniya' Moors
Others
Total
Districts
]affna
Mannar
Vavuniya
and
Mullaitivu
Ethnic
Community
Tamils
Sinhalese
Moors
Others
Total
Tamils
Sinhalese
Moors
Others
Total
Tamils
Sinhalese
Moors
Others
Total
Population
increase
1953 1981 1953-1981
477,586 812,247 334,661
5,902 4,615 -1,287
6,394 13,757 7,363
1,967 493 -1,474
491,848 831,112 339,264
28,223 68,178 39,955
2,097 8,710 6,613
10,879 28,464 17,585
2,490 1,558 932
43,689 106,910 63,221
25,913 142,803 116,890
5,934 19,824 13,890
2,844 10,417 7,573
421 372 49
35,112 173,416 138,304
73,133
15,541
6,640
255
95,904
Population
increase (% )
1953-1981
70
-22
115
-75
69
141
315
161
-37
145
451
334
366
12
394
continued
Table 22. (cominued)
Population Population
Ethnic increase increase (% )
Districts Community 1953 1981 1953-1981 1953-1981
Tamils 37,511 93,510 55,999 149
Sinhalese 15,273 86,341 71,068 465
Trincomalee Moors 27,777 74,403 46,626 167
Others 3,357 2,536 -821 -24
Total 87,917 256,790 168,873 192
Tamils 130,377 317,941 187,564 143
Batticaloa Sinhalese 31,107 157,017 125,910 405
and Moors 106,033 240,798 134,765 127
Amparai Others 2,975 3,929 954 32
Total 270,493 719,685 449,192 166
Tamils 238,216
Sinhalese 10,646
Batticaloa' Moors 79,317
Others 2,720
Total 330,899
Tamils 79,725
Sinhalese 146,371
Amparai' Moors 161,481
Others 1,209
Total 388,786
Tamils 531,722 1,023,228 491,506 92
Northern Sinhalese 13,933 33,148 19,215 137
Province Moors 20,117 52,638 32,521 162
Others 4,878 2,423 2,455 50
Total 570,650 1,111,437 540,788 94
Tamils 167,888 411,451 243,563 145
Eastern Sinhalese 46,380 243,358 196,978 425
Province Moors 133,410 315,201 181,791 136
Others 6,332 6,465 133 2
Total 354,010 976,475 622,465 175
Tamils 699,610 1,434,679 735,069 105
Tamil Sinhalese 60,313 276,507 216,193 358
Districts Moors 153,527 367,839 213,912 139
Others 11,210 8,888 -2,322 -21
Total 924,660 2,087,912 1,168,165 127
Source: Robert N. Kearney, Communalism and Language in the Politics olCeylon, p. 8; Edito-
rial Notes, "Notes and Documents: Human Rights Violations and Ethnic Violence in Sri
Lanka," p. 140.
'Vavuniya District was tedtawn to include a portion of Anutadhapura District in 1979 and a
portion of the Vavuniya and Mannar districts were combined to form the Mullaitivu District.
Amparai District was carved out of the Batticaloa District in 1960 and hence the yeat 1953 can-
not be used to determine its ethnic composition.
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In the 1940s, Amparai was a sparsely populated portion of the Bat-
ticaloa District, but the Gal Oya River Basin Development project
and government-sponsored colonization scheme of the 1950s contrib-
uted to the rapid growth of its population. By 1960, the area had
been sufficiently colonized to warrant its status as a separate district.
Its population grew by more than 83 percent between 1963 and 1981
and by as much as 22 percent between 1971 and 1980. To the Tamils,
the state-sponsored colonization of Batticaloa District by Sinhalese
settlers and the subsequent creation of Amparai District were con-
trived by Sinhala governments to weaken the Tamil stronghold in
their traditional homeland. Sinhalese colonization of the Batticaloa
District contributed to communal tension, and it is no surprise that
Amparai District witnessed the first of the many communal distur-
bances that have plagued Sri Lanka since 1958. Amparai, Batticaloa,
Mannar, and Trincomalee districts, which are targeted for Sinhalese
colonization, registered the highest population increases between
1971-1981. During the same period, the overall increase for the
island was 17 percent; the districts of Amparai, Batticaloa, Mannar,
Trincomalee, and Vavuniya registered increases as high as 42.6, 28.9,
44.3, 36.4, and 59.3 percent, respectively.36 The overall population
of the combined Northern and Eastern provinces grew by 126 percent
between 1953 and 1981, whereas the Sinhalese population increased
by 358 percent; the Tamil population grew by 105 percent (see Ta-
ble 22).
This resettlement of Sinhalese peasants in Tamil areas has drasti~
cally altered the ethnic composition of the Tamil districts; at least
165,670 Sinhalese were added to the population of the Northern and
Eastern provinces in fewer than thirty years (see Table 8). This j
explains why the Sinhalese population increased dramatically from..
fewer than 46,500 in 1953 to as many as 243,000 in 1981, an increas~
of 424 percent. In contrast, the Tamil and Moor populations in-
creased by only 145 and 136 percent, respectively, during the same
period. Trincomalee District witnessed the highest level of growth for
the Sinhalese population, due exclusively to colonization. The Sinha-
lese population in this district was approximately 15,270 in 1953, but
by 1981 it had swelled to 86,280, an increase of 465 percent. In terms
of actual numbers, Amparai District has the largest number of Sinha-
lese; the size of the Tamil population is only half that of the Sinha-
lese.
State-sponsored colonization schemes and gerrymandering have
CHAPTER 4
resulted in more political leverage for the Sinhalese living in some
\
Tamil districts (see Table 23 and Figure 7). Sinhala governments have
/ often redrawn and altered the size of districts in Tamil areas in orderJ to facilitate greater representation of Sinhalese in the legislature. The
\ size and number of districts in the Northern Province have been
\ modified by gerrymandering, and Tamils are fearful they will soon
\ become a minority in their own homeland. In order to create the
\ Mullaitivu and Vavuniya districts, the combined area of ]affna and
Mannar was reduced from 4,920.32 to 4,074.6 square kilometers, a
decrease of 845.72 square kilometers. In contrast, the combined size
of Vavuniya and Mullaitivu districts has increased from 3,664.64 to
4611.3 square kilometers, an increase of 946.66 square kilometers.
Table 23. Ethnic Distribution and Parliamentary Representation in Sri Lanka,
1946-1977"
Year
1946
1953
1971
1977
Ethnic % of Elected
Communityb Population Total M.P.'s Weightage
Sinhalese 4,621,507 69.2 68 71.0%
Tamils 1,514,320 17.3 20 21.0%
Muslims 408,823 6.2 6 6.3%
Total 6,658,339 95 (Burghers 1)
Sinhalese 5,616,705 69.3 75 78.0%
Tamils 1,818,801 22.9 13 13 .6f\J
Muslims 511,425 6.3 6 6.3%
To.tal 8,097,895 95 (Burghers 1)
Sinhalese 9,146,679 71.9 123 81.0%
Tamils 2,611,935 20.5 19 12.5%
Muslims 853,707 6.7 8 5.3%
Total 12,711,143 151 (Burghers 1)
Sinhalese 10,204,000 73,30 137 81.5%
Tamils 2,644,000 19.00 21 12.5%
Muslims 983,000 7.00 10 5.9%
Totalb 14,850,000 168
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical Pocket Book ofthe Democratic Socialist
Republic ofSri Lanka, 1981, 1982, 1983, and 1984; Robert N. Kearney, The Politics ofCeylon
(Sri Lanka), p. 47; Robert N. Kearney, "Politics and Modernization," in T. Fernando and R.
N. Kearney, eds., Modern Sri Lanka: A Society in Transition, pp. 57-81; Satchi Ponnampalam,
Sn' Lanka: National Conflict and the Liberation Struggle, p. 193; Walter Schwarz, The Tamils
ofSn'Lanka, pp. 13-14; Angelito Peries, "Historical Background of Genocide of Thamils in Sri
Lanka," p. 14.
'The United National Party extended the tenure of parliament until 1989 by means of a refer-
endum conducted in 1982.
bIncludes Indian Tamils.
1961
a.
1961
c.
Amparai District
Trincomalee District
1981
b.
1981
d.
~ MOORS (::::::::::1 TAMILS I::::JSINHALESE o OTHERS
Figure? Major Commmunities in Amparai and Trincomalee Districts
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This increase was accomplished by annexing portions of the Sinhalese
Nuwaragam Plata North and Hurulu Plata North divisions of the
Anuradhapura District (see Figure 8). The original southern bound-
ary of Vavuniya District was restored in 1980. This annexation trans-
ferred the Padawiya colony from Anuradhapura District to Vavuniya
District and raised the Sinhalese population of the district from 11.4
to 16.6 percent. Likewise, the percentage of Sinhalese residing within
the original boundaries of the Batticaloa District was only 28 percent
of the total population in 1981. In 1960, before the Amparai District
was carved out, Tamils had represented approximately 48 percent of
the population of the Batticaloa District. In 1981, Tamils comprised
only 20 percent of the population of the new Amparai District and
the Sinhalese 37.6 percent. The political leverage of the Sinhalese in
the Eastern Province was further enhanced by the creation of two
electoral districts that correspond to the Assistant Government Agent
divisions where Sinhalese have been settled since the 1950s (see Fig-
ure 1). The Amparai Electoral District and the Seruwila constituency
of the Trincomalee District are represented by Sinhalese members of
parliament. Most of the Sinhalese population of the Trincomalee Dis-
trict is concentrated in the Seruwila Electoral District, which com-
prises the Assistant Government Agent divisions of Seruwila, Goma-
rankadawala, Morawewa, and Kantalai, where most of the Sinhalese
reside.
In providing for electorates to be determined according to area and
population the Soulbury Constitution of 1946 provided for adequate
representation for minorities: one seat for every 1,000 square miles
and one seat for every 75,000 inhabitants. Since twenty-five seats or
26.3 percent of the ninety-five seats in the legislature were allocated
according to area, the minorities of the Northern and Eastern prov-
inces were assigned 8.4 percent of the seats in the House of Represen-
tatives even before the seats were allocated according to population.
The area provision did furnish adequate representation and protec-
tion against majority domination of the legislature until the 1970s.
However, the population of the country almost doubled between
1946 and 1970, and the number of seats in the House of Representa-
tives was accordingly increased to 151. The eight seats that were allo-
cated according to area to the minorities of the Northern and Eastern
provinces account, at the present time, for only 5.3 percent of all the
seats in the legislature. Thus, the strength of the Tamils and the Mus-
lims in the legislature has declined relative to that of the Sinhalese
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(see Table 23). In 1977, the Sri Lankan Tamils and the Indian Tamils,
who accounted for 20.5 percent of the total populatioh of the coun-
try, had only 12.5 percent of the seats in the House of Representa-
tives. On the other hand, the Sinhalese, who accounted for 73.3 per-
cent of the population, were allotted 81 percent of the seats in 1977.
The United National Party, which won 140 out of 168 parliamentary
seats in 1977, extended the tenure of parliament until 1989 by means
of a referendum.
The overrepresentation of the Sinhalese in the legislature is due
partly to the disfranchisement of Tamils of Indian origin. The Indian
Tamils elected seven representatives to the House of Representatives
in 1946, but since 1949 only one has been elected to represent them
in the legislature. They were not represented in the legislature
between 1956 and 1976. In 1977, Indian Tamils constituted more
than 6 percent of the total population but had only one elected repre-
sentative in parliament. Indians have lived and worked in the hill
country for nearly two centuries, but they have been deprived of their
political rights. Yet, the thousands of disfranchised Indians are
counted for purposes of electoral delimitations, so that more Sinha-
lese are elected from the hill country to parliament. Since these mem-
bers of parliament are elected by a Sinhalese electorate they do not
have to represent the interests of the Sri Lankan Indians. The Sri
Lankan Tamils and the Tamils ofIndian origin, as one group, consti-
tuted 18.1 percent of the total population, but had only 12.5 percent
representation in the 1981 legislature. Therefore, while the Sinhalese
comprised 73.98 percent of the total population in 1981, they
enjoyed more than 81.5 percent representation. By denying voting
rights to Indian Tamils, more seats have been created for members of
the Sinhalese community than their population would warrant.
Therefore, it is not surprising that one observer, commenting on the
problems facing the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka, stated that "Cey-
lon, perhaps, is the only country in the world which has given
weightage in representation to the majority community in the legisla-
ture at the expense of the minority."37 Indeed, "the weightage intro-
duced in favor of minority groups was now turned into weightage
'favoring the majority group. It is now possible for one of the major
Sinhalese political parties to ignore the Tamil minority and still win
an absolute majority in parliament."38
CHAPTER 5
The Tamil Move toward Eelam
DURING the nineteenth century, the British abandoned the separate
systems of administration for Tamil and Sinhalese areas that the
Dutch and Portuguese had employed and replaced them with a
highly centralized unified form of government. Under this central-
ized government all decisions relating to the administration of prov-
inces and the allocation of resources for development of rural districts
were concentrated with the bureaucracy in Colombo, the capital of
Sri Lanka. Plans for the economic development of the country were
based upon generalized schemes that were applicable to the island as
a whole, especially to the developed parts of the southwest rather
than to the outlying rural districts. Officials and planners at the
district level, who were knowledgeable of the local problems and
environment, were rarely consulted or trusted when economic devel-
opment plans were prepared for their districts. These practices con-
tributed to the unbalanced development of regions, with most of the
outlying districts lagging behind Colombo and other districts in the
southwest.
When Sri Lanka became independent in 1948, local politicians and
bureaucrats continued to deemphasize the devolution of specific
decision-making powers to governing bodies at the district and pro-
vinciallevels. Sri Lankan politicians and bureaucrats even compelled
the Donoughmore Commission to abandon its recommendation for
the establishment of provincial councils designed to decentralize
administrative functions to provinces in the 1930s. It is also possible
that Sinhalese communal pressure may have influenced the decision
of the Donoughmore Commissioners not to pursue their recommen-
dation on the devolution of administrative functions to provincial
councils. I Apparently, the British were not concerned about develop-
ing backward-rural areas nor genuinely interested in safeguarding the
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rights of the Tamils. The Choksy Commission of 1956 recommended
the establishment of regional councils but the United National Party
was reluctant to carry out the recommendations for fear that it would
turn Sinhalese extremists against them. 2 Had the recommendation of
the commission to devolve specific decision-making functions to
provinces been carried out, many of the controversies over Tamil
rights, colonization, and regional autonomy might have been mini-
mized and even avoided.
Demands for a Tamil Linguistic State within a Federal Union
Tamil demands for decentralization of administration began with the
formation of the Federal Party under the leadership of S.]. V.
Chelvanayakam in 1948. However, the Federal Party had to wait until
the elections of 1956, when it received a clear mandate from the
Tamil people, to devise a strategy for the creation of a semi-autono-
mous Tamil state within the framework of a "Federal Union of Cey-
lon." Indeed, the Federal Party would have limited its demands to
the devolution of specific administrative functions to the Northern
and Eastern provinces had the problems facing the Tamils been lim-
ited to discrimination in employment and in the allocation of
resources for the economic development of Tamil areas. However,
with the enactment of the Sinhala only legislation, plus state-spon-
sored Sinhalese colonization of Tamil districts, the Federal Party
demanded the establishment of a Tamil linguistic state to be called
"Thamil Arasu" within a federal union.
For Tamils, the desire to use their mother tongue for administrative
purposes does not merely reflect their political sentiment but also
indicates their linguistic competence. For over three centuries, when
Sri Lanka was under British, Dutch, and Portuguese rule, more than
90 percent of the Tamil population three years and older were at the
mercy of a few unscrupulous translators and others who were profi-
cient in Portuguese, Dutch, and English to communicate with the
government. Only a very small percentage of the population was pro-
ficient in these languages and thus able to work for their colonial
masters. There is little doubt that Tamils were eager to become free
from British domination; they wanted to educate their children and
to communicate with the government in their mother tongue. To
their disappointment, Sinhala was made the only official language of
independent Sri Lanka and the Tamils continued to be aliens in their
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own land. Within ten years of independence, Tamils were debarred
from using their mother tongue to secure employment and their
leaders were largely excluded from the executive branch of govern-
ment. They were denied funds to develop the economy of their dis-
tricts and were deprived of their right to preserve their traditional
homeland. To demonstrate their disapproval of discriminatory laws,
they staged peaceful demonstrations, some of which were ignored
while others were broken up by security forces. Indeed, since 1958
Tamils have been verbally threatened by Sinhalese extremists and, on
occasion, targets ofmob violence.
When the Tamils failed to secure any political concessions from \,
Sinhala governments, they began to de~and the establishment of a \1
federal system of government. They claImed that a federal system of I'
government would safeguard their language, preserve their tradi-
tional homeland, and permit them to live peacefully with the Sinha- I
lese in a united Sri Lanka. Federalism, according to some Tamils, is I
the only solution to the ethnic problem. As they see it, Sri Lanka!
"can either become the Switzerland of the East-by following the'
middle path of negotiation, conciliation, and goodwill-or the Leba-
non of South Asia... ."3 They were prepared to accept a federal sys-\
tem of government with Sinhala as the official language but in which \ /
Tamil would be the language of administration and the medium of l 1/
instruction in the Northern and Eastern provinces. A federal system
of government, according to the Tamil federalists, would ensure
employment opportunities for Tamil-speaking people in Tamil dis-
tricts while at the same time exclude those Tamils who are not compe-
tent in the Sinhala language from securing employment in Sinhalese-
dominated areas and in the central government. A federal system of
government also appealed to the Tamils because it would deter the
planned colonization of Tamil areas by Sinhalese.
Sinhalese extremists are, however, opposed to the granting of
regional autonomy to Tamil areas because they_ct~imjLwouldJay_the
fou~~Q.n-£or-the-revivaLofthe_'faIl1iLkiQg~.9~ of precolgp.:i~J~jf-Il.es.
They believe it would pave the way for complete-independence,
although this claim cannot be substantiated with actual facts.
Regional problems associated with multilinguistic societies have been
solved by establishing a federal form of government in such large
countries as Canada and in small countries such as Switzerland.
Indeed, federal systems of government in these countries have served
to allay the fears of minorities, averted national disintegration, and
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contributed to economic prosperity. To assure the Sinhalese that the
Tamils will remain an integral part of Sri Lankan society, the Federal
Party emphasized that the decision-making powers of the governing
body in the Tamil state would be limited to lands, agriculture, fisher-
'f ies, i~dustrie.s, education,. and health. Federalists have always stressed
J' that If the nghts of Taml1s were guaranteed, they would cooperate, I with the Sinhalese to develop a strong national economy. Such good-I will, they claim, could not be secured without the establishment of a
I federal system of government that would guarantee the Tamils the
use of their language for administrative purposes, preserve their cul-
ture, provide employment opportunities for Tamils, and develop the
Tamil areas according to the economic needs of the inhabitants with-
out interference from the Sinhala government. 4 Federalists did not
demand political independence but they had wanted some measure
~~independen~--------------------------------
There is no substance to Sinhalese claims that Tamils would seek
foreign assistance to subjugate the Sinhalese once regional autonomy
is granted under a federal set-up, since defense, foreign affairs, cur-
rency, transportation, and other essential services related to national
security would be under the control of the central government.
Instead of educating the public on the merits of federalism for multi-
linguistic societies, Sinhalese leaders criticized Tamil demands as a
ploy to create a separate state for them in the North. Even Tamil
leaders did not educate the Tamil electorate on the concept of federal-
ism, and many Tamils equated the decentralization of specific deci-
sion-making power to the Tamil provinces with the establishment of a
Tamil kingdom or Thamil Arasu, which was the name of the Federal
Party. Nevertheless, if the federalists had been serious about estab-
lishing an independent sovereign state for the Tamils, they would not
have persisted in negotiating with Sinhalese leaders on issues pertain-
ing to decentralization of administration to provincial councils.
Indeed, Tamil leaders have consistently expressed their willingness to
negotiate with governments to settle this ethnic problem to the
mutual benefit of both communities. Some Sinhalese politicians,
however, have been less willing to negotiate with the Tamil leadership
on the ethnic issue than to ..educate" the Sinhalese masses about the
wrong reasons why regional autonomy should not be granted to
Tamils. They have not communicated to the Sinhalese masses that the
sharing of governmental power by authorities at the provincial level,
under a federal system of government, would be limited to specific
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functions involving regional or rural development. Instead, they
have, for their own political reasons, manipulated the regional auton-
omy issue and obstructed the government from granting even mini-
mum concessions to the Tamils.
Regional Councils as an Alternative to Federalism
One of the most significant political concessions ever offered to the
Tamils came in 1957 when Prime Minister Bandaranaike and Federal
Party leader Chelvanayakam signed the Bandaranaike-Chelvanaya-\
kam Pact (see Appendix 1).5 In negotiating this settlement the feder-
alists departed from their original plan for the creation of a semi- ii
autonomous linguistic state within a federal union, while the Sinhala r
government granted limited concessions to Tamils on the sensitive I
issue of colonization of Tamil districts. Tamils consider the coloniza- i
tion issue to be the most serious of the problems facing them, since j
maintaining their traditional homeland is a prerequisite for the pres-
ervation of the Tamil language, for providing employment oppor-
tunities to Tamils, and for Tamils to live without fear in their own
land. The Tamil federalists also sought concessions for Tamils in
Sinhala areas, while being aware that Sinhala was the the only official
language of Sri Lanka. They were satisfied that Tamil was to be made
the language of administration in the Northern and Eastern prov-
inces. It was already apparent that the federalists were no longer
demanding that Tamil should have parity of status with Sinhala as an
official language as long as Tamil was recognized as the language of a
national minority. Federalists had insisted all along that Tamil should
have the official status of a national language.
The main provisions of the pact were:
(a) Tamil should be recognized as the language of a national
minority.
(b) Tamil should be the language of administration in the North-
ern and Eastern provinces while Sinhala would continue as the only
official language of Sri Lanka, including the Northern and Eastern
provInces.
(c) The Northern Province would form one single region and be
served by one regional council while the Eastern Province should be
divided into two or more regional council areas with prior approval of
parliament.
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(d) Two or more council regions could amalgamate even across pro-
vincial boundaries or one region could divide itself. "Regions could
collaborate for common purposes" with prior approval of parliament.
(e) Council members would be elected directly by the people of
the respective council areas. Electorates would be carved out by a
Delimitation Commission.
(f) Regional councils would have authority over agriculture, lands,
and land development, colonization, education, social services, fish-
eries, roads, electricity, and cooperatives. The council could not initi-
ate major laws but would have the powers to make by-laws, similar to
those granted to municipal councils.
(g) Regional councils would have the power to select those allotted
to colonization schemes and also to appoint personnel to direct these
projects.
(h) Block grants would be allotted to regional councils by the cen-
tral government based upon an agreed formula. The regional coun-
cils would have the financial powers of taxation.
The provisions of the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact were a
marked departure from the concessions the federalists had demanded
from the government on the issues of language and colonization.
Foregoing their original position, they dropped their demands for
parity of status for Sinhala and Tamil throughout the island. Instead,
Tamil would be used for administration in the Northern and Eastern
provinces, provided this did not conflict with the"Sinhala only" pro-
vision. They also accepted the status of Tamil "as a language of a
national minority" instead of insisting upon the status of "national
language." The Federal Party's proposal that Tamil provinces should
have substantial legislative powers was dropped and instead substan-
tial administrative powers were to be granted to regional councils.
Although Sinhalese colonization of Tamil areas would be minimized
under the proposed agreement, it would still be under the direct con-
trol of the Land Ministry in Colombo. The federalists thus sacrificed
many of their original demands for the sake of reaching an honorable
settlement with Sinhalese leaders.
The agreement was never enacted into law because of pressure
from both Sinhalese extremists and the United National Party, which
accused Bandaranaike of attempting to divide the country on a racial
basis. It became apparent, once again, that Sinhalese politicians were
willing to manipulate the ethnic issue at the risk of endangering the
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political stability of the country and its national unity, as long as it
contributed to the political advantage of the party they represented.
Contrary to Sinhalese claims, the proposed regional councils were
merely glorified municipal councils and would not have had any
powers to make laws or to contribute to the reestablishment of the
Tamil kingdom in the North. Since the signing of the Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam Pact in 1957, no other Sinhalese government has
offered the Tamils concessions that included the provisions set out in
the pact, and the Tamils, for their part, have been unwilling to accept
any agreement that does not incorporate its major provisions, espe-
cially that of the regional councils.
Between 1960 and 1977, no significant progress was made toward
devolution of administrative power to the provinces. Sinhalese
leaders were reluctant to consider decentralization of administrative
functions to governmental bodies at the provincial or regional levels.
Instead, most of the subsequent discussions on devolution of admin-
istrative functions were restricted to district councils rather than
regional councils. Srimavo Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party
government (1960-1965), Dudley Senanayake's National Govern-
ment (1965-1970), and Srimavo Bandaranaike's United Front (1970-
1977) were all unwilling to revive the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam
Pact as a means of devolving minimum administrative functions to
governing bodies at the district level (see Appendix I).
Demands for an Independent, Sovereign State
S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike's government had granted some conces-
sions to the Tamils in 1958 regarding the use of their language for
administrative purposes in the Northern and Eastern provinces,
according to the provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions)
Act No. 28. 6 These language concessions were, however, modified or
ignored when Mrs. Bandaranaike's Sri Lanka Freedom Party enforced
new regulations making Sinhala both the official language and the
language of administration in the Tamil provinces. When the SLFP
was defeated in the general elections of 1965, the coalition National
Government was successful in enacting appropriate regulations for
the use of Tamil for administrative purposes and as a medium of
instruction in the Northern and Eastern provinces, according to the
provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regulations,
1966 (see Appendix III).7 No progress was made, however, toward
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resolving the issues of economic development in Tamil areas, cessa-
tion of colonization in Tamil areas, and devolution of administrative
power to district councils.
The Tamils suffered a major setback to the progress they had made
toward securing language concessions from the National Government
when Srimavo Bandaranaike's United Front came to power. The
United Front introduced the new constitution of 1972, which reaf-
,j firmed the position of Sinhala as the only official language of Sri
Lanka without making any reference to the status of Tamil as a
national language or as the language of administration in the North-
ern and Eastern provinces. The new constitution did not incorporate
any safeguards guaranteeing the rights of minorities. It not only
became difficult for Tamils to administer the Northern and Eastern
provinces in Tamil, but they also found it increasingly unsafe to live
in the Sinhalese-dominated South. By the mid-1970s, the Tamils had
lost confidence in the ability of Sinhala governments to redress their
grievances. In 1976, the Tamil United Liberation Front issued its
manifesto demanding the creation of an independent Tamil state:
... what is the alternative now left to the nation that has lost its rights to
its language, rights to its citizenship, rights to its religion and continues
day by day to lose its traditional homeland to Sinhalese colonization?
What is the alternative now left to a nation that has lost its opportunities
to higher education through "standardisation" and its equality of oppor-
tunities in the sphere of employment? What is the alternative to a nation
that lies helpless as it is being assaulted, looted and killed by hooligans
instigated by the ruling race and by the security forces of the state? Where
else is an alternative to the Tamil nation that gropes in the dark for its
identity and finds itself driven to the brink of devastation?
There is only one alternative and that is to proclaim with the stamp of
finality and fortitude that we alone shall rule over our land our forefathers
ruled.... Hence the TULF seeks in the General Elections the mandate
to the Tamil nation to establish an independent, sovereign, secular,
socialist state of Tamil Eelam that includes all the geographically contigu-
ous areas that have been the traditional homeland of the Tamil-speaking
people in the country. 8
The TULF manifesto also stated that Eelam would be ultimately
established "either-bypeacefuLmeans orby.direct action or struggle."
Despite this v;w TULF members, for the most part, continued-to-
negotiate with the government in hopes of finding a solution to the
ethnic problem. In all of these negotiations TULF members claimed
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that Sinhala governments had deliberately neglected the economic
development of the Tamil-majority areas. They stressed that the gov-
ernments had ignored Tamil demands for a greater share of the
national growth and that Tamil districts, particularly ]affna, have
consistently lagged behind many Sinhalese districts in the amount of
capital invested in large-scale development projects. The TULF main-
tained its willingness to negotiate with the government on the issue
of decentralization of administrative and legislative functions to
regional councils even after the 1977 parliamentary elections when
the UNP was returned to power and TULF candidates enjoyed a huge
victory that demonstrated the extent to which the Tamil community
supported its demands. TULF members stressed that in order to
achieve a more balanced regional development of the island, the
national government should be willing to decentralize specific deci-
sion-making functions to provincial governments.
The Integrated Rural (District) Development Program of 1976
Since 1957, successive governments have failed to introduce appro-
priate legislation to decentralize administrative functions to provinces
or districts in order to encourage them to initiate development proj-
ects. However, Mrs. Bandaranaike's United Front government initiat-
ed the Integrated Rural (District) Development Program (lRDP) of
1976 "in an attempt towards the achievement of a more balanced
regional development in Sri Lanka."9 Programs and projects initiated
under IRDP have been vigorously pursued by_the United National
Party go-Ve.rnment because the World Bank and other international
fUnding agencies will grant loans for projects involving rural develop-
mentschemes as long as there is some measure of decentralization of
administrative functions to districts. The IRDP did not, however,
involve any decentralization of administrative functions to districts as
envisaged by Tamil1eaders. Tamil leaders had hoped that many of the
rural districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces could be devel-
oped by the establishment of district councils, especially when rural
development plans can be initiated at the district level, bur the
United Front and the UNP governments had refused to accept Tamil
proposals. Instead, the UNP government adopted the IRDP to
develop rural districts. It was disappointing to the Tamils to know
that while the United Front and the UNP governments were reluctant
to decentralize administrative functions to regional councils, they
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devised alternative plans to develop rural districts, although such
plans did not originate at the regional level.
The UNP government is required to follow the guidelines set by
the World Bank and other international funding agencies in order to
finance rural development projects under the Integrated Rural Devel-
opment Program. The IRDP permits planners, administrators, and
members of parliament at the district and provincial levels, who are
better informed than the bureaucrats at the national level, to identify
the specific problems facing their areas and to devise appropriate
strategies to solve them. 10 Decentralization of administrative func-
tions to local bodies is deemed a prerequisite for the success of rural
development projects, and the government accomplished this by
establishing a "decentralized budget, the appointment of district
Political Authorities, followed by the appointment of District Minis-
ters," and by enhancing the "role played by Members of Parliament
in Government's administrative and development activities at the
district level."ll Indeed, the Sri Lankan government would not expect
to receive financial support from outside funding agencies for its rural
development projects without having devised appropriate adminis-
trative arrangements for elected members of parliament to have some
voice in the development of their respective areas. Even the type of
rural development projects initiated by the government under the
Integrated Rural Development Program are those that the World
Bank and other funding agencies or countries are willing to support
projects that would improve agricultural productivity; increase the
supply of irrigated water for crops; set up processing facilities for agri-
cultural commodities such as canned fruits, vegetables, and fish;
establish small- and medium-scale industries to process edible oils,
manufacture sugar, fertilizer, textiles, small farm implements, and
cement; and improve education, health, and infrastructure in rural
areas. 12 The World Bank, for example, is favorably disposed toward
granting funds for rural development schemes which are designed to
raise productivity of rural farmers. 13 Following the recommendations
of funding agencies, Sri Lankan governments were successful in
r
financing many projects at the district level between 1979 and 1982.
I Since the inception of the IRDP, large sums of capital, most of it in
(
the form of grants from foreign sources, have been invested in the
development of Sinhalese districts. 14 Integrated Rural Development
II Programs were implemented in the Sinhalese districts of Kurunegala(1979), Matara (1979), Hambantota (1979), Nuwara Eliya (1980),
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Matale (1981), Puttalam (1981), and Badulla (1982). The first IRDP
project was implemented in the Kurunegala District in 1979 to
improve its infrastructure, rural electrification, water supply, educa-
tion, and health at a cost of Rs. 465 million. This project is also asso-
ciated with irrigation and water management to improve paddy pro-
duction. Approximately Rs. 200 million for this project was funded
through the International Development Association (IDA) of the
World Bank. Between 1976 and 1981 similar development plans were
initiated for:
(1) Matara District at a total cost of Rs. 75 million from a grant
from the Government of Sweden;
(2) Hambantota District at a total cost of Rs. 147 million from a
grant from the Government of Norway, a project that also involved
the restoration of the Kirama-Oya irrigation scheme;
(3) Nuwara Eliya District at a cost not specified but with funds
committed by the Netherlands government for the preparation of a
rural development program and its implementation;
(4) Puttalam District at a total cost ofRs. 300 million, from a plan
developed and evaluated by the World Bank;
(5) Matale District at an approximate cost of Rs. 780 million, more
than Rs. 250 million of which was provided by the World Bank; and
(6) Badulla District at a cost of Rs. 369.5 million with funds from
IFAD and SIDA. 15
Almost Rs. 2 billion were targeted for developing rural districts
under the IRDP projects during the period 1979 to 1982, yet, no sin-
gle project was implemented in Tamil districts until 1984 when Man-
nar and Vavuniya districts were brought under this program. Indeed,
many IRDP and major river basin projects have been financed from
foreign sources involving large sums of money to improve Sinhalese
districts. It is true that the United States had a water project in Point
Pedro in the ]affna Peninsula, but "the foreign aid utilization in the
]affna District for the period 1977-1982 was almost nil." 16 Therefore,
while the Integrated Rural Development Program has the approval of
the World Bank and other countries that are funneling large sums of
money toward rural development at the district level in Sri Lanka, no
effort was made by the UNP government to improve the depressed
economy of rural districts in Tamil areas, particularly in]affna. Rather
than merely promising to redress the grievances of the Tamils, as
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pledged in its election manifesto of 1976, and even before appoint-
ing a presidential commission to deal with those grievances, the UNP
government should have initiated development projects in Tamil
areas under the IRDP. The)affna District should have been one of the
first districts to be developed under the program, since it is one of the
few districts that has not benefited from agricultural investment pro-
grams since the 1950s.
District Development Councils
The United National Party conceded in 1977 that some of the Tamil
grievances were justified and that appropriate measures would be
adopted to resolve these problems. Based on the recommendations of
the Presidential Commission, appointed in 1979 to inquire into these
grievances, the District Development Councils Act No. 35 was
enacted in September 1980 defining the composition, structure,
powers, and responsibilities of the proposed district councils. 17 Provi-
sions were made to establish one District Development Council
(DDC) in each of the island's twenty-four administrative districts.
The DDCs are composed of: (1) a district minister who is a member
of parliament of the governing party but does not necessarily repre-
sent the people of the district where he serves as minister; (2) mem-
bers elected to the council every four years and members of parlia-
ment of the district (the number of members elected directly to the
council would not normally exceed the number of members of parlia-
ment representing the district); and (3) an executive committee com-
prised of the chairman of the council, the district minister, and two
appointed members selected by the district minister in consultation
with the chairman and with the approval of the president. IS The
chairman of the council will represent the party that receives the
highest number of votes in the district council elections and is there-
fore chosen directly by the people.
The DDC scheme is basically an economic plan intended to end
discriminatory government policies that have blocked the develop-
ment of rural agricultural districts. The law-making functions of the
councils are limited, even though they have the power to prepare
plans for agricultural and industrial development for their respective
districts. The councils also have control over the location of industries
and the selection of workers who are to be employed in major eco-
nomic enterprises. They may collect and levy local taxes according to
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local needs. They exercise control over the planning and maintenance
of schools and provide improved educational opportunities to more
students in rural districts. They are democratically constituted, mem-
bers of the council and their chairmen being elected directly by the
people of the district. The district minister is, however, appointed by
the president and is responsible only to him or her. On paper, specific
administrative functions have been transferred to district govern-
ments so that the people of all twenty-four districts can upgrade their
economy by developing agricultural and industrial projects.
Some consider the legislative and executive functions of the DDCs
as reflecting the" roles of both cabinet and parliament at the central
government level"; 19 and the elected members of the council, the
chairman of the council, and the district minister have powers and
responsibilities that correspond to those performed by the members
of parliament, the prime minister, and the president, respectively.
The structure and associated administrative arrangements of the
DDCs may have been partially intended to satisfy prospective foreign
donors, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World
Bank, which have stressed the need to decentralize specific decision-
making functions to provincial governments in order to develop rural
areas. 20 The DDC plan is the only agreement negotiated between a
Sinhala government and Tamil leaders within the last quarter century
that became law, because the DDCs were not meant to resolve the
language and colonization issues, which were conveniently set aside.
The TULF and the Tamil people hoped that the DDC plan would
solve some of the pressing problems facing them. The TULF believed
that the DDCs would provide a means to deal with the lack of
employment, food, and basic manufactured items in Tamil districts.
Even with their limited administrative functions and restricted
powers the DDCs can, nevertheless, in consultation with the relevant
ministries in Colombo, prepare annual development plans involving
"agriculture, food, land use, settlement, animal husbandry, small
and medium industries, health, education, etc."21 Funds for DDCs
are generated from rates and taxes that are subject to parliamentary
approval. Funds were derived from "fines, proceeds from sales, prop-
erty revenues, funds allocated by parliament (currently fixed at the
number of MPs in a district multiplied by Rs. 2,500,000), separate
grants allocated by the appropriate ministers, loans, donations, and
direct assistance of one kind or another."22 To finance development
projects, the DDCs can raise taxes locally, receive allocations from the
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center, obtain loans within Sri Lanka, and even "negotiate loans
directly with external lenders, with the approval of the Minister of
Finance and Foreign Affairs."23
The establishment of the District Development Councils, as antici-
pated, did not solve the problems of language and colonization; it
was never meant to. The TULF assumed that the constitutional provi-
sions for the use of Tamil as a language of administration in the
Northern and Eastern provinces would also be effectively implement-
ed with the establishment of district councils. To their disappoint-
ment the DDCs did not solve the problems of language, coloniza-
tion, and development of Tamil areas. 24 Using the existing structure
of the administrative districts, both the DDCs and the IRDP were
designed to encourage balanced regional development at the district
level rather than to implement the provisions of the Tamil Language
(Special Provisions) Regulations of 1966 and to halt Sinhalese coloni-
zation ofTamil districts. While it is true that the DDCs are democrat-
ically constituted, this does not mean that the decision-making
authority has been truly devolved to district councils or that develop-
ment plans need not be approved by the relevant ministries. It is
equally true that while the initiation and implementation of develop-
ment plans are at the district level, the council's power to implement
projects can be restricted if there is a lack of funds or if a council's
decision conflicts with that of the district minister. The DDCs could
have been used effectively to develop Tamil districts had the district
ministers and others, who were chosen to administer the DDCs,
cooperated with the chairmen and members of the councils. More-
over, some of the Tamil leaders, who demanded a greater degree of
regional autonomy for Tamil areas, were opposed to their functioning
and did not cooperate with the government to carry out the DDC
plan. A district minister, who was chosen from the ruling party by the
president, was not directly responsible to the people of other districts,
especially of the Tamil districts and often succeeded in blocking any
plans that were contrary to the government's policies or which gave
undue economic advantage to a Tamil district.
In reality the DDC plan is an administrative arrangement designed
to transfer government functions from the central government to the
districts. The district minister has to abide by the decisions of his gov-
erning party on issues relating to colonization and can thus block any
decisions made by the council that might prohibit allottees from
Sinhalese districts from settling in newly developed colonization
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schemes in Tamil districts. The executive committee of a council has
no power to override the wishes of the district minister in case of dis-
agreements because the DDCs Act (No. 35 Part XII) specifies that the
president can dissolve the executive committee if the committee does
not go along with the district minister's wishes. Moreover, the presi-
dent can also dissolve a district council by accusing them of being
incompetent. Even when a district minister goes along with a council
on a controversial project with the prior approval of the line minis-
tries involved, there is always the possibility that the decision will be
overridden by the parliament, the president, or both.
The District Development Council chairman and officials encoun-
tered serious problems in implementing the DDCs. Bruce Matthews,
who interviewed the DDC chairman and the government agent of
]affna District in 1983, indicates that certain powers that were to be
devolved from the ministries of finance, health, and education to the
DDC, as proposed in the DDCs Act, were not transferred. The gov-
ernment agent stated that he did not receive the cooperation of gov-
ernment ministries to administer the district or even to implement
projects vital to the community, such as expanding the]affna General
Hospital. 25 Government ministries and departments have even
blocked the implementation of development projects that were
passed by the chairman and members of the DDCs in Tamil districts.
Thus it is apparent that, while on paper the DDCs were supposed to
devolve governmental powers to districts in order to satisfy Tamil
demands, the chairmen and members of the DDCs were not always
able to implement projects they considered essential to local com-
munities. Instead of cooperating with the members of DDCs, the
ministers were intent on controlling and restricting the powers of the
elected representatives of districts.
The most serious factor limiting the effectiveness of the DDCs was
the lack of financial resources. Funds to administer the DDCs were
limited because, just as the DDCs were being established, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund discovered that the Sri Lankan government
treasury had been spending generously on items quite beyond
agreed-upon limits. In fact, no measures were adopted by the trea-
sury to set aside funds for the new DDC budget. Because there was
little support within the bureaucracy to allocate funds to DDCs,
those funds were cut back sharply. The revenue from local taxes was
insufficient to support local projects, especially when the DDCs were
reluctant to raise local taxes, given the state of the local economy in
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many districts. The funds allocated for old works and new projects for
districts have been small and, "considering the wide range of projects
that the DDCs may wish to engage in, the budget so far has been
completely limited in scope,"26 The government's 1982 allocation for
new works under the district budget for the Jaffna District was
approximately $1 million, and this was too small to bring about sub-
stantial progress toward improving the depressed economy. The
Tamils had hoped that large sums of money would be funneled into
the Tamil districts via the DDCs to develop major irrigation, agricul-
tural, industrial, and road transportation projects. However, very lit-
tle public investment has gone into the Tamil areas. Indeed, the gov-
ernment continued its policy, under the guise of having granted
substantial concessions to Tamils by establishing the DDCs, to reduce
the "once prosperous northern Thmil districts to near destitution and
have convinced more than a few Ceylon Tamils that its real aim is tan-
tamount to genocide,"27
The establishment of District Development Councils did not help
to resolve the ethnic problem and the militant separatists continued
to push for a violent solution. Likewise, the army continued to use
violence against innocent civilians in retaliation for attacks on police
stations, army units, government establishments, and government
informants by militants. This cycle of violence led ultimately to the
trauma of the anti-Tamil 1983 riots, which compelled the govern-
ment to convene an all-party conference onJanuary 10, 1984, to work
out a peaceful settlement to the ethnic conflict. The Indian govern-
ment persuaded members of the TULF to participate in the confer-
ence by convincing them that an acceptable alternative to their
demand for a separate state had been negotiated between Indian and
Sri Lankan officials, as recorded in the document referred to as
Annexure C (see Appendix IV).
Annexure C and the President's Proposals
The TULF found the Annexure C proposals acceptable because they
provided for some regional autonomy for Thmil provinces. As noted
earlier, the proposals also empowered regional councils to have juris-
diction over large areas; to enact laws on specific subjects; to maintain
internal law and order; to administer justice; to undertake social and
economic development; to have control over cultural matters and
land policy; and to collect funds to initiate development projects.
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Because of pressure from Sinhala extremists and opposition parties,
the president did not present the proposals at the all-party conference
as expected, substituting instead a modified version of the 1980 Dis-
trict Development Councils concept, which the TULF rejected. Nego-
tiations went forward despite the TULF rejection, however, and after
nearly eighteen months of talks and continued violence by both sepa-
ratists and security forces, a ceasefire was arranged. The Thimphu
peace talks collapsed because the government failed to present any
new proposals that deviated markedly from the original draft pro-
posals on District Development Councils. In rejecting the govern-
ment's proposals, the TULF reiterated that the Tamil people would
not accept any proposals which do not: (1) recognize a Tamillinguis-
tic region, constituting the Northern and Eastern provinces; (2) grant
regional autonomy to Northern and Eastern provinces; (3) empower
regional bodies in Tamil provinces to enact laws on certain specified
subjects relating to social and economic development and mainte-
nance of law and order; and (4) recognize Tamils as a distinct ethnic
group in Sri Lanka. It is apparent that the TULF and the separatist
groups will agree to a political settlement to the ethnic problem only
if an "acceptable and viable alternative" to a separate state is offered
by the Sri Lankan government.
By January 1986, various Tamil leaders were united in their
demand for the establishment of a federal form of government for Sri
Lanka, in which the Northern and Eastern provinces would be recog-
nized as a Tamil linguistic state within the federal union. It is as
though the Tamils are beginning to take up again their original
demand for the establishment of a federal form of government as
envisaged by S. J. V. Chelvanayakam's Federal Party in the 1950s.
... ARMY CAMPS PRIOR TO JUNE 1987
:A AIRPORT
t: SEAPORT
• MARKET TOWNS
• VILLAGES
-PRINCIPAL ROADS
Figure 9. Jaffna Peninsula
~,------
Epilogue
SINCE this study was completed in December 1985, dramatic changes
have developed in the military strengths and tactics adopted by the
Sri Lankan troops and Tamil militants in the intensifying war, in the
domination of one militant group over the others in the battle for
control of Tamil areas, and in the positions taken by the Sri Lankan
government and Tamil leaders on the questions of defining the pre-
cise powers to be devolved to provincial or regional councils and
identifying the territorial limits of a Tamil linguistic region formed by
the linkage or merger of the Northern Province and a major portion
of the Eastern Province. Following the collapse of the Thimphu talks
and subsequent negotiations, violence was renewed with greater vigor
as the negotiators failed to narrow the gap that existed between the
expectations of Tamil leaders and the proposals submitted by the gov-
ernment.
Both the government and Tamil militants had used the cease-fire
to strengthen their respective military positions and, by the end of
1985, the government was in a much stronger position to launch mil-
itary operations against militants in the Northern and Eastern prov-
inces. The Sri Lankan government had gradually built up its forces in l!
1985 by purchasing new helicopter gunships, light aircraft, gunboats, /'
new armored personnel carriers, small arms, and artillery from Paki-
stan, Israel, and South Africa. Government forces were also trained I
by SAS British mercenaries, the Israeli Secret Service, and Pakistani
military personnel in guerrilla tactics to fight Tamil militants and to }
fly helicopter gunships and light aircraft. Likewise, Tamil militant
groups were well placed to purchase arms in the open market and to
operate training camps in South India. They became better equipped
and trained in the use of surface-to-air missiles and rocket-propelled
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grenades, in the placing of land mines to blow up vehicles transport-
ing army personnel, in the use of remote devices to blow up build-
ings, and in confronting government forces in the open.
At the outset, the government concentrated its military operations
in the Eastern Province, where troops mounted a series of attacks on
Tamil villages in order to flush out militants. The victims were mostly
civilians, many of whom were killed or rendered homeless. Unlike in
the Northern Province, the ethnic composition of the population in
the Eastern Province has been radically altered by more than forty
years of aggressive policy of settling Sinhalese in the predominantly
Tamil areas, particularly in the Assistant Government Agent Divi-
sions (AGA Divisions) of Kantalai, Thampalagamam, Morawewa,
Gomarankadawala, and Seruwila, as well as in the Urban Council
area of Trincomalee in the Trincomalee District. Except for the Kanta-
lai, Seruwila, Gomarankadawala, and Morawewa AGA Divisions,
where the Sinhalese are in the majority, Tamil-speaking people pre-
dominate in all the other AGA Divisions, including the Thampalaga-
mam AGA Division. The region that lies between Seruwila AGA
Division and Kantalai AGA Division and the area that lies within
and around the Trincomalee Urban Council limits have become the
sites of especially fierce battles waged between government troops
and Tamil militants.
Of the 111 army camps distributed in the Northern and Eastern
provinces, 36 are located in the Trincomalee District, with 23 serving
the area around the town and port of Trincomalee. Tamil militants
control the region north and west of the town, where most of the war
of terror and counterterror has been fought with government troops
and Sinhalese home guards. Thousands of Tamils living in the town
of Trincomalee, and in the villages north and west of Trincomalee,
such as Nilaveli, Srimapuram, Kuchchaveli, Kanniya, and Thampa-
lagamam, have been killed and their homes and shops burned since
August 1985. Because there is a greater ethnic mix in many of these
areas, Tamil militants are less entrenched and are vulnerable to
attacks by government troops. In an attempt to regain control of
these areas, the army conducted a ruthless campaign by burning
towns and thereby displacing thousands of Tamil villagers. Tamil mil-
itants, for their part, retaliated by attacking Sinhalese peasant col-
onies and fishing villages in the Eastern Province and thwarted other
efforts by the present government to settle refugees from the pre-
dominantly Sinhalese community, on sites which were vacated by
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Tamils who had fled to the relative safety of refugee camps. Tamil
militants considered these attempts by the government to settle
Sinhalese refugees to be a deliberate attempt to change the ethnic
composition of critical areas in the Eastern Province, so that the
merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces into a single Tamil lin-
guistic province, which the militants insist is required for a political
settlement of the ethnic conflict, can never be achieved. Violence in
the Batticaloa, Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya districts continued
unabated as government forces and home guards attempted to drive
out Tamils from these districts while furnishing protection to Sinha-
lese villages against militant attacks. More than 100,000 Tamils were
rendered homeless in the Northern and Eastern provinces by Septem-
ber 1986 as a result of these military actions. In the Mullaitivu Dis-
trict alone, an estimated 11 ,000 Tamils were housed in eight refugee
camps while twenty-eight refugee camps sheltered as many as 30,000
Tamils in the Eastern Province. In Vavuniya, there were approxi-
mately 3,000 Tamils in six camps, but a large number of Sinhalese
had begun to leave this district for the Anuradhapura area many
months prior to September 1986.
Once the government had accomplished the task of driving out
thousands of Tamil inhabitants from vital areas of the Eastern Prov-
ince through its "search and destroy" operations and was convinced
that it would ultimately win its war against militants in this province,
it launched an attack against the Tamil stronghold in the Northern
Province, particularly the ]affna Peninsula. The tough stand taken
against certain Tamil leaders by the Indian government following the
collapse of the Thimphu talks may have given the green light for the
Sri Lankan government to declare that Tamil demands for the cre-
ation of a single linguistic state were unacceptable and that the gov-
ernment could therefore seek a military solution to the ethnic con-
flict. In March 1986, the government launched an all-out offensive
from the land, air, and sea against militants in the ]affna region. The
aerial bombardments from light aircraft of densely populated Tamil
areas, which resulted in the killing of many civilians, prompted inter-
national condemnation, as well as censure by some members of
human rights and nongovernmental organizations at the 42nd ses-
sion of the United Nations Human Rights Commission held at
Geneva in February and March 1986. India threatened to pull out as
a mediator and its External Affairs Minister even accused the Sri
Lankan government of perpetrating genocide. The Indian govern-
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ment, however, succeeded in convincing the Sri Lankan government
to withdraw its military offensive and set up a time-frame of one
month in which to resume serious negotiations. This involved the
submission of a counterproposal to the proposals presented by the
Tamil United Liberation Movement (TULF) early in 1986. The Sri
Lankan government was also aware that, in order to avoid a reduction
in foreign aid allocations, a peace settlement had to be negotiated
before June of 1986, when a meeting of the country's main aid
donors was to take place.
The Sri Lankan government's counterproposals, which were sub-
mitted in April of 1986, provided for the establishment of separate
provincial councils. These proposals were an improvement over the
previous proposals, which placed more emphasis on the devolution of
administrative functions to district councils and provincial councils,
but the package was not intended to satisfy the militants who had all
along insisted that unless provisions were incorporated that would
recognize the right of self-determination for Tamils and provide for
the establishment of a single Tamil linguistic state that would be
administered by a regional council, they would reject them. TULF
refused to commence direct talks to thrash out its differences with the
government as long as the killing of civilians by government troops
continued unabated. In a public statement to the news media, Mr.
Amirthalingam of the TULF criticized the proposals on grounds that
substantial powers would not be devolved to a Tamil linguistic prov-
ince, which could be formed by merging the Northern and Eastern
provinces. Even before the terms of the proposals were made public,
Tamil militants launched a series of systematic bomb attacks at vari-
ous locations in Colombo, including the explosion aboard the Air
Lanka Tristar which killed foreign tourists for the first time. They also
exploded a bomb at the Central Telegraph Office. These bomb
attacks outside the ]affna region may have been designed to display
their strength and as retaliation for the bombing of the ]affna Penin-
sula in March 1986. Nevertheless, the government used these inci-
dents and the TULF's rejection of its counterproposals as excuses to
resume its major military offensive against the Tamil stronghold in
the]affna Peninsula. The government referred to the bombing of the
national airline as an act of international terrorism and appealed to
Western democracies to assist Sri Lanka in its war against Tamil mili-
tants.
The Sri Lankan government launched its major offensive against
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Tamil militants in the ]affna Peninsula immediately after an episode
of internecine warfare among the Tamil militants in May 1986. In the
power struggle for the control of the ]affna region, the Tamil Eelam
Liberation Organization (TELa) was effectively wiped out by the
LTTE, but this did not imply that the Tamil militant resistance was
psychologically weakened. The LTTE regrouped quickly and de-
ployed the arms seized from the TELa to defend the peninsula
against the three-pronged attack of the army, navy, and air forces.
Army advances into the town of]affna were halted by militants, who
kept up attacks with mortars and rocket-propelled grenades and
mined roads as well. The LTTE was able to repulse the attacks from
land but was helpless in trying to defend the peninsula against aerial
bombardment. In fact, when government troops failed to link up on
land, the government resorted to aerial attacks. After week-long
fierce fighting in which more than a hundred civilians were killed,
government troops were driven back into their barracks. Bombs
dropped from planes damaged the General Hospital, teaching insti-
tutions, and commercial buildings in the densely populated town of
]affna, and shelling from gunboats in the east coast of the peninsula
destroyed fishing villages and rendered many people homeless. Nev-
ertheless, government plans to link up troops stationed in various
camps were foiled and the army continued to be confined to its
camps. Roads leading to these camps continue to be mined and the
armed militants who are dug in behind sandbags keep constant sur-
veillance over the camps.
The ability of Tamil militants to keep government troops in their
camps has brought welcome relief to the people of the peninsula.
The army, consisting almost entirely of Sinhalese, had been dis-
patched periodically to ]affna since 1958 in order to break up peace-
ful demonstrations staged by Tamils who wanted to show their dis-
approval of laws and regulations directed against them. After the
militant groups began their violent campaign against the government
in 1977 by attacking troops and destroying public buildings, the]aff-
na Peninsula and its adjoining islands were placed under military
occupation. Sinhalese troops often reacted to attacks with indiscrimi-
nate brutality, which often took the form of burning homes, com-
mercial buildings, libraries, and buildings of historical importance,
including Hindu temples, and by killing civilians. By 1986, the army
camps were under siege, and supplies to these camps had to be deliv-
ered by air and sea. Large areas around many of these camps, espe-
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cially around the Palali Airport and the Jaffna Fort, have been
declared security zones and many civilians have been made homeless.
Nevertheless, people have resumed normal life in the peninsula
although they live in fear of being harassed by army personnel.
The LTIE has taken over the civil administration of the area, main-
taining law and order and supplying food and gasoline to the people
of the region by purchasing them from the government. The govern-
ment supplies electricity to the region through the LTTE, which in
turn, collects payments for electricity bills. It has also begun to levy
taxes at border crossings and on such items as cigarettes and cement
to maintain the civil administration. In addition to the Jaffna Penin-
sula, many populated areas in the Northern Province are under the
control of the LTIE, but its domination of the Eastern Province is
limited to Tamil areas, where it has blown up army convoys and
waged pitched battles with government troops. The Eelam People's
Revolutionary Front (EPRLF) was eliminated from the Jaffna Penin-
sula in December 1986, but the EPRLF, TELa, the Eelam Revolu-
tionary Organization of Students (EROS), and the LTIE continue to
operate outside the northern region under the direction of leaders
from Tamil Nadu.PLOTE in a recent statement declared that it had
suspended its activities in the northern part of Sri Lanka. The compe-
tition for control among the militant groups has been shifted to the
Eastern Province, and whether the LTIE can overshadow the EPRLF
in this province is not certain. It is feasible, however, that the LTIE
may coordinate its efforts with EROS and PLaTE, which claim to
have substantial support among the Tamils and Muslims of the prov-
ince, in order to regain some of the areas they lost to government
troops in 1985. Nevertheless, the LTIE, whose members have shown
very little inclination to compromise on certain issues, is the most
dominant force in Tamil areas.
The Sri Lankan government withdrew its offensive after meeting
resistance from the militants and after the Indian government con-
demned the aerial bombings of densely populated areas and
threatened to abandon its role of mediator. Moreover, the United
States government had asked the Sri Lankan government to cease
military action and to seek a political solution. Donor nations, too,
became impatient with the escalation of violence, but the killings
and reprisals continued into June 1986, as each group tried to drive
out the other from vital areas in the Trincomalee District. Tamil mili-
tants carried out many bombings, including an explosion in a passen-
.....
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ger train, and the bombing of a cement factory in Trincomalee and
the soft-drink bottling plant in Colombo, which killed eight people
and injured forty. As the violence escalated, public pressure from
both within and outside the country compelled the government to
revive the peace process. During and just prior to the]affna offensive,
Indian diplomatic efforts were considered by the Sri Lankan govern-
ment to be a stumbling block to a settlement of the ethnic problem.
By mid-]une, however, the government became very sensitive to
international condemnation of its military operation, including its
concern that the donor countries of the Aid Consortium, which was
to meet in Paris on June 19, 1986, might reduce their aid allocation
to Sri Lanka if it did not seek a political settlement to the ethnic
problem.
On June 18, 1986, only one day before the meeting of the Aid
Consortium, the Sri Lankan government published a cabinet-ap-
proved peace plan and announced that it would summon a Political
Parties Conference (PPC) on]une 25, 1986, to discuss its draft pro- I /;
posals for the devolution of greater governmental power to the nine v
provincial councils in such matters as maintenance of internal law and
order, education and culture, land settlements within the province, j
and agriculture and industry. The TULF boycotted the PPC because!
of the_continuing aerial bombardment of heavily populated Tamil
ar~-as in the north and the massacre of Tamils by government troops
and-nome guards in the Eastern Province. It was apparent that the
government was determined to demonstrate to the militants that
government forces were still in command of the situation, despite the
temporary setback in Jaffna. The Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) _
boycotted the conference because it claimed that the territorial integ-
rity of Sri Lanka would be sacrificed if the government's proposals
were to become law and that too many concessions were being offered
to the Tamils. The SLFP, therefore, continued to espouse its policies
along pro-Sinhalese communal lines, as has been its tradition since
1956. The Indian government backed the proposals, claiming that
they seemed practical enough for resumption of talks and for nego-
tiating alternative provisions that would perhaps allow for possible
merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces, which the TULF pro-
posed earlier.
InJuly 1986, the Indian government persuaded the TULF to enter
into direct negotiation with the Sri Lankan government and Tamil
militants to agree to a cease-fire. TULF leaders, who strongly believed
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that any political settlement of the ethnic problem should have the
approval of the militants, discussed the main provisions of the pro-
posals with their leaders before meeting with government negotiators
in Colombo. The government, however, made it known, from the
outset, that it intended to introduce legislation to give effect to its
proposals, with or without amendments, even if the various Tamil
leaders rejected them. As expected, the provisions dealing with the
devolution of powers to provincial councils and the territorial limits
of the Tamil linguistic region were found to be unacceptable to the
leaders of the TULF and the militant movements. President ]ayewar-
dene later declared that he would not introduce the promised legisla-
tion unless the militants laid down their arms.
This rejection of the proposals offered by the Sri Lankan govern-
ment came only one week after the Tamil Nadu police in South India
had arrested more than a thousand Tamil militants, including the
leaders of EROS, EPRLF, LTTE, PLOTE, and TELO and had confiscat-
ed a large number of weapons, ranging from machine guns to sur-
face-to-air missiles, as well as communications equipment. The
immediate cause for this crackdown may be attributed to three inci-
dents that were alleged to have been instigated by Tamil militants,
one resulting in the shooting of an Indian citizen by a militant and
the others involving militant raids on two villages. The timing of this
crackdown may have been done as a gesture of goodwill to President
]ayewardene, who was to attend the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation Conference held in Bangalore from November
15 to 17, 1986, and perhaps to put pressure on the militants to accept
the government's proposals. The Indian government did not aban-
don the peace process and is reported to have ordered the Tamil Nadu
government to release the communications equipment in order to
persuade the militant leaders to have direct talks with Indian negotia-
tors while another group of Indian government negotiators had sepa-
rate talks with the Sri Lankan government spokesmen. Leaders of the
militant groups talked with Indian negotiators, but they rejected the
Sri Lankan proposals, since they did not provide for real merger
between the two provinces. Indeed, the Sri Lankan government's
proposal to carve three provinces out of the Eastern Province, one for
each community, was completely contrary to the basic demands of the
Tamils that the integrity of their traditional homeland must be pre-
served at any cost. Despite the failure of the peace talks, however, the
fact that the militants, especially the LTTE, were willing to have a
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dialogue with Indian officials indicates that, for the first time, Tamil
leaders were willing to abandon their demand for total independence
and seek regional autonomy for a Tamil linguistic state within Sri
Lanka.
To the L1TE, the portion of the Jaffna Peninsula where it provides
security to the inhabitants, maintains law and order, runs the civil
administration, and collects taxes represents part of the Tamil linguis-
tic state. The L1TE even abandoned its supposedly original plan to
declare the Jaffna Peninsula an independent region on January 1,
1987. In fact, the LTTE and other militant groups did not entirely
reject the government's proposals but merely commented on certain
provisions which they felt were inadequate to meet their basic
demands. These changes have had a positive impact on the LTTE's
relationship with the Sri Lankan government, since the government
was willing to have direct talks with the LTTE on ways to solve the
ethnic problem.
Three factors might have convinced the government to talk with
the LTTE. First, the TULF and the militant groups, especially the
most powerful, the LTTE, have shown a willingness to abandon their
demand for total independence for Tamil areas and to seek regional
autonomy within Sri Lanka. Second, the government had become
impatient with India's mediator role since little progress was made in l
the latter half of 1986 in persuading Tamil leaders to accept govern-
ment proposals. Third, since the LTTE emerged as the most domi-
nant militant group during the closing days of 1986, the government
found it desirable and convenient to negotiate with it directly, since it
could speak for other groups and thus holds the key for negotiating a
lasting settlement to the ethnic problem. The first direct contact
between the government and LTTE resulted in the release of two sol-
diers, who were held by the latter, in return for two militants. The
representatives of the government had a second meeting with the
LTTE in December 1986 on the possibility of starting talks to end the
conflict. Although the LTTE insisted that, as a prerequisite for com-
mencing talks, Indian participation was essential and that all Tamil
political prisoners and detainees should be released, it did not totally
reject the idea of commencing peace talks with the government.
With the dawn of 1987, there appeared to be a temporary setback
to the peace process, since the Sri Lankan government suspended
delivery of gasoline and kerosene to the Jaffna Peninsula in retalia-
tion for the LTTE's moves to issue car license plates, perhaps using
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Tamil script, for a fixed fee. Even at this stage, when the prospects of
a negotiated settlement look promising, the Sri Lankan government
could cut off supplies of essential items, including electricity, and
launch an all-out attack on the ]affna Peninsula in order to crush the
militants. Indeed, events of the past three years have shown that
there can be peace one day and war the next, and it is difficult to pre-
dict whether there will be a prolonged war or a peaceful settlement of
the ethnic issue in the immediate futute.
The prospects for ending the ethnic conflict in the near future can
be evaluated in the light of the dramatic changes that have developed
since mid-1985. The Sri Lankan government, which represents the
Sinhalese people, is resolved to use its enhanced military capability to
uphold the privileged position of Sinhalese-Buddhists on the island
and to preserve the territorial integrity of Sri Lanka for the Sinhalese.
Leaders of the militant movements, particularly the LTTE, believe
that they have the endorsement of the Tamil people to use any form
of military tactics to free the Tamils from Sinhalese domination, to
preserve their distinct nationality, and to defend the territorial integ-
rity of their traditional homeland in northern and eastern Sri Lanka.
Indeed, the Sinhalese and the Tamil people have not, as yet, staged
any mass protests to disapprove the policies and tactics that have been
adopted by the government and the militants to achieve their respec-
tive objectives. It might seem that given the conflicting claims of
/, Sinhalese and Tamils regarding their inalienable rights and privileges
in Sri Lanka, there are no solutions to the ethnic problem. However,
their conflicting claims can be resolved through the establishment of
a Tamil linguistic region within the framework of a federal union of
Sri Lanka without endangering the goals of the Sinhalese-Buddhist
nation to preserve its identity.
The developments that have occurred since early 1986 regarding
the attirudes of both the government and Tamil militants toward
their respective demands warrant examination. The government was
serious about its original proposals on district councils but later aban-
doned them and proposed the establishment of provincial councils.
Later it proposed, among other options, the possibility of redrawing
the provincial borders to create a Tamil majority region in the Eastern
Province and link it with the Northern Province by a narrow corridor
through a newly created Sinhalese majority region. Although the
proposal to carve out a Sinhalese-majority province, a Tamil-majority
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province, and a Muslim-majority province out of the Eastern Province
was rejected by the Tamil leaders as being completely contrary to their
basic demands, the fact the government was willing to propose the
creation of any Tamil linguistic region is encouraging. This does not
imply that the prospects for a compromise are bright. There remain
many conflicting issues on the devolution of powers to provincial
councils and on the question of merging the Northern Province with
a large portion of the Eastern Province. In particular, Tamil leaders
questioned the government's rationale for establishing nine provin-
cial councils if they were primarily designed to resolve the ethnic
problem. Furthermore, the Tamil leaders would want the Indian gov-
ernment to underwrite and monitor any kind of settlement.
Militant leaders perhaps were compelled by external factors to
abandon their original demands for a separate Tamil state and to
negotiate for a Tamil linguistic state, preferably within the framework
of a federal constitution. Thi~major change may have been a
re~_onse_t{Ltbe_p()Ji~L()(!heIfldian.go_Yernment, .according to which
mat government opposes the creation ofanyjndependent state in
IndiaorSri-lanka~-Militants-are·alsoincreasingly cognizant of the fact
that-tnefneed tobefiien.dly with India in order to secure the latter's
support to monitor and enforcetheterms·ofany prop·osals that might
be negotiated-with the government,as well as to ensure the safety of
T:nnils in Sri Lanka. Nevertheless, most of the militant leaders, espe-
cially in the UTE, are hardliners who would not accept proposals that
were not designed to end all aspects of discrimination against minori-
ties and guarantee, among other conditions, the economic develop-
ment of Tamil-dominated areas, the preservation of the ethnic com-
position and territorial integrity of their traditional homeland, and
the right of the Tamils to live without fear of Sinhalese mobs and the
armed forces. By the mid-1980s, moreover, militant groups, espe-
cially the LTTE, were in a position to enter peace negotiations from a
position ofstrength.
"Had the same package of proposals submitted by the government
at the Political Parties Conference in 1986 been implemented unilat-
erally by this or previous governments in the 1960s or 1970s, the
Tamils would have wholeheartedly accepted them. Tamil leaders are
reluctant to accept the proposals now for many valid reasons. First,
many Tamils are distrustful of the government's intentions and
express doubt that it will implement the proposals, especially given
pressure from Sinhalese extremists. Second, it will take many years
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before the majority of Tamils forget the inhumane treatment they
were subjected to during the anti-Tamil riots, especially during 1983,
and the atrocities perpetrated against civilians by the army of occupa-
tion. From 1977 on, government troops have taken advantage of the
Prevention of Terrorist Act and Emergency Regulations to arrest hun-
dreds of innocent Tamils, in addition to unleashing violence on the
civilian population. Past reports of Amnesty International, including
its September 1986 publication, provide testimony to the fact that
hundreds of Tamils have disappeared after mass arrests and were
killed and tortured during detention. The inflamed passions that
have been ~!:..ou~~slaIIWl!K!heSinhalese andThmlTsoyme-nrutal kill-
ings of th~ir loved ones, friends~-an(rn.eigliD61s;as-well as the burn-
ing of homes-,--whlCliliiisroiCeoi:h-ousandSinto fefugee-camps, will
take many years to subslae-:-Tothink-that-pe.ople.-who were directly
and i~(firectly afteeteal>y the violence will return to the devastated
areas of Trincomalee, Batticaloa, and Vavuniya and live peacefully as
members of an ethnically mixed community is unrealistic. Under
these circumstances, the government has had to come to grips with
the uncompromising demand for a Tamil linguistic region, compris-
ing the Northern Province and a large portion of the Eastern Prov-
ince, where Tamil-speaking people can live peacefully.
Questions have been posed by the government on the difficulties
of merging the Northern and Eastern provinces because of the pres-
ence of a large number of Sinhalese villages in the Trincomalee Dis-
trict, especially around the town and port of Trincomalee and in the
Seruwila, Thampalagamam, Kantalai, and Gomarankadawala AGA
Divisions. It is feasible to merge Kantalai, Morawewa, and Gomaran-
kadawala with the North-Central Province, while Thampalagamam
and the region north of Trincomalee, which have become desolate
because of the violence, can form a link between the Northern and
Eastern province.s~]:vn~9jd further violence and to end the practice of
stationing government troops in Tamil-dom~ated_~veryat-
teI~ipt_snoiI!~-oe-made·-hy·the government to designat~·5eparate
regions or divisions foi-i:lie-Tamil-and--Sinhalese·toriiiiii.inlties~ This
would necessitat~'the-~~~~ment-~rth-~ STnhalese population from
the Seruwila and its surroundings to Sinhalese-dominated areas.
Indeed, the Allai peasant colonization scheme was initiated by a pre-
vious government to settle Sinhalese peasants in Seruwila and in sur-
rounding AGA Divisions. The town of Trincomalee and its surround-
ings, which have become a ghost region except for the presence of a
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large number of Tamil refugee camps, should be part of the Tamil
linguistic region, while the port of Trincomalee can be administered
from Colombo. In the south, the Amparai Electoral District can be
merged with the Sinhalese-dominated Uva Province, while the Batti-
caloa District and a large portion of the Amparai District could form
part of the Tamil linguistic region. Constitutional arrangements,
however, would have to be made to permit the Muslims, who form
the dominant community in the southern portion of the Eastern
Province, to administer it as a district within the Tamil-speaking lin-
guistic region.
The desir~_Qf!he_Tamils .toestablish :rTamil linguistic .province by
mergiggj;QniQns..QLthc;__l'-{()xthern.and EasterfLproYinces can be
attffflute.d.. to many factors. One, the Tamils have always insisted that
the EasternProvince· is an integral part of the Tamil traditional home-
land and that its ethnic composition was deliberately altered by the
government's policy of settling Sinhalese in this province. Neverthe-
less, it is irrelevant whether Tamils constitute the dominant commu-
nity, but it is important to recognize that Tamils and Muslims, who
have lived for centuries as members of the Tamil-speaking commu-
nity, constitute the vast majority of people in the Eastern Province.
Sinhalese settlements were intentionally established in strategic loca-
tions in the Eastern Province to alter the contiguity that has tradition-
ally existed between the densely populated Tamil areas of the North-
ern and Eastern provinces. Most of the fierce fighting between
government troops and militants in Trincomalee District was to
secure control of vital areas where the Northern and Eastern provinces
merge. Tamil leaders of various groups insist that the merger of ihe
Northern and Eastern provinces is a prerequisite for commencing any
serious negotiations with the government.
Second, d1e.NorthernProyince is not as agriculturally and industri-
ally developed, given the largeSize-ufits-·population, compared to
other provinces in_the-Dry-Zone. Lack of water resources has limited
the cap;iC1iY_QLthe province to-expand the area.under.cultivation and
to raise the yield of various crops. Moreover, since the mid-1950s, its
economi..c-dcvelopment has been neglected··by.Sighala-dominated
governments~IheNorttretll.Pr()Vince, therefore, relies on other prov-
inces and urban cenier~ to feed its people~topurchas.e fertilizer, and
to market its onions, tobacco, chillies, potatoes, and grapes. The
Eastem-Province can supply a large quantity of the food that is
needed to feed thousands of people who live permanently in the
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Northern Province, as well as those who moved into the province as a
result of the 1983 anti-Tamil riots. More than a half-million Tamils,
many of whom now live as refugees in Tamil districts and those who
will return from India and elsewhere once a peace settlement is
reached, have to be fed also. Ther~fore,ifth~l'~~ilJinguistic region
is,to be economicallyviabl~-the Eastern Province-should remain an
int~giiliartofit.
Third, ·!h~Northern}J~()vi.!!c.~J:l:clc~productivefarmlands to resettle
refugees and to rehabilitate large numbers of militants, who have to
be·compensatedf(){ surrendering their arms. The Eastern Province
can meet some ofthejmmedi:i!.e needs of the refugees a~(rmilitants.
It will take decades before the war-t'oiriTimitareascanbe revitalized.
Fourtn,..toaVOIQ-me-:-fecurrence ofCommunal VIOlenCe: adequate
measU-res should be taken to ensure i:h'at:Tamil:speakin~ple and
Sinhalese live in separate regIOns. It IS oecauseOftllecthnic mix that
Trincomalee DistricfrarikSasine leader among districts in the num-
bers of;r~i~;l!}Pi~in tIie riuriiD"er-ofi"fiCidents ofk[fiings'and repri-
sals,..inthe-number.ofpeopluendetedl!9meIesS,' ind in the number
of refugee camps. Indeed, Tamil militants would-be reluctant to
relinquish their arms, accept an offer of amnesty by the government,
and settle in unsafe areas with ethnically mixed populations where
there would always be the possibility of renewed violence and the
reappearance of army camps. Under these circumstances, the mili-
tants would refuse to surrender their arms. On the other hand, Tamil
militants would be required to disarm in order to assure the Sinhalese
people that the Tamil linguistic state would pose no danger, actual or
potential, to the Sinhalese. Fina~m~.rg.eL9~Northern and
Eastern provinces would facilitate.~h.e,_d~ydQIlinenLOfmajor projects
by making it f~;J.sible_tQ.PQQlth~resourcesofalarge region.
AlthOUgh many of the provisions in the government's PPC pro-
posals were drawn from the Indian Constitution, as presented in the
Chithamparam Papers, prepared by the minister in the central gov-
ernment representing Tamil Nadu, some of the critical provisions
were modified to ensure that the Sri Lankan parliament and the pres-
ident would have overwhelming authority over the provincial coun-
cils. In particular, executive power was to be vested with the governor,
an appointee of the president, rather than with the elected provincial
councils; governors of Indian states hold ceremonial positions, except
during times of emergency. Moreover, the draft legislation empow-
ered the parliament to override the legislative authority of the provin-
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cial councils and allowed the president to assume emergency powers
over the provinces, even when there was no officially proclaimed
emergency, in order to deploy the national police and the security
forces in the provinces. Even the powers devolved to the provincial
councils on matters relating to higher education, land development
and land settlement, interprovincial irrigation, and the maintenance
of law and order were found to be inadequate. Moreover, no provi-
sions were made in the draft legislation to ensure that provincial
councils, especially of the Tamil areas, would be provided with ade-
quate financial resources, from either local or foreign sources, to initi-
ate major development projects and to rebuild the war-torn Tamil
areas. Finally, the proposed legislation did not guarantee the territo-
rial integrity and sovereignty of Tamil provinces since the parliament
in Colombo had the power to alter any provisions in the constitution,
including altering the boundaries of provinces, by a two-thirds
majority.
The December 19, 1986, proposals, which were submitted by the
Sri Lankan government, were intended to address some of these
problems. The Sri Lankan government and Indian mediators had
agreed on a plan that called for the merger of a portion of the Ampa-
rai District, where the Sinhalese are in a majority, with the Monera-
gala District and for the recognition of the remaining portions of the
Eastern Province as a Tamil linguistic province. If this plan were to be
implemented, Tamils would constitute nearly 50 percent and Mus-
lims 35 percent of the population of Eastern Province, respectively.
According to this proposal, the Eastern Province would function as
separate unit, although the Northern and Eastern provinces wou·ld
have a single government, the same judicial system, and one univer-
sity system. This plan, however, did not satisfy Tamil demands for the
merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces, especially since the
Sinhalese-dominated AGA Divisions in the Trincomalee District
would still be an integral part of the Tamil linguistic province. In
addition, the constitutional provisions relating to the executive power
of the governor and the ease with which provisions can be altered by a
two-thirds majority in parliament did not guarantee adequate consti-
tutional safeguards against discrimination by the Sinhalese majority.
Whether the Tamil militants would have accepted this plan with fur-
ther modification is not certain, but the possibility was not pursued
by the Sri Lankan government, for no apparent reason. Nevertheless,
there was some hope that a breakthrough in the crisis was imminent
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in December 1986, even though Tamil militants were reluctant to
negotiate with the Sri Lankan government and assumed the responsi-
bility of running the civil administration of the Jaffna Peninsula,
which had become virtually an independent region.
The government imposed an embargo on fuel, food, and medical
supplies on the Jaffna Peninsula, and its security forces embarked on
a military offensive in the region inJanuary 1987 in retaliation for the
militant takeover of the civil administration. Although attempts
made by the security forces to move out of their camps were foiled by
Tamil militants, air raids and shellings from the Jaffna fort caused
extensive damage to the nearby buildings, such as the main hospital,
schools, shops, and temples in the city. In addition to the civilian kill-
ings in the city of)affna, shelling from gunboats resulted in the death
of civilians in the coastal towns of Myliddy and Valveddithurai. The
Indian government tried, without success, to compel the Sri Lankan
government to end its embargo and to stop the killing of civilians.
The LITE demanded that the 2,000 Tamil detainees, who were held
in the Boosa camp, be released and the fuel embargo lifted before
they would commence peace talks with the government.
The violence continued unabated for more than three months, and
in April 1987 , the Sri Lankan government declared a unilateral cease-
fire to coincide with the Sinhalese and Tamil new year. The govern-
ment also declared that it was prepared to lift the embargo and
resume peace talks if the militants observed the cease-fire. The cease-
fire ended abruptly when more than 125 Sinhalese civilians were
machine-gunned to death in a remote jungle near Trincomalee and
more than 100 people, most of them Sinhalese, were killed when a
bomb exploded in a crowded bus station in Colombo. The govern-
ment claimed that the LITE and the EROS perpetrated these violent
incidents for the sole purpose of stifling the peace talks and launched
a major offensive against Tamil militants. The LITE and the EROS
denied responsibility. This offensive was also triggered by criticisms
leveled by SLFP against the UNP for the latter's inability to protect
the Sinhalese population and for the lawlessness, as well as the eco-
nomic problems, that the country faces.
By the end of May 1987, government forces succeeded in occupy-
ing a large portion of the Vadamarachchi AGA division, which
includes the coastal towns of Valveddithurai, the birthplace of LITE
leader V. Prabakaran, and Point Pedro. The military occupation of
this region was accomplished by destroying coastal towns, temples,
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and homes and by killing civilians in the interior villages. This mili-
tary offensive compelled large numbers of people in the Vadamarach-
chi area and a large area around the Palali Airport to evacuate their
villages and take shelter in the densely populated AGA divisions,
such as Valigamam North, where there is already a scarcity of food,
fuel, and medicine due to the embargo. Yet the government refused
to permit the International Red Cross and reporters to enter the]aff-
na Peninsula in order to relieve the suffering of the people. This
prompted some Indian leaders to accuse the Sri Lankan government
of conducting genocide against the Tamils and for Tamil leaders to
claim that the government was using its tightly controlled media to
publicize atrocities that were perpetrated against Sinhalese civilians
while refusing to divulge pertinent information on the devastating
effects of its military offensive on the civilian population in the]affna
Peninsula. ----------~
In early]une, India announced that it intended to furnish much- \
needed fuel, food, medicine, and clothing to the war-torn area of the /
]affna Peninsula through the Indian Red Cross, transporting relief (
supplies in a flotilla of fishing boats. On]une 3, the day before the ,
boats sailed from South India, more then thirty Sinhalese civilians, J
most of whom were Buddhist monks, were savagely killed near
Amparai by fifty armed men. The government blamed the LITE for
this and other violent acts against Sinhalese civilians. Given the spate
of incidents involving raids on paramilitary camps in Sinhalese areas
by a left-wing extremist Sinhalese group (identified by the Sri Lankan
government as the People's Liberation Front GVP) it is possible that
these acts may have been carried out by groups other than the Lm
and the EROS in order to sabotage the peace talks and create anarchy
in the country. On June 4, the Indian fishing boats carrying relief
supplies and ninety reporters were forced by the Sri Lankan Navy to
return to the South Indian port of Rameswaram, but the supplies
were later dropped from Indian transport planes to the people of the
]affna Peninsula over the objections of the Sri Lankan government,
which accused India of violating Sri Lanka's independence and its ter-
ritorial integrity.
India's insistence on furnishing relief supplies to the ]affna Penin-
sula has major implications. First, people from all parts of the sub-
continent supported the Indian government in carrying out this relief
mission as "a token of India's deep and abiding concern for the suf-
fering of the, pepple ~£ the ]affna Peninsula." India's position was
0~t\j\);'i'! ,.! .
" I: j "-I: \ L
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that the mission was a humanitarian gesture on the part of the people
of India, especially when other relief agencies, including the Red
Cross, were barred from furnishing relief supplies. Second, although
India has not provided military protection to the people of the Jaffna
Peninsula, it was prepared to meet the challenge of the Sri Lankan
Air Force in the event that its planes were forcefully prevented from
dropping supplies. This bold move was intended to reiterate India's
policy that any move by either the Sri Lankan government or Tamil
militants to resolve the ethnic conflict militarily will be resisted by
India. Indeed, India is strongly committed to a peaceful resolution of
the ethnic problem and is vehemently opposed to the creation of a
separate Tamil state or to any attempt of the Sri Lankan government
to subjugate the Sri Lankan Tamils and to dictate the terms under
which the latter would be governed. Third, India has gained the
respect of Sri Lankan Tamils, including the militants, for carrying out
the daring mission. Therefore, the militants might be willing to
accept a political settlement, provided that India is prepared to
underwrite that settlement. Thus, India is in a stronger position to
persuade Tamil militants and the Sri Lankan government to compro-
mise on certain issues related to the government's December 19 pro-
posals, which have stood in the way of negotiating a settlement.
The Sri Lankan government did not halt its military offensive after
India dropped relief supplies to the people of the Jaffna Peninsula.
Government forces continued to take control of other coastal towns,
including Kankesanthurai, the main port of the Jaffna Peninsula,
and contemplated advancing toward the city ofJaffna. On June 10,
1987, however, the government announced that it had completed its
mission of securing control of the northern coastal towns in the pen-
insula. It also declared that it had no intention of moving toward the
city ofJaffna and called for the resumption of peace talks. Control of
the northern coastal towns had been secured in order to stop the flow
of military supplies from South India; the city ofJaffna, a militant
stronghold, was avoided. Moreover, a southern advance through the
heart of Valigamam North AGA division, which is one of the most
densely populated rural areas in South Asia, would have resulted in
the slaughter of thousands of civilians.
Although the militants are not capable of defending against aerial
bombardment, the closely knit settlements, with their tall fences and
market gardens, furnish adequate protection for the militants to carry
out successful assaults against government troops. Nevertheless, even
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if the militants are totally defeated and the peninsula comes under
the direct control of the government, the ethnic conflict will not be
resolved. Indeed, Tamil militants will continue to carry out their
operations elsewhere and regain their foothold on the ]affna Penin- \//
sula. Moreover, the odds of the Sri Lankan government or any other ,
government defeating a guerrilla army, which has the support of the;
local populace, is virtually impossible. Therefore, if there is to be
national reconciliation and lasting peace in Sri Gii1ca, the govern-
ment -rrnrn!IIake-every_~ff()r~~~2=~c:~_tE~_~_pea~~_~~urementwith
Tamilleaaer~, especially t~e Tamil militants. -
A potitical settlement t at wIHpromote national reconciliation can
only materialize ifTaIiUr:speakirrg-pe()plei-bothTamils and Muslims,
are per1l1itted_t~us)nduct their own affairs, through a democratically
constitut~(lQrovinc~r;"Ssembfy-or-c-oiincirvesied with substantial leg-
islativ~nd ~~~cutive powers in matters that effect their economic
and sodal well-being. There islirtIe-doubt that there would be
national reconciliation and peace in Sri Lanka if the proposed provin-
cial counciLof the Tamil linguistic region, formed by the linkage of
the Northern and Eastern provinces, were vested with substantial
powers, similar to those possessed by states in a full-fledged federal
system_of government. Now that India has the leverage to convince
both the militant~and the Sri Lankan government to modify their
respecJivedemands fortotal independence or preservation of the uni-
tarycharacter of the constitution, the best hope fof a peaceful settle-
ment exists.

APPENDIX I
The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact
July 26, 1957
Statement on the General Principles of the Agreement:
"Representatives of the Federal Party had a series of discussions
with the Prime Minister in an effort to resolve the differences of opin-
ion that had been growing and creating tension.
"At the early stages of these conversations it became evident that it
was not possible for the Prime Minister to accede to some of the
demands of the Federal Party.
"The Prime Minister stated that from the point of view of the gov-
ernment he was not in a position to discuss the setting up of a federal
constitution or regional autonomy or any step which would abrogate
the Official Language Act. The question then arose whether it was
possible to explore the possibility of an adjustment without the Fed-
eral Party abandoning or surrendering any of its fundamental princi-
ples and objectives.
"At this stage the Prime Minister suggested an examination of the
government's draft Regional Councils Bill to see whether provisions
can be made under it to meet reasonably some of matters in this
regard which the Federal Party had in view.
"The agreements so reached are embodied in a separate docu-
ment.
"Regarding the language the Federal Party reiterated its stand for
parity, but in view of the position of the Prime Minister in this matter
they came to an agreement by way of an adjustment. They pointed
out that it was important for them that there should be a recognition
of Tamil as a national language and that the administrative work in
the Northern and Eastern Provinces should be done in Tamil.
"The Prime Minister stated that as mentioned by him earlier that
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it was not possible for him to take any step that would abrogate the
Official Language Act.
USE OF TAMIL. "After discussions it was agreed that the proposed
legislation should contain recognition of Tamil as the language of a
national minority in Ceylon, and that the four points mentioned by
the Prime Minister should include provision that, without infringing
on the position of the Official Language Act, the language of admin-
istration in the Northern and Eastern Provinces should be Tamil and
any necessary provision be made for non-Tamil speaking minorities in
the Northern and Eastern Provinces.
"Regarding the question of Ceylon citizenship for people of
Indian descent and revision of the Citizenship Act, the representa-
tives of the Federal Party forwarded their views to the Prime Minister
and pressed for an early settlement.
"The Prime Minister indicated that this problem would receive
early consideration.
"In view of these conclusions the Federal Party stated that they
were withdrawing their proposed satyagraha."
JOINT STATEMENT BY THE PRIME MINISTER AND
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL PARTY ON
REGIONAL COUNCILS:
"(A) Regional areas to be defined in the Bill itself by embodying
them in the schedule thereto.
"(B) That the Northern Province is to form one Regional area
whilst the Eastern Province is to be divided into one or more Regional
areas.
"(C) Provision is to be made in the Bill to enable two or more
regions to amalgamate even beyond provincial limits; and for one
Region to divide itself subject to ratification by Parliament. Further
provision is to be made in the Bill for two or more regions to collabo-
rate for specific purposes of common interest.
DIRECT ELECTIONS. "(D) Provision is to be made for direct election
of regional councillors. Provision is to be made for a delimitation
Commission or Commissions for carving out electorates. The ques-
tion of M.P.'s representing districts falling within regional areas to be
eligible to function as chairmen is to be considered. The question of
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Government Agents being Regional Commissioners is to be consid-
ered. The question of supervisory functions over large towns, strategic
towns and municipalities is to be looked into.
SPECIAL POWERS. "(E) Parliament is to delegate powers and specify
them in the Act. It was agreed that Regional Councils should have
powers over specified subjects including agriculture, cooperatives,
land, land development, colonization, education, health, industries.
and fisheries, housing, and social services, electricity, water schemes
and roads. Requisite definition ofpowers will be made in the Bill.
COLONIZATION SCHEMES. "(F) It was agreed that in the matters of
colonization schemes the powers of the Regional Councils shall
include the powers to select allottees to whom land within their area
of authority shall be alienated and also power to select personnel to
be employed for work on such schemes. The position regarding the
area at present administered by the Gal Oya Board in this matter
requires consideration.
TAXATION AND BORROWING. "(G) The powers in regard to the
Regional Councils vested in the Minister of Local Government in the
draft Bill to be revised with a view to vesting control in Parliament
wherever necessary.
"(H) The Central Government will provide block grants to
Regional Councils. The principles on which the grants will be com-
puted will be gone into. The Regional Councils shall have powers. of
taxation and borrowing."
Source: Government of Ceylon (Sri Lanka), House of Representatives, Parliamentary
Debates (Hansard), vol. 30, cols. 1309-13 I 1.
APPENDIX II
The Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact,
March 24, 1965
1. Action to be taken early under the Tamil Language Special Pro-
visions Act (No. 28 of 1958), to make provision for the Tamil lan-
guage to be the language of administration and of record in the
Northern and Eastern Provinces. Mr. Senanayake also explained that
it was the policy of the Party that a Tamil-speaking person should be
entitled to transact business in Tamil throughout the island.
2. Mr. Senanayake stated that it was the policy of his party to
amend the Language of the Courts Act to provide for legal proceed-
ings in the Northern and Eastern Provinces to be conducted and
recorded in Tamil.
3. Action will be taken to establish District Councils of Ceylon
vested with powers over subjects to be mutually agreed between the
two leaders. It was agreed, however, that the Government should
have power under the law to give directions to such Councils in the
national interest.
4. The Land Development Ordinance will be amended to provide
that Citizens of Ceylon be entitled to allotment of land under the
Ordinance. Mr. Senanayake further agreed that in granting land
under Colonization Schemes the following priorities to be observed
in the Northern and Eastern Provinces:
(a) Land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces should in the first
instance be granted to landless peasants in the District;
(b) Secondly, to Tamil-speaking persons resident in the Northern
and Eastern Provinces; and
(c) Thirdly, to other citizens of Ceylon, preference being given to
Tamil residents in the rest of the island.
Source: s. Ponnampalam, Sn· Lanka: The National Question and the Tamtl Libera-
tion Struggle, pp. 259-260.
I
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APPENDIX III
Tamil language (Special Provisions)
Regulations, 1966
1. These regulations may be cited as the Tamil Language (Special
Provisions) Regulations, 1966.
2. Without prejudice to the operation of the Official Language Act
No. 33 of 1956, which declared the Sinhala language to be the offi-
ciallanguage of Ceylon the Tamil Language will be used:
(a) In the Northern and Eastern Provinces for the transaction of all
the Government and public business and the maintenance of public
records whether such business is conducted in or by a department or
institution of Government, a public corporation or a statutory insti-
tution; and
(b) for all correspondence between persons other than officials in
their official capacity, educated through the medium of Tamil lan-
guage and any official in his official capacity, or between any local
authority in the Northern and Eastern Provinces which conducts its
business in the Tamil Language and any official in his official ca-
pacity.
3. For the purpose of giving full force and effect to the principles
and provisions of the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28
of 1958, and these regulations all Ordinances and Acts, and all
Orders, Proclamations, rules, by-laws, regulations and notifications
made or issued under any written law, the Government Gazette and
all other official publications, circulars and forms issued used by the
Government, public corporations or statutory institutions, shall be
translated and published in the Tamil language also.
Source: Government of Ceylon, Sri Lanka (Colombo: Department of Public Infor-
mation), February 1, 1966, p. 4.
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AnnexureC
In terms of paragraph six of President's statement of December 1st,
1983, the following proposals which have emerged as a result of dis-
cussions in Colombo and New Delhi are appended for consideration
by the All-Party Conference. These proposals are in the context of
unity and integrity of Sri Lanka and will form the basis for formulat-
ing the Agenda of the All-Party Conference.
(1) The District Development Councils in a Province be permitted
to combine into one or more Regional Councils if they agree by deci-
sions of the Councils and approved by Referendum in that district.
(2) In the case of District Councils of Northern and Eastern Prov-
inces, respectively, as they are not functioning due to the resignation
of the majority of members, their union within each province to be
accepted.
(3) Each Region will have a Regional Council if so desired. The
convention will be established that the leader of the party which com-
mands a majority in the Regional Council would be formally
appointed by the President as the chief minister of the Region. The
Chief Minister will constitute a Committee of ministers of the
Region.
(4) The President and the Parliament will continue to have overall
responsibility for all subjects not transferred to the Region and gener-
ally for all other matters relating to maintenance of sovereignty,
integrity, unity, and security and progress and development of the
Republic as a whole.
(5) The legislative power of the region would be vested in the
Regional Councils which would be empowered to enact laws and
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exercise executive powers in relation thereto on certain specified listed
subjects including the maintenance of Internal Law and Order in the
Region, the administration of justice, social and economic develop-
ment, cultural matters and land policy. The list of subjects to be allo-
cated to the Regions will be worked out in detail.
(6) The Regional Councils will have powers to levy taxes, cess of
fees and to mobilize resources through loans, the proceeds of which
will be credited to a Consolidated Fund set up for that particular
Region to which also will be credited grants, allocations or subven-
tions made by the Republic. Financial resources will be apportioned
to the Region on the recommendations of the representative Finance
Commission appointed from time to time.
(7) Provisions will be made to constitute High Courts in each
region. The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka will exercise appellate and
constitutional jurisdiction.
(8) Each Region will have a Regional Service constituting (a) offi-
cers and public servants of the Region and (b) such other officers and
public servants who may be seconded to the Region. Each Region will
have a Regional Public Service Commission for recruitment and for
exercising disciplinary powers relating to the members of the Region-
al Service.
(9) The armed forces of Sri Lanka will reflect the national ethnic
composition. In the Northern and Eastern Provinces the police force
for internal security will also reflect the ethnic composition of these
Regions.
(10) A Port Authority under the Central Government will be set
up for administering the Trincomalee Port and Harbour. The area
that will come under the Port Authority as well as the powers to be
assigned to it will be further discussed.
(11) A national policy on land settlement and the basis on which
the government will undertake land colonization will have to be
worked out. All settlement schemes will be based on ethnic propor-
tion so as not to alter the demographic balance subject to agreements
being reached on major projects.
(12) The Constitution and other laws dealing with the official lan-
guage Sinhala and the national language Tamil be accepted and
implemented as well as similar laws dealing with the National Flag
and Anthem.
(13) The Conference should appoint a committee to work out con-
stitutional and legal changes that may be necessary to implement
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these decisions. The Government will provide its secretariat and nec-
essary legal offices.
(14) The consensus of opinion of the All-Party Conference will
itself be considered by the United National Party Executive Commit-
tee and presumably by the executive body of the other parties as well
before being placed before Parliament for legislative action.
Source: Tamtl Times, October 1984, p. 5.
APPENDIX V
President's Proposals to All-Party
Conference
The President's Proposals
The following are the proposals presented by the Sri Lankan Presi-
dent Mr.]. R. Jayewardene, to the All-Party Conference:
"System of Government: The basic unit of government to be the
pradesheeya mandalaya covering an assistant government's area. The
actual composition of its members will have to be decided.
"The next units to be urban councils and municipal councils as at
present constituted.
"The third unit should be district councils and their composition
arid methods of elections and powers and functions will have to be
redefined. The area of operation to be the present districts.
"The district councils will be directly elected by the people of the
districts. The chairman and the vice-chairman would be the first and
second names in the list of the party receiving the highest vote, if
elections were to be held on the basis ofproportional representation.
"Inter-district co-ordination and collaboration: Inter-district co-
ordination to be permitted in defined spheres of activity. District
councils must vote for this co-ordination. If they wish to have a refer-
endum in the district a referendum should be held.
"If units are constituted for this purpose they should include the
chairman and the vice-chairman of each district council and a limited
number of additional representatives elected by each district council.
The relationship between such institutions and the district councils
from which they are constituted has to be worked out.
"Second Chamber: There are several precedents where the instru-
ment of a second chamber has been successfully employed to ensure a
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more equitable exercise of political power by all members or sectors of
a multi-ethnic society.
"To that extent, if any proposal to establish inter-district collabora-
tion or cooperation is required well-defined spheres of activities may
well be examined, since this proposal offers the possibility of various
combinations of two or more districts for different purposes as well as
establishing co-ordinating bodies for inter-district functional opera-
tions. The chairman and the vice-chairman of each district council
would be ex-officio members of the Second Chamber. Since these
members of the Second Chamber are those who enjoy the confidence
of the majority of the members of the district council or the units of
co-ordination between districts, the Second Chamber would be a res-
ervoir for the purpose of appointing Ministers to function for inter-
district co-ordinating units.
"Ministers who enjoy the support of the majority in either the
inter-district co-ordination units or in a district council could be
appointed by the President and removed also by him. Their func-
tions, duties and obligations have to be discussed. The question of
these Ministers being answerable to the co-ordinating units in the
exercise of their executive functions will have to be studied and a
procedure for implementing any decisions taken will have to be
worked out.
"Composition of the Second Chamber: With regard to the compo-
sition, the powers and functions of the Second Chamber, consider-
ation should be paid to President's memorandum presented to the
All-Party Conference on the second chamber proposal on July 23rd
1984.
"The Second Chamber may be constitured with adequate repre-
sentation for all major and minor ethnic communities.
"Provisions may be made for the representation of minority com-
munities from districts where there are substantial or significant con-
centrations of such minority communities. The district councils in
respective districts could also elect or nominate such members. Thus
the four ethnic groups on the island, the Sinhala, Sri Lankan Tamils
and Tamils of recent Indian origin and Muslims should be repre-
sented in such a way as to ensure representation which will create a
source of fair participation.
"The two members from each district to be elected at the same
time and as at a general election. The second chamber's term of
office, therefore, coincides with that of the first chamber. When
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there is a dissolution of parliament, it would mean the dissolution of
both chambers. The district will be the constituency.
"Some powers of Second Chamber: There must be a sharing of
powers between the two chambers in regard to the exercise of legisla-
tive power in respect of all proposed legislation affecting fundamen-
tal rights and language rights guaranteed under the Constitution. In
this regard, no proposed legislation should become law unless
approved by the president.
"The Second Chamber may be vested with the implementation of
provisions of Chapter IV, Section 22 of the Constitution dealing with
the national language, Tamil.
"The Second Chamber could also constitute select committees to
inquire into and report on all aspects of ethnic disputes such as those
relating to university admissions, educational facilities, employment
of communities. Land settlement, exercise of language and cultural
rights and development of backward regions would also be consid-
ered. The recommendations of committee 'B' will be considered in
this context.
"The stateless: There was support too for the proposal referred ear-
lier in this report that the stateless (some 90,000 of them) be given
citizenship-vide paragraph 9 (3) of the report.
"Ethnic violence and terrorism: There was acceptance too that the
causes of ethnic violence and all forms of terrorism in all parts of the
country must be eradicated-vide paragraph (4) of the report."
Source: TamtfTimes, October 1984, p. 15.
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Why TULF Rejected President's Proposals
"We are constrained to state that the two Bills before this confer-
ence do not embody the scheme of autonomy which could be
accepted by the Tamil people or their accredited representatives, the
TULF," said Mr. A. Amirthalingam, the leader of the Tamil United
Liberation Front, in a statement made on behalf of his party after the
All-Party Conference (APC) was formally wound up on 21.12.84.
The following is the full text of the TULF statement:
"In response to an invitation from President Jayewardene dated
December 28, 1983, the TULF agreed to attend the All-Party Confer-
ence summoned for January 10, 1984, on the basis of certain pro-
posals" to enable them to arrive at an acceptable solution to the
present problems facing the Tamil community in Sri Lanka.
When those proposals were abandoned, the TULF would normally
have withdrawn from the conference. But we continued to participate
and pursue the search for an acceptable viable alternative to our
demand for an independent State of Tamil Eelam.
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the late Prime Minister ofIndia, who "offered
her good offices to enable a final solution to be reached" and her
Special Envoy Mr. G. Parthasarathy, played a very big part in per-
suading the TULF to continue the negotiation process.
In view of certain aspersions cast by some people on India's role in
this matter, it behooves me to place this fact on record. India has
been the biggest factor working for a peaceful political solution.
In the very first statement we made at the conference, we indicated
that though we were elected on a mandate to work for a separate
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State, if an acceptable and viable alternative is offered, we were will-
ing to recommend it to our people.
Even in the face of total absence of positive response on the part of
leading Government Members-even when the majority Sinhala
Opposition party avoided the responsibility by walking out-we con-
tinued to participate because of our party's commitment to non-vio-
lence an integral part ofwhich is the path of negotiation.
We indicated that a solution based on a Tamil linguistic region,
consisting of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, granting regional
autonomy to the Tamil nation as continued in the proposals placed
before this conference by the Ceylon Workers Congress, may be one
we could recommend to the Tamil people.
We also said that the regional body should be "empowered to
enact laws and exercise thereto on certain specified listed subjects,
including the maintenance of internal law and order in the region,
the administration of justice, social and economic development, cul-
tural matters and land policy."
A careful study of the provisions of the draft bills placed before the
Conference will convince anyone that they fall far short of the
regional autonomy indicated above.
When we accepted the scheme of District Development Councils
in 1980, it was clearly understood that it was not meant to be an alter-
native to our demand for a separate State.
It was hoped that it may help to solve some of the pressing prob-
lems, like colonization, and ease tensions thereby creating the cli-
mate for a solution to the larger political questions.
The total failure of the Government to work that scheme in the
proper spirit has largely contributed to the present situation. The rep-
etition of the provisions of the same law in the present draft is totally
unacceptable to the Tamil people.
The bills do not embody a proper scheme of devotion or auton-
omy. Devolution to the larger unit should be done by the constitu-
tion and that unit may delegate any functions to the smaller unit.
I am surprised that even these meagre and inadequate provisions
are being opposed by some responsible persons.
We have endeavoured both in the All-Party Conference and in
informal discussions outside to work out a peaceful solution.
Time is tunning out. The Tamil areas are under virtual siege. Nor-
mal life has come to a standstill. Death, arson, rape, and looting,
stalk our areas. Starvation is staring the poor people in the face.
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This is the grim reality of the situation in the Northern and Eastern
Provinces.
We are constrained to state that the two Bills before this conference
do not embody any scheme of autonomy which could be accepted by
the Tamil people, or their accredited representatives, the Tamil
United Liberation Front."
Source: Tamil Times, January 1985.
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expounds the same theme on the view of life. Moreover their most revered god
Murugan, the son of Siva, is an important figure in the pantheon of Sinhalese Bud-
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ing 150,000 Indians between the two countries, with each granting citizenship rights
to 75,000. Therefore, India was to grant citizenship rights to 600,000 Tamils of
Indian origin while Sri Lanka was supposed to absorb the remaining 375,000.
Despite the fact that 600,000 Tamils of Indian origin were entitled to Indian citizen-
ship, only 505,000 opted to apply for such citizenship. Moreover, only 400,000 of
the 505,000 applicants were repatriated to India by the time the pact ended in Octo-
ber 31, 1981. Therefore, the Indian government has yet to grant citizenship rights to
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try,34-35,85-86
Conference on Tamil language and culture,
61
Constitution of 1972: and formation ofTUF,
57; and minority rights, 13, 56. See also
Constitution of Sri Lanka
Constitution of Sri Lanka, 1948,9-11
Crown lands, 88, 91
December 19, 1986, proposals, and Amparai
electoral district, 181
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 10
Devanampiya Tissa, 23
Dharmapala, Anagarika: and Buddhist
Revivalist Movement, 32, 33; and Sinha-
lese nationalism, 33
District Councils: Mrs. Bandaranaike's pro-
posals on, 53; National Government's pro-
posals on, 54-55
District Councils Dtaft Bill of 1968,54-55
District Development Councils (DDCs): com-
position of, 160; functions and powers of,
160-161; funds for, 161-162; and prob-
lems of implementation, 162-164, 216nn.
25,26
District Development Councils Act No.35 of
1980, 66, 160; objectives and drawbacks
of, 66-67, 72, 76
District minister, 160-164
District Quota System, 124
Districts. See Administrative divisions
Donoughmore Commission, 149
Donoughmore Constitution of 1931: and
abolition of communal representation, 34,
85; See also British colonial government
INDEX
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam: as indepen-
dent Dravida State, II, 13; offers support
for Eelam, 65; support for, in plantation
areas, 40
Dravidians, I, 20; and Megalithic culture of
South India and Sri Lanka, 21, 203n. 17.
See also Yakshas
Dry Zone, I, 78-84; development of, in
twentieth century, 117; and economy of
Northern Province, 179; peasant coloniza-
tion in, 88-93, 95-102; physical environ-
ment, 102-103; rice production in, 107-
114; river basin development projects in,
93-95; water resources, 103-107
Durayappah, Alfred, 62
Dutch, 3, 26-28,117,149-150
Dutugemunu, 23-24
Eastern Province, changes to, 170, 174, 176,
179, 181; and militants, 180
Economic blockade of]affna Peninsula, 175-
176, 182
Economic development of Tamil districts,
103-104, 107-113, 137-140
Economic nationalism, 36
Education, regional and ethnic variations in,
122, 123, 124
Eelam: militants endorse concept of, 73;
11JLF calls for establishment of, 13, 15, 57,
60-61. See also Suntharalingam
Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF), 75-
76
Eelam People's Revolutionary Ftont (EPRLF):
and elimination of, in]affna Peninsula,
172; organization and tactics of, 74; and
Thimpu talks, 75
Eelam Revolutionary Organization ofStu-
dents (EROS): and killing of Buddhist
monks, 183; organization and tactics of,
74-75
Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna: and Bandara-
naike-Chelvanayakam Pact, 50; and Bud-
dhist Commission Report, 45; and use of
Tamil, 47; and SLFP, 44; and Tamil lan-
guage Regulations of 1966, 53
Elahera scheme, 94
Elara, 24
Electoral districts, and basis of representation,
146
Elephant Pass, 131
Emergency Regulations 15a of]uly 3, 1983,
68
Employees Provident Fund, 135
Employment of Tamils: in government ser-
vice, 128-130; in private sector, 134-137;
in public sector, 130-134, 139
English language, and Tamils, 4-5, 28, 85,
117-119
English Methodist Church, 117
Environmental factors: and agriculture in
Tamil districts, 102-114, 116; and collapse
of ancient Sinhalese civilization, 25, 81-
84; and employment opportunities in
Tamil districts, 4, 46, 85, 117
Ethnic composition, 4-7; of Legislative Coun-
cil, 8, 30
Ethnically mixed regions: and recurrence of
violence, 180; in Trincomalee, 178
Ethnic violence. See Anti-Tamil riots
Federal Party (Th,amil Arasu), 12; and anti-
Tamil disturbances of 1957, 50; and call for
economic independence, 152; formation
of, 39-40; and Gal Oya anti-Tamil riots,
48; and house detention, 51; and national
government, 53; proscribed by coalition
government, 52; receives mandate from
people, 44; and Sinhalese mob violence,
48; and Tamil linguistic state, 150; and
Tamil as national language , 153; threatens
mass civil disobedience campaign, 49
Federal system of government (Federalism):
educating Sinhalese masses about, 152;
rationalefor, 48-49, 115; "Sinhala only"
under, 151; as solution to problems of
multilinguistic societies, 150; and Tamil
demands, 77,165
Fifty-fifty scheme ("50-50"),9,35-38
Foreign aid allocations, and timing of mili-
tary operations, 170, 172, 173
Free Trade Zone, 134, 139
Galle District, 135
Gal Oya colonization scheme: and first anti-
Tamil riot, 48, 88; settling Sinhalese peas-
ants in, 91-92; sugar cane plantation and
factory at, 131. See also Amparai electoral
district
Gampaha District, 122
Gandhi, Indira, 71, 106n. 68
General Certificate ofEducation Advanced
Level, 119, 122, 124-126, 128
General Certificate ofEducation Ordinary
Level, 58, 122, 128
Genocide, 169, 183
Gerrymandering, 143-144, 146
Giritala scheme, 94
Gomarankadawala AGA Division, 146, 168,
178
Government in British colonial times. See
British colonial government
Government of Sri Lanka. See British-style
parliamentary system ofgovernment
Government's counterproposals of April
1986,170
Government's military offensive: and cease-
228
fire of April 1987, 182; of March 1986, 77,
169; of May-June 1986, 170-171; ofJanu-
ary 1987,182; of May-June 1987, 182-
184
Government proposals: and all-party confer-
ence ofJanuary 1984, 70-71, 164-165; of
December 19.1986, 181-182; and Political
Parties Conference ofJune 1986, 173, 180-
181; and SAARC Conference of November
1986,174
Goyigama caste: and election of Ramanathan
to Legislative Council, 30; and support for
non-Tamil candidates, 33, 37. See also
Karava caste
Goyigama arrivistes, 37
Grapes, production of, 179
Green Revolution, and rice production, 108-
109
Guaranteed price schemes, 137
Gunboats, 167, 170, 182
Gurunagar camp, 74
Hambantota District, 90; and the IRDP, 158-
159; rainfall distribution of, 103; and Uda
Walawe project, 94
Helicopter gunships, 167
High School Certificate, 122
Hindu temples, 78
Holocaust. See Anti-Tamil riots of 1983
House of Representatives, changes in number
of members in, 146-148. See also Consti-
tution of Sri Lanka
Human rights violations, 208, 209n. 41
Hurulu Plata North Division, 146
Huruluweva Tank, 105
India: and accusation of genocide, 183; and
bombing of Tamil areas, 77; and cease-fire
of 1985,75; and commitment to nego-
tiated settlement, 77; and delivery of relief
supplies, 183-185; Eelam concept rejected
by, 177; and impact on Sri Lanka's history,
1; as mediator, 70-71,172; militarysolu-
tion rejected by, 184; PPC proposals
backed by, 173
Indian and Pakistani Residents (Citizenship)
Act No.3 of 1949, 39
Indian Constitution, 180
Indian National Congress, 34-35
Indian Red Cross, 183-185
Indian Tamils, of Sri Lanka: and attacks by
Sinhalese mobs, 67; and Bandaranaike-
Gandhi agreement of 1974, 206n. 68; citi-
zenship and voting rights of, 11, 39, 115;
educational opportunities for, 123, 125;
representation of, 148; settlements and
employment of, 28; Sinhalese attitude
toward, 28-29, 39-40; and Sri Lankan gov-
INDEX
ernment-Indian government agreement of
1986, 207n. 68; and Sri Lankan Tamils, 28,
204n. 38; and Srimavo-Shastri Pact of
1964, 206n. 68; and State Council, 36; and
support for EROS and EPRLF, 74; and sup-
port for left-wing parties, 40
Industries in Sri Lanka, 130-134
Integrated Rural (District) Development Pro-
gram (IRDP), 157; and district budgets.
158-160
International community, pressure from, 77,
169
International Monetary Fund, 161, 163-164
Internecine warfare, and Tamil militant
movement, 74, 76, 171
Iranamadu colony, 90
Irrigation: ancient Sinhalese projects, 78; and
colonization schemes, 88-95; department
of, 81; development of, in Dry Zone, 79-
80; in Tamil districts, 103-113
Jaffna District: foreign aid in, from 1977-
1982,159-160; and funding for DDCs,
164; industries and industrial development
in, 130-131, 133, 138, 139-140; irrigation
and peasant resettlement projects in, 107;
population density in, 95,108,117; prob-
lems offarming in, 137-138; and public-
sector employment, 135-137; rice produc-
tion in, 108-114; sugar cane factory for,
133; unemployment and landlessness in,
90, 100-101, 116, 133, 213n. 1
JaffnaFort, 171, 182
Jaffna Hospital, 170, 182
Jaffna kingdom, 3, 25-28, 84, 204n. 34
Jaffna Peninsula, 25; arrest ofTamil youths
in, 60; economic blockade of, 175-176;
effect ofopen economic policy in, 137-
138; English education and church in,
117-118; exports from, 134; and govern-
ment's military offensives, 169. 170-171;
as an independent region in 1986, 182;
longest dry season in, 103; population den-
sityin, 117. 213n. 2; postal system for, 52;
and Tamil militant groups, 68,74, 171,
172; violence in, 62, 65, 66-67; and water
project, 159; water resources and popula-
tionin, 80-84,102,116. See alsoJaffna
District
Jatika Sevaka Sangamaya, and the anti-Tamil
riot of 1983,69
Jayewardene,). R., 41; and all-party confer-
ence ofJanuary 1984, 70-72. 164-165;
implements DDCs Act, 67; and Political
Parties Conference of 1986, 173; and Presi-
dential Commission, 65; and riots of 1983,
69; and separate provinces in Eastern Prov-
ince, 174. See also United National Party
INDEX
Kalutata District, 122, 135
Kandy District, 135
Kandyan kingdom, 26-27
Kandyan Sinhalese, 28,30,39-40,85,122-
123
Kankesanthurai: cement factory at, 130, 133;
and development of harbor, 58, 134, 139;
fishing industry, 140; and government
troops, 184
Kantalai AGA division, 146, 168; and North
Central Province, 178
Kantalai colonization scheme: and selection
ofSinhalese settlers, 91; and sugar cane
factory, 92, 130
Kantalai Tank, 88, 91, 93
Karainagar: and fishing industries, 140; naval
base at, attacked by EPRLF, 74
Karava caste, 30
Kaudulla scheme, 94
Kerala,27
Kotelawala, SirJohn: and Tamil also as offi-
ciallanguage, 43; and UNP government,
42. See also United National Party
Kotte, kingdom of, 26
Kurunegala District, 80, 135, 158-159
Land Development Department, 88
Land Development Ordinance of 1935,36
Legislative Council: of 1833, 30; of 1912, 30;
of 1921, 31. See also British colonial gov-
ernment
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 13,
62-63; and civil administration ofJaffna
Peninsula, 171, 182; and issue of automo-
bile license plates, 175-176; andJaffna
offensive of May-June 1987, 182-184; and
killing of Buddhist monks inJune 1987,
183; and other Tamil militant groups, 74-
75,170,171,172; organization and tactics
of, 68, 73-75; and relations with govern-
ment, 64, 174, 175
Madura, South India, 20; Dravidian dynasty
of,27
Magha of Kalinga: and fall ofPolonnaruwa,
25; and founding ofJaffna kingdom, 26
Mahabharata, 21
Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, 33; formation
of, 44; government of, 45-47
Maha season, 83, 108-112
Mahavamsa: and Dutugemunu-Elara con-
flict, 24-25; and origin ofSinhalese society,
19-22; and rise of Sinhala nationalism in
1950s, 43; and spread of Buddhism, 22-23
Mahaweli Ganga Basin: and accelerated
development program, 93, 105; and
ancient settlements, 78, 83
Mahaweli Ganga Diversion Project, 94-95;
designed to benefit Sinhalese districts,
105-107,212n.38
Malaria, and decline of ancient Sinhalese civi-
lization, 25, 80, 84
Malaysia, Tamil emigration to, 119
Mannar District, 90, 95; and distribution of
rainfall, 103, 108; and irrigated agricul-
ture, 109, 135; population changes in,
143; Tamils brutalized in, 169
Mannar island, 78, 82, 105
Maritime provinces. See Administrative divi-
sions
Marxist parries, and Sri Lanka Freedom Parry,
44,56
Matale District, and IRDP, 159
Matara District, 122; and IRDP, 158-159
Megalithic culture, in norrhwest Sri Lanka,
78. See also Dravidians
Metamorphic rocks, and water-holding capac-
ity in Dry Zone, 102
Meteorological drought, and Tamil areas, 103
Methodist Church, 117
Mettananda,1. H., 47
Mettegama, textile industries in, 133
Militant hideouts, bombing of, 77
Militants. See Tamil militants
Military: buildup, 167; solution to ethnic
problem, 77, 169
Minneriya, 94, 133
Moneragala District, 94, 112, 181
Moors. See Ethnic composition
Morawewa AGA division, 146, 168; and
Norrh Central Province, 178
Mount Pedro, 74
Mullaitivu District: population changes in,
95,108,135; Tamils in, 169
Murugan, and Valli. See Sinhalese-Tamil eth-
nic differences .
Muslim majority province, 177, 179
Muslims. See Ethnic composition
Myliddy: fishing porr of, 140; shelling of,
182
Nachchaduwa Tank, 105
Nagas, 21,78
National Assembly. See Constitution of Sri
Lanka
National language, Tamil as a, 51,64,153
Northern Province, 180; lack ofwater
resources, 103-104; and reliance on other
provinces for rice, 113, 179
Nuwara Eliya, and IRDP, 158-159
Nuwaragam Plata Norrh division, 146
Nuwarakalawiya, 80, 83
Oberai hotel, bombing of, 74
Official Language Act No. 33 of 1956,45
Open economic policy, 137-138, 179
Padawiya: peasant colony of, 91; scheme, 94;
Tank, 93,105; and Vavuniya, 146
Pakistan, 167
Palali, 172, 183
Pali Chronicles, 19, 23-24, 78
Pallavas, 24
Pandus, and Pandyans of South India, 20, 24
Pandu Vasudeva, 20
Pan-Sinhalese ministry: and discrimination
against Tamils, 36; formation of, 35
Papadakis formula, 103
Parakramabahu I, 25
Parakramabahu VI, 204n. 34
Parakrama Samudra, 92
Paranthan: chemical factory at, 130; and fer-
tilizer production, 139; peasant colony of,
91
Parliamentary Elections (Amendment) Act
No. 48 of 1949,39
Peasant colonization, 12, 40, 48; and Annex-
ure C proposals, 71, 72; and Banadara-
naike-Chelvanayakam Pact, 49,51; and
boundaries of Eastern Province, 179; and
federal system ofgovernment, 151; fight-
ing in, 168; policy, purpose, and nature of,
88-93; and Senanayake-Chelvanayakam
Pact, 55, 58,60,153-154; and Sinhalese,
95-102, 107-108, 140; and lamils, 141-
143, 153
Pedro Bank, 140
People's Liberation Front, 183
People's Liberation Organization ofTamil
Eelam (PLOTE): organization and tactics
of, 73-75; withdrawal from Northern Prov-
ince, 172
Point Pedro: fishing port of, 140; and mili-
tary occupation of, 182; and water project,
159
Political Parties Conference of]une 25,1986
(PPC): government proposals made at,
174, 180-181; SLFP boycott of, 173
Polonnaruwa, 25, 50, 84
Polonnaruwa District, 80, 90-93, 102; and
population density, 108; and rice produc-
tion, 108-113
Ponnambalam, G. G.: approves legislation
denying rights to Indian Tamils, 39;
excluded from board of ministers, 36;
excluded from Kotelawala's cabinet, 42;
and "50-50" scheme, 37-38; forms All-
Ceylon Tamil Congress, 37; joins UNP, 38;
and major industries in Tamil areas, 131
Portuguese, 26, 28, 84; and Catholic schools,
117,149-150
Presidential government, 10-11
Press, and anti-Tamil propaganda, 183
Prevention of Terrorism Act No. 48, 65,177,
178
INDEX
Protestants, 11
Provinces. See Administrative divisions
Provincial councils: and Donoughmore Com-
mission, 149; government proposals for,
170,174,180-181
Puttalam, 26, 81
Puttalam District, 133; and IRDP, 159
Rajarata, 25-26, 90. See also Sinhalese king-
dom
Rajava/iya, 25
Ramanathan, SirPonnampalam, 30, 31, 32
Ramayana, 21
Rameswaram, port of, 183
Referendum of 1982,68
Refugees: in Anuradhapura District, 169;
and anti-Tamil riots of 1958,50; and anti-
Tamil riots of 1977,69; and anti-Tamil riots
of19S3, 76; homes and jobs for, 179; prob-
lems of, 178; Sinhalese, 168
Regional Councils: and Annexure C pro-
posals, 71-72, 87; and Bandaranaike-
Chelvanayakam Pact, 49,58,66, 153-155
Relief supplies to]affna. See India
Report ofthe Presidential Commission of
Inquiry, 1977, 63
Rice: district-wide production of, 108-113;
production of, in ancient times, 80; as sta-
pie food, 4
River basins: and development projects, 92,
93-95; Dry Zone water discharge in, 83,
104-107
Sabragamuwa Province, 28
Saivites, 20
Sakka,23
Sangha. See Buddhism
Sasana. See Buddhism
Security forces (including police), and terror-
ism, 68; and violence against Tamils, 60,
61,62,68-69,77,168,169
Senanayake, D. S, 36; as an advocate of Sri
Lankan nationalism, 41; and first Sri
Lankan government, 38-40
Senanayake, Dudley: and National Govern-
ment, 53-55; and UNP government, 42.
See also District Councils Draft Bill of
1968; Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact;
Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regu-
lations of 1966
Senanayake-Chelvanayakam Pact, 12,53-56,
155
Senate. See Constitution of Sri Lanka
Seruwila AGA division, 146, 168; and redis-
tribution of Sinhalese population, 178
Seruwila Electoral District, 146
Sinhala Maha Sabha, 33. See also Bandara-
naike, S. W. R. D.
INDEX
"Sinhala only": impact on Tamils, 46-47,
52-53; instructions for Thmil children, 116,
127-128; provisions of, 44-45; significance
to Sinhala-Buddhists, 47-48, 86
Sinhalese: attitude toward Indian Tamils, 28;
attitude t()ward Sri Lankan Tamils, 29; as
defenders ofSinhalese-Buddhist society,
21-25; and group identity, 1,43; as otigi-
nal settlers ofSri Lanka, 19-23; representa-
tion in legislature, 40, 148. See a/so Peas-
ant colonization
Sinhalese districts: and educational levels,
122; length of dry season in, 103; rice pro-
duction in, 107-114; water resources and
irrigated agriculture in, 104-107
Sinhalese extremists: attitude toward Tamil
demands, 2, 12, 15,26; and Bandaranaike-'
Chelvanayakam Pact. 49-50, 150; and col-
onization ofTamil districts, 81; and con-
cept of regional councils, 154-155; and
concept of Tamil traditional homeland, 80;
and economic development of Tamil dis-
tricts, 58; and objection to federal state,
48, 151-152; and Tamil grievances, 177;
and Tamil Language (Special Provisions)
Regulation of 1966, 53-54; and use of
Tamil language, 47
Sinhalese home guards, 168, 169
Sinhalese kingdom, collapse of, 25, 80-84
Sinhalese-majority province, 176
Sinhalese nationalism, 7, 23-24, 28-30, 32-
33,36-37,41,43~44,85
Sinhalese-Tamil ethnic differences, 1; and
intergroup prejudices, 85-86, 176; and
rights and privileges, 2-3; and Sinhalese
identity, 19.22-23; and Tamil identity, 19
Soil moisture, 203
Soulbury Commission, 37, 85,146. Suo/so
Constitution of Sri Lanka
South Asian Association for Regional Cooper-
ation Conference, 174
South India, training camps in, 70, 167
Squatters, Sinhalese, 93
Sri Lanka Freedom Parry: and all-parry con-
ference, 72; and boycott of Political Parries
Conference, 173; and Presidential Com-
mission, 66; and UNP, 182. See a/so Ban-
daranaike, S. W. R. D.; Bandaranaike,
Srimavo
Srimavo-Shastri Pact. See Indian Tamils
Standardization scheme, 58-59, 123-124, 127
State of emergency:)affna District, 65
Suntharalingam, c., 11, 51, 208n. 24
Surface-to-air missiles, and militants, 77,
167, 184
Tamankaduwa, 80, 83-84
Tamil Congress, 36-40, 53
Tamil districts: and agriculture, 103, 108-
112; development projects in, 159; and
electoral districts, 146; ethnic composition
in, 141-143; major industries in, 130-133;
schooling and literacy in, 122; water
resources in, 104-107
Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization, 74-75,
171
Tamil Federal Parry. See Federal Parry
Tamil (traditional) homeland, 2, 3, 27, 47-
48,50,84-85; federal system for preserv-
ing, 151; and regional councils, 153;
Sinhalese rejection of, 86-87
Tamil kingdom, 80; and federal system of
government, 151-152; and regional coun-
cils, 155
Tamil Kingdoms of South India, 2, 22-26.
See a/so Cholas
Tamil Language (Special Provision) Act No.
28 of1958, 50-51,155
Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Regula-
tionsof1966, 53-56, 87,155
Tamillinguistic state, 169, 174, 177, 178,
179-180,181
'Thmil militant movement: and India, 177;
intergroup differences within, 68, 73-75;
origin of, 57-60; role of caste and Marxist
ideology in 209n. 50; and violence, 61, 68
Tamil militants, 14; and acts of violence
against government, 61, 62, 64, 66, 68-69,
184-185, 210n. 53; and retaliatory attacks
on Sinhalese civilians, 75,168,170,172-
173, 182, 183; and government proposals,
173-175
Tamil ministers and UNP government, 58
Tamil Nadu, 3, 13,.27; and people of, 70, 84
Tamil nationalism, 44, 46, 86
Tamil rulers, as patrons of Buddhism, 21 .
Tamil-speaking people, in Eastern Province,
179
Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF): and
Appapillai Amirrhalingam, 61; and Dis-
trict Development Councils, 66, 161-164;
and Eelam, 13, 57-59,62, 157; and failure
of Thimphu talks, 75-76; formation, 12-
13, 57; and Indian supporr for Tamil cause,
63,65; manifesto of 1976,156-157; and
Political Parries Conference, 173-174; pop-
ular supporr for, 77; proposals of 1986,
170; proscribed in 1983, 69-70; and rejec-
tion ofgovernment proposals, 72, 165; and
S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, 60-61
Tamil Youth Congress, 34-35
Tamils, Sri Lankan: as distinct nationality, 27,
76; and education, 117-118; employment,
128-130,131-133,135,136-137; and lan-
guage, 46-48,58, 116, 119, 150, 151; ori-
gin of settlements, 3, 21-22; relations with
government; 162, 177-178, 184; and uni-
versityadmissions, 120-127
Tanks and irrigated agriculture, 78, 81-84;
resroration of, 85
Thamil Arasu. See Federal Patty
Thampalagamam, 168, 178
Thimphu talks, 73, 75-76, 167
Tobacco, 137, 179
Trincomalee, 4, 168, 169; coastal stretch of,
population in nineteenth century, 83; and
Tamils of, 26, 78
Trincomalee District, 84, 90-92; and control
of, 179; and electoral district, 146; employ-
ment in manufacturing, 135; ethnic com-
position of, 141-143; and Pima Flour mill,
134; population changes in, 97, 100, 102;
and Sinhalese villages in, 178
Uda Walawe River Basin Project, 91, 93-94
United Front Government: adopts 1972 Con-
stitution, 56; and Tamils, 57, 58-59,60-
61, 120, 155-156
United National Patty (UNP) and govern-
ment, fitst national government, 39, 40;
and District Council bill, 54-56; and Fed-
eral Patty, 51; and IRDP, 157-160; and lan-
guage, 43, 44,53-54,64; and open eco-
nomic policy, 137-138; and SLFP, 182; and
state ofemergeney, 65, 68; and Tamils, 67,
69; and TULF, 69
United Nations, and bombing of]affna,
169
United States of America, and]affna Penin-
sula, 159
Universal suffrage. See Donoughmore consti-
tution
University admissions policy: and District
Quota System, 124; and lower qualifying
marks for Sinhalese students, 120-122; and
negative impact on Tamils, 58-59,64,
125-127; prior to 1970s, 119; and stan-
dardization scheme, 123-124, 127
University of Ceylon: in Colombo, 126; in
]affna Oaffna Campus), 126-127; in Pera-
deniya, 120, 126
INDEX
Valaichchenai, paper factory at, 130
Valveddithurai, shelling of, 182
Veddhas, 19,20,21,202n. 10
Valigamam Notth AGA division, 183, 184
Vanni, 26, 82, 83; government policy towatd
development of, 90
Vavuniya District, 4, 91; attempt to increase
size of, 144-146; changes in ethnic compo-
sition of, 141-143; and employment in
manufacturing, 135; and IRDP, 159; popu-
lation changes in, 95-96,100-101,105,
108; Tamil civilians brutalized and
rendered homeless in, 169
Veyangoda, textile industries in, 133
Vijaya, and propagation of the Sinhalese race,
19-20
Vijaybahu 1,25
Vikrama, Rajasinha, of Kandyan kingdom,
27
Village Expansion Scheme, peasant coloniza-
tion scheme compared with, 91, 92-93, 97,
102
Village Development Ordinance of 1937, and
Indian Tamils, 36
Viplavakari Lanka Sama Party, 44
Walawe Ganga, and Uda Walawe project, 94,
133
Water deficit, and agriculture in Tamil areas,
103, 107
Water resources, and]affna Peninsula, 80-84,
102; and Dry Zone, 104-107
Welikade Prison, massacre, 64, 68
Wellawatte spinning mill, 139
Wet Zone, 1,4; economic conditions in, 118;
education in, 122; population, 80, 85, 90,
93-94, 102, 108
World Bank: and DDCs, 161; and develop-
ment of Kankesanthurai Harbor, 134; and
development projects, 157-158; and]affna
District, 133
Yakshas, 20; as ancestors ofpresent-day
Tamils, 21-22, 78, 202n. 13
Yala season, 108-112
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